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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The goal of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of the transmission
of central bank policy in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of
2007/2008, focussing on the eects on bank lending in particular. As a consequence
of the crisis, central banks had to adjust the way they conduct monetary policy
considerably, as previous relations between monetary policy, and its inuence on
ination and economic activity have been substantially dierent than what had
been observed before the Financial Crisis. Starting with the turmoil on the US
subprime market, negative repercussions spread around the world, and presented
many central banks with new, unfamiliar and dicult problems.
During the Great Moderation era from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, a
consensus in the macroeconomic literature emerged that the time of deep and
long recessions had been overcome. Central banks through their policy actions
seemingly had stabilised the economy on a steady and sustainable growth path,
with output being near potential. Low and stable ination rates as well as fewer
and weaker recessions seemed to be indicators for this (see for example Bernanke
(2004), or Blanchard et al. (2013)).
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Since the 1980s, central banks in almost all advanced economies changed
their policy objectives to provide the economy with low and stable ination,
primarily through targeting ination directly. It was widely assumed that this
stabilisation alone would be enough to guarantee decent economic growth with
fewer uctuations.
Typically, central banks today steer the economy by manipulating the short-
term policy rate, at which depository institutions can renance themselves at the
central bank. These rates act as a guideline for nancial market participants, on
which they orientate their own interest rates. An increase or a decrease of these
policy rates acts as a drag or stimulus for the economy, and thus subsequently
aects ination.
The impact of monetary policy typically visible before the GFC has been put
into question due to the changing landscape in light of the turmoil in nancial
markets (see e.g. Boivin et al. (2010)). Because of policy rates approaching the
zero lower bound (ZLB), standard policy measures of central banks have not been
able to impose their usual eects on the business cycle. Due to this, monetary
policy transmission through the interest rate channel could not be ensured to the
same extent as before the crisis.
By resorting to measures which are typically not in the toolkit of central banks
(at least not in such large dimensions), like the provision of additional liquidity,
targeted asset purchases, and/or enhanced communication policies, central banks
expected to generate further stimuli on the economy, to counter the negative
impacts of the Financial Crisis. The main goal of these unconventional monetary
policies (UMP) was to stabilise nancial markets in the short run, and to set
additional impulses in the medium term, to revive bank lending and subsequently
economic growth (see e.g. Trichet (2009)).
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The dissertation at hand has the objective to provide a better understanding
of the eects of central bank policies on the economy, and especially on credit
creation of commercial banks, on the background of the broadened measures
introduced after the Financial Crisis. The focus is specically on why and how
the eects of central bank measures in relation to bank lending have changed.
Throughout the thesis, two important improvements to the existing literature
are implemented. To answer the rst question of why central banks had to engage
in UMPs, an alternative explanation for the reasons of the secular fall in interest
rate levels for the last 40 years throughout advanced economies is given. The
existing literature does not adequately consider the rationale that interest has to
be earned rst, before it can be distributed. But, as the amount of debt-to-GDP
has risen during this timespan, the ability to provide interest has receded, which
puts a pressure on interest payments, and thus interest rate levels.
To answer the second question of how the transmission mechanism towards
bank lending has changed, a critique of the use of credit variables in empirical
estimations is brought forward. Typical empirical estimations of the eects of
monetary policy on bank lending take the outstanding stock of credit as the
relevant credit variable. As the change in the stock is not only consisting of new
lending, but also of repayments, write-downs, revaluations and securitisation, the
impact of monetary policy on credit creation might be over- or underestimated in
typical empirical models.
For this analysis, Chapter 1 lays the foundation by giving a short outline
of the transmission of monetary policy, focussing particularly on the changing
landscape after the Financial Crisis and its eects through the banking system
on credit creation. As in the whole thesis, a special emphasis lies on the Euro
area and the monetary policy transmission of the European Central Bank (ECB)
towards bank lending.
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1.2 Monetary Policy Transmission
The monetary transmission mechanism stands in the centre of the analysis of the
eects of monetary policy on the economy. Traditionally, monetary transmission
has been categorised into two types. First, the classical money view assumes that
central banks aect short-term nominal market interest rates through manipula-
tions of the policy rate. Given frictionless nancial markets, the assumption here
is that such changes feed through to a broader range of nancial market interest
rates, and thus aect aggregate spending directly. The second type, the credit
view, bases its foundations on the eects due to market imperfections mainly
in credit markets. These imperfections are assumed to amplify the eects as
postulated in the money view.
1.2.1 The Money View
The money view of monetary policy transmission explains the eects of monetary
policy decisions on economic activity through changes in interest rates, which feed
through to the real economy through the liability side of bank balance sheets (see
Boivin et al. (2010), Mishkin (1996), Woodford (2003) for the following).
Given the monopoly supply of base money, central banks can control the
interest rate on its renancing operations, as the banking system needs to equip
itself with enough base money to meet public demand for currency, to meet reserve
requirements and to clear interbank balances. By altering the renancing rate,
central banks can thus control the funding costs of liquidity demand for banks,
i.e. the level of money market rates. Banks then pass on these costs on to their
customers, by changing interest rates demanded on short-term loans and oered
on deposits. This channel is broadly known as the interest rate channel.
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Furthermore, by aecting short-term nominal interest rates through manipu-
lation of the level of interest, central banks can also inuence long-term rates to a
certain degree, since long-term rates are linked to future short-term rates. Long-
term real rates reect the average of expected future short-term interest rates|the
so-called expectation hypothesis of the term structure. Since consumption and
investment decisions are interest elastic (albeit to dierent degrees), changes in the
policy rate therefore aect these decisions and subsequently aggregate spending.
Additionally, the money view postulates further channels, through which
policy rate decisions aect the economy. By lowering interest rates, returns on
domestic assets become relatively more unattractive in relation to foreign assets.
As a result, the domestic currency depreciates, which makes domestic goods
cheaper and leads to a rise in exports, and consequently aggregate spending. This
mechanism is referred to as the exchange rate channel.
Despite aecting interest rates, monetary policy can also aect valuations
of rms through the so called Tobin's q (see Tobin (1969)). This q is dened
as the market value of a company divided by its replacement cost of capital. If
the q is high, it is attractive to nance investments by issuing new equity, as
the replacement cost of capital is relatively cheap. Investment spending will
then in turn rise, and thus increase aggregate spending. Such a rise in rm
valuations might increase spending by private individuals through higher net
worth of the assets. This further wealth mechanism has been brought forward by
Modigliani (1971).
1.2.2 The Credit View
More important for the scope of this thesis are the eects of monetary policy
postulated by the credit view. This view has been brought forward by the fact
that observed large real economic eects cannot be explained by the relatively
18
small impulses of monetary policy working through the aforementioned channels
towards changes in long-term interest rates (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995),
or Mishkin (1995)). These strong eects are seen to be generated by credit market
imperfections, like asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (see Gertler
and Gilchrist (1993)).1
The credit view states that monetary policy has eects on credit supply and
demand, by aecting balance sheets of lenders and borrowers, and thus enhancing
the traditional interest rate channel. Two distinct bank based channels, which
inuence the amount of bank lending, have been brought forward in the literature.
The rst one is the balance sheet channel, which works through the balance
sheets of non-nancial borrowers (rms and households). Because of information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, internal funding is an imperfect
substitute to external funding. This dierence, the external nance premium,
drives a wedge between the expected return of lenders and costs faced by borrowers
(see Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). It furthermore aects the values of assets
held by rms and households which can be posted as collateral, and subsequently
the net worth of non-nancial borrowers. As lending conditions depend on risk
and the net worth of borrowers, the ability to obtain credit can thus be aected.
According to this view, monetary policy changes the external nance premium in
the same direction. A hike in the policy rate thus not only raises risk-free interest
rates through the interest rate channel, it also increases the cost of external funds
for borrowers (the nancial accelerator ; see Bernanke et al. (1999)). This increase
in the relative cost of capital reduces lending and investment, and thus economic
activity.
1 Gertler and Karadi (2015) provide a recent empirical verication of the importance of such
credit market frictions towards the transmission of monetary policy shocks.
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The second credit channel is the bank lending channel. By inuencing short-
term interest rates, loan supply of depository institutions is also shifted, through
the external nance premium of these lenders (see Bernanke (2007), or Bernanke
and Gertler (1995)). Moreover, an increase in the policy rate worsens the terms
under which banks can renance themselves with central bank reserves, thus
leading banks to create fewer reservable deposits, which have to be replaced by
either shrinking their assets or raising non-reservable liabilities. A reduction in
quantity or rise in the price of reserves thus impairs the ability of banks to provide
loans. This impacts aggregate spending, if potential borrowers are not able to
replace bank loans with other sources of nancing.
1.3 Transmission Mechanisms after the Global
Financial Crisis
The Financial Crisis led to a rethinking about the workings of these monetary
transmission mechanisms. Since the crisis began, previous regularities about
the relation between monetary policy and the real economy have been put into
question. While on the one hand ination did not fall as much as would be
expected by the severity of the crisis, monetary policy on the other hand was also
not able to stimulate the economy to a large extent (see Blanchard et al. (2013)).
To counter the negative repercussions of the Lehman crash and the subsequent
GFC, central banks around the world cut their interest rates aggressively (see
Figure 1.1). This had the eect that policy rates quickly approached the ZLB.
Thus, further stimuli through interest rate policy could not be accomplished. As
an answer to the main policy tool not being available anymore, central banks
broadened their policy measures and engaged in operations which are typically not
in their toolkit. These unconventional monetary policies were aimed at stabilising
20
nancial markets and to provide further monetary policy accommodation. Most
notably, central banks engaged in broadened communication policies, provided
emergency liquidity to nancial institutions and conducted purchases of nancial
assets (see e.g. Borio and Disyatat (2009) for a classication of UMPs). Although
a more in depth discussion about the specic transmission of UMPs will be given
in Chapter 5, the eects of these policies are discussed here briey.
Figure 1.1: Central bank policy rates
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Note: Main renancing rates for the ECB ( ), Bank of England ( ), Bank of Japan ( )
Bank of Canada ( ), Riksbank ( ), and the Eective Federal Funds rate for the Fed ( ).
The vertical line indicates the time of the Lehman crash in 9/2008. Sources: ECB, BoE, BoJ,
BoC, Riksbank, Fred.
In response to the breakdown of well functioning interbank money markets,
central banks provided commercial banks with further liquidity in the form of an
over-allotment with central bank reserves. These emergency liquidity provisions
were intended to reduce market stress and enable a smooth functioning of money
markets (see e.g. Trichet (2009)).
By purchasing nancial assets, central banks aimed to revive nominal spending
through the injection of money into the private sector, which is supposed to increase
spending. Since purchases directly from banks only increase base money, these
operations have been intended to purchase securities from private non-banks. But
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as only depository institutions are able to engage directly in transactions with the
central bank, these purchases have to be funnelled through the banking system.
This in turn increases base money and broad money at the same time. The
increase in broad money should then lead to an increase in asset prices as well as
spending, and thus ultimately raise ination (see e.g. Benford et al. (2009)). By
providing liquidity through enhanced renancing operations and engaging in nal
purchases of securities, central banks expanded their balance sheets signicantly
after the crisis (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Central bank total assets
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Note: Data for the ECB ( ), Fed ( ), Bank of England ( ), Bank of Japan ( ). The
vertical line indicates the time of the Lehman crash in 9/2008. Data has been normalised to 100
in 8/2007. Sources: ECB, Fred, BoE, BoJ.
There is a broad literature pointing out that asset purchases and liquidity
provisions by the central banks were able to lower not only short-term market
rates, but also longer-term interest rates (see e.g. Borio and Zabai (2016), or
Williams (2014) for an overview). But, evidence of these policies also increasing
economic activity and ination is somewhat inconclusive. While most studies
show an increase in output and ination in response to UMPs, the magnitudes
and signicances dier greatly and are quite uncertain (see also Borio and Zabai
(2016) for an overview). Important for the scope of this thesis are the eects of
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UMPs towards bank lending. In this regard, the results are even more uncertain
and inconclusive. Some studies show an increase in bank lending in response to
UMP shocks, others do not nd a signicant impact (see Chapter 5 for a further
discussion).
Furthermore, through enhanced communication policies, central banks aimed
at lowering not only short-term rates, but also longer-term rates. With these
forward guidance policies after the crisis, central banks promised to keep interest
rates lower for a longer period of time, even if policy rules would recommend
otherwise (see e.g. Filardo and Hofmann (2014)). Through lower expected future
interest rates, spending was supposed to be boosted immediately.
1.4 Policies by the European Central Bank after
the Global Financial Crisis
As the focus of this thesis lies primarily on the eectiveness of monetary policy
transmission of the ECB, this subsection gives a short overview of the general
toolkit of the ECB and its additional policy measures after the Financial Crisis.
The European Central Bank aims to aect the level of short-term money
market interest rates to keep ination below, but close to two percent in the
medium term (see ECB (2011c) for the following discussion). Typically, this is
done by restricting the price and/or quantity of renancing operations, in which
depository institutions can renance themselves with central bank reserves. Banks
need those reserves to meet public demand for currency, reserve requirements and
to clear interbank balances. For this, the ECB uses either open market operations
or standing facilities, to manage liquidity conditions in the banking sector. By
setting the rate for the standing facilities (these are the marginal lending and
the deposit facility), the ECB sets a corridor within which the overnight money
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market rate can uctuate. Typically, the ECB will manage the liquidity in a way
that the money market rate will be close to the main renancing rate, which is
typically in the middle of the two standing facility rates.
Starting on the 15th October 2008, the ECB changed its conduct from variable
rate tenders with a pre-announced minimum bid rate to xed rate tenders with
full allotment, to counteract the negative eects that dysfunctional money markets
were exerting on the banking system. This had the consequence that the ECB
provided unlimited reserves at a pre-dened interest rate to the counterparties. As
a result, more reserves than needed for reserve requirements were allotted to the
counterparties and the overnight money market rate dropped down almost to the
deposit facility rate, because of the excess liquidity in the interbank market, thus
providing further stimulus without shifting the main renancing rate. Additionally,
the collateral requirements for these renancing operations were lowered, resulting
in an expansion of the range of eligible securities.
Furthermore, the ECB conducted several unconventional measures, for which
they coined the term enhanced credit support. These policies specically laid its
focus on commercial banks, as they are the primary source of credit in the Euro
area (see ECB (2009b)). These bank based measures were intended to enhance
bank lending above and beyond what would be achievable by interest rate policy
alone (see Trichet (2009)).
The rst operations were a lengthening of the maturities of the ECB's longer-
term renancing operations (LTRO), in addition to the main renancing operations
(MRO), which have a maturity of one week. These operations typically have a
maturity of three months. They were prolonged rst to six months and then even
up to one and three years (see e.g. Rogers et al. (2014) for an overview of the
liquidity operations of the ECB since the crisis). This provision of longer-term
liquidity to the banking system was aimed to meet banks' increasing demand for
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liquidity, and thus resolve mismatches of their funding and investment sides of
their balance sheets.
Additionally to conducting renancing operations, the ECB also engaged
in outright purchases of eligible assets through structural operations. Through
several asset purchase programmes (APPs), the ECB bought private and public
sector securities, to provide the economy with an additional stimulus and thus
bringing ination closer to its target rate.
The transmission mechanisms through which these additional operations are
supposed to aect the economy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, in which
the eects of these on bank lending in the Euro area are estimated.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis contains ve chapters that give an overview of the eects of monetary
policies on bank lending after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008. While
Chapter 1 already built the theoretical foundation of the transmission process of
monetary policy towards bank lending, the following chapters estimate how bank
lending was aected by the GFC and its subsequent monetary policy responses.
Thereby, Chapter 2 attempts to give an explanation as to why we have seen a
secular decline in the general level of interest rates in the majority of advanced
economies over the last 40 years. Only because of this long-lasting decline, which
restricted the central banks' abilities to lower policy rates distinctly after the GFC,
central banks were forced to resort to policies which have not been used widely
before the crisis. The insights of this chapter have been previously published in
Behrendt (2017a).
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There are several explanations in the literature as to why the general level of
interest rates exhibited a secular falling trend, even before the Financial Crisis.
Rachel and Smith (2015), Bean et al. (2015) and the IMF (2014), among others,
provide numerous explanations of the reasons of this decline. However, previous
studies have left out the outstanding amount of credit in an economy, and the
resulting lower ability to distribute interest as a potential explanation. This gap
is closed within Chapter 2.
The main hypothesis of this chapter is the insight that interest payments
have to be earned (supplied) rst, before they can be distributed among the
dierent stakeholders. In the long-run, interest payments can only be sustainably
guaranteed out of the per-period added value. Because of the higher indebtedness
in most economies around the globe in the last four decades, the capacity to make
interest payments out of the generated value has markedly receded. Due to the fact
that income for the other factor income groups|namely prots and dividends out
of economic activity and labour income|have not receded as much as would be
needed to compensate the growing amount of interest claims, the average interest
payment per debt contract, i.e. the average interest rate, must consequently
diminish. This has the implication that as long as economic agents do not live
o their substance, nor redeem interest payments by issuing new debt, and/or
the debt amount in relation to economic output does not shrink, the average
paid out interest per debt contract cannot rise, without the need that other
stakeholders would need to cut back on their claims in the production process.
Central banks are therefore confronted with a certain restriction in their ability to
raise interest rates, without potentially causing new, unwanted negative side eects.
These theoretical insights of Chapter 2 are taken up in the second part of
the dissertation, to answer the question, if and how central banks were able to
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stabilise the economy and provide impulses towards bank lending through their
expanded operations after the Global Financial Crisis. The focus here is on the
inuence of monetary policies on lending activity by commercial banks in the
Euro area.
Thereby, a special interest is on the usage of credit variables in empirical
estimations of the monetary transmission mechanism through the banking system.
The overwhelming majority of the empirical literature analysing questions about
the inuence of central bank policies on bank lending applies the outstanding
amount of credit as the relevant variable. But this variable is only appropriate
with limitations to answer such questions, because the change of the outstanding
stock does not indicate the true amount of newly issued credit. Apart from
incorporating new lending activity, the change in the stock contains several other
factors, namely maturing loans, revaluations, securitisation, and write-os. But,
in the assessment of central bank policies towards credit creation, it is of primary
interest how current and future lending evolves, and not how the amount of
previously issued credit changes.
This part of the thesis gives a critical review of the measurement of bank
lending in the econometric literature; rst from a theoretical point of view in
Chapter 3 and then in two separate empirical estimations. The research questions
there deal with determinants of bank lending supply and demand in Chapter 4,
and the eects of the UMPs on bank lending in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 picks up the above mentioned insight from a theoretical perspective.
It is based on a previously published paper (Behrendt (2016b)). The specic
factors contained in the change of the outstanding stock of credit are analysed as
to which extent central banks can inuence these. The main conclusion there is
that the other factors, except for newly issued credits, are to a large extent out of
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the sphere of inuence of the central bank.
Further, from an empirical point of view there occurs the problem that the
other factors are only partly correlated with newly issued credits. Thus, empirical
estimations would over- or underestimate the eect of monetary policy shocks on
bank lending, if the outstanding stock is applied as the relevant credit variable.
A look at the stylised facts supports the theoretical argumentation. The
correlation between newly issued credits and the change in the outstanding stock
of commercial and industrial loans in the USA for the period between 1998 and
2015 is only 0.30. This implies, that 70% of the change in the stock cannot be
explained by new lending. For the Euro area, the correlation for bank lending to
non-nancial corporations is 0.46 for the period 2003-2015. This loose relation is
becoming even less binding in times of high economic volatility.
There are also problems regarding the timing. Central banks might come to
dierent conclusions on their policy decisions while looking at the change in the
stock of credit. The ECB (2011b) stated in their Monthly Bulletin of June 2011:
"The annual growth rate of MFI loans to the private sector . . . [increased] to 2.6%
in April". Even though the stock grew, new lending to the private sector decreased
at an annual rate of 11.2% in April 2011. This dierence stems from a slowdown
of the fall in new lending, and potentially in lower write-downs and higher upward
revaluations. The focus on the credit stock might, among others, be a reason
that the ECB raised its interest rates in July 2011, as they assessed that there
might be price pressures due to the continued growth in bank lending (see ECB
(2011a)). If the ECB would have looked at the underlying credit creation instead
of the change in the stock, it might have come up with a dierent decision.
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Chapter 4 picks up the insights of Chapter 3. An empirical investigation about
determinants of credit creation is conducted there., while revealing dierences
between empirical estimations applying the outstanding stock of credit and new
lending. The goal of this chapter is to measure the impacts of dierent determining
variables on credit supply and demand. This chapter has been previously published
as Behrendt (2016a).
Dierent empirical time series models, similar to the existing literature, are
therefore considered. The overwhelming majority of the existing literature in this
eld applies the outstanding amount of credit as the dependent variable (see e.g.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (2000), or Kishan und Opiela
(2000)). The empirical estimation on the basis of a simultaneous equations panel
model with instrumental variables (IV) for eight Euro area countries, similar in
their set-up to Carpenter et al. (2014) and Calani et al. (2010), reveals that
there are partly considerable dierences between the determinants in the supply
as well as the demand equation, while applying the two credit variables. This
has far reaching consequences for the determination of credit creation as well as
the assessment of the transmission of central bank policies through the banking
system. However, the specications with the new lending variable can better
represent the underlying theory.
Following on these results, an assessment of the eectiveness of the
unconventional monetary policies of the ECB on credit creation by non-nancial
corporations on the basis of a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR)
is performed in Chapter 5. Peersman (2011) und Gambacorta et al. (2014))
show that the UMPs of the ECB have a signicant positive impact on bank
lending. However, these studies apply the outstanding stock of credit. As shown
in Chapter 3, this variable can only reveal the true amount of new lending to a
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certain degree, what can lead to imprecise results on the question at hand. This
is conrmed in the empirical estimation while using the new lending variable. It
can be shown that there is only a signicant positive reaction of lending to an
unconventional monetary policy shock in the short-run, which dies out fast. The
results of this chapter have been previously published as Behrendt (2017b).
The rst main insight of this thesis is that in regard to bank lending, central
bank policies since the Global Financial Crisis do not exert the same eects as
before the crisis. A major reason for that is seen in high debt-to-GDP ratios, which
might be to a certain extent responsible for the low interest rate environment.
It is argued that through higher indebtedness the ability to distribute interest
has receded, and similarily interest rates, as other stakeholders did not abide
from their share in the production process to compensate claimants on interest
payments suciently.
The second main insight of this thesis is that it is appropriate to use the
amount of newly extended loans instead of the change in the outstanding stock
as the relevant credit variable to explain the inuence of monetary policy on
bank lending. If the outstanding stock (or the change thereof) is applied for
specic questions, estimations could be prone to imprecise results, as the change
in the stock is comprised not only of newly issued credits, but also incorporates
repayments, revaluations, write-os and securitisation activity.
While this dissertation specically lays its focus on the impact of monetary
policy in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and the specic policy
responses in their impact towards bank lending, it deliberately leaves out a
discussion about potential side eects of the additional measures central banks
engaged in since the GFC, like possible consequences for central bank independence,
asset price ination, distributional consequences, or problems of potential exit
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strategies from these unconventional policy measures. Such considerations would
go beyond the scope of this dissertation, as the purpose is specically to empirically
analyse the eects of monetary policy on new credit creation.
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Chapter 2
Low Long-Term Interest Rates -
An Alternative View
The fall in risk free interest rates since the 1980s has mostly been described as
being induced by factors that push down interest rates from the demand side. This
chapter contributes to the literature by adding a view of the supply side, namely
that interest has to be earned rst, before it can be distributed. Consequently,
interest can only sustainably be distributed from the added value in a given period.
But through higher debt ratios today, a smaller amount of added value can be
used to fund interest payments than in the past. In such an environment, average
interest rates can only be held stable, if the nominal amount of interest paid out
is rising, which would then lead to lower income for labour and/or a lower reward
for entrepreneurs in the form of corporate prots and dividends. But labour and
entrepreneurial income did not fall as much as would be needed to compensate
for the much higher amount of interest bearing assets since the 1980s. The only
logical consequence then is a fall in average interest rates. This chapter is based
on insights previously published as Behrendt (2017a).
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2.1 Introduction
For the last four decades the world experienced a substantial decline in risk free
interest rates. Many theories on this secular decline circulate in the literature and
the policy debate. Standard theories about the fall in interest rates explain it by
a drop in the natural risk free interest rate, the so called Wicksellian rate, which
is in line with an economy operating without any inationary or deationary
pressures, i.e. when demand for capital is equalling its supply (Wicksell (1898)).
There are proponents who ascribe this decline to an overhang of savings relative to
investments, the so called Global Savings Glut hypothesis (see Bernanke (2005)),
to a lower investment-demand schedule (see Gordon (2010)), a higher demand for
safe instead for risky assets (see Caballero and Farhi (2013)), reduced growth and
ination outlooks potentially leading towards Secular Stagnation (see Summers
(2014)), lower term premia (see Adrian et al. (2015)), a central bank driven fall
in interest rates, a shift in demographics (see Favero et al. (2013)), or rising
inequality (see Rachel and Smith (2015)). Bean et al. (2015) and the IMF (2014)
give overviews about these numerous explanations.
Most of these theories look onto the demand side of interest rates, but leave
out the supply side, namely that interest has to be earned (supplied) rst, before
it can be distributed to the specic stakeholders. Based on this premise, the
following chapter aims to contribute to these mentioned plentiful theories about
the secular decline of interest rates by adding the additional viewpoint, that
interest can sustainably only be distributed from the added value in the economy
in the long-run.
Due to this constraint, there is a boundary on the amount of interest that
can be distributed. If all added value ows towards interest payments, which
would imply that other stakeholders (labour and company owners) do not receive
any payments for their contribution in the production process, the maximum
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amount of interest to be distributed is given by the added value divided by the
amount of outstanding debt|the GDP-to-debt ratio. But the ability to distribute
interest has receded in the last forty years, since higher debt levels in the economy
have lead to more interest bearing assets in relation to added value. However,
this chapter is not giving a causal interpretation as of how interest rates evolve
over time in such a higher indebted world, but only shows the limits of interest
payments from the above mentioned constraint.
There would be no pressure on interest rates, if the nominal amount of interest
paid out in an economy would grow proportionally with the growth of nancial
claims. But since the added value has to be distributed among the dierent
stakeholders, namely to creditors in the form of interest, to labour in the form
of wage payments, to land owners in the form of rents, and to company owners
and entrepreneurs in the form of prots and dividends, there is no guarantee that
interest remains proportionally the same in a higher nancialised world.
The constraint to distribute interest is binding on a rst stage for entities which
generate economic value, as they can make interest payments without sacricing
current or future payments. These are predominantly non-nancial corporations,
as their share of added value is above 70% for most advanced economies. Due to
the increasing proportion of debt to the underlying added value, from which the
dierent stakeholders have to be paid out, there needs to be a fall in either the
proportion going to labour, a decline in amounts available to company owners,
lower income from land ownership, lower average interest rates distributed to the
creditors, or a combination of all of these. This puts a ceiling on how much these
corporations are sustainably able to pay for taking out loans, without running
the risk of not being able to pay the creditors in full. This notion is based on the
assumption that these corporations are not living o of the substance and/or are
not engaging in some kind of Ponzi -nancing.
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On a second stage, nancial intermediaries face a constraint to pass on interest
by the amounts they receive in income (interest and non-interest) from the value
adding sector. They are subject to the same trade-o as non-nancial corporations,
as they also need to channel their surpluses towards labour, prots, rents and
interest. But due to higher nancialisation, the funds which are owing to the
nancial sector have to be distributed to a larger number of debt obligations
originated within the nancial sector itself.
So there are pressures on interest rates from the value adding sector, which is
higher indebted, and from a similarly higher indebted nancial sector. As long
as these developments do not reverse, there is no room for higher interest rates,
without other stakeholders needing to cut back on their claims in the production
process. This has vast implications for future developments of interest rates in
most advanced economies of the world, as these are probably bound to be low for
a longer period of time, if the other stakeholders do not signicantly abide from
their claims, or debt levels are reduced substantially.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 will give a short overview of
the prevailing theories of why interest rates fell over the last couple of decades.
In Section 2.3 the rationale, as for why looking at the origin of interest in the
economy is important to understand the evolution of interest rates in the past,
will be given. Section 2.4 then captures the underlying developments of interest
rates and debt levels, while Section 2.5 looks at the distribution of factor incomes.
Section 2.6 specically accounts for the impact of the nancial sector towards
lower interest rates. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The drop in short- and long-term interest rates in advanced economies over the last
40 years has received broad attention in academic research and policy discussions
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in the last couple of years. Several factors have been identied to potentially
contribute to this decline. Although the literature mainly ascribes the secular
decline to ination adjusted real interest rates, a large part of the decline, especially
since the 1990s, when ination became anchored in most advanced economies, can
be attributed to a decline in nominal rates (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Reference interest rates on 10-year government bonds
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Note: Nominal ( ) and real ( ), simple average over France, Germany, the UK and the
US. Source: IMF.
There are three main categories of explanations in the literature, where most
of the theories of falling interest rates can be attributed to.
The rst is pointing towards a shift in the savings-investment schedule across
the world. Substantially higher savings rates, especially in emerging economies,
but also in some advanced ones like Germany, have put pressure on rates because
of a surplus of savings over investments. Bernanke (2005) ascribes this process
especially to emerging markets, specically to south-east Asian countries, shifting
their policy objectives after the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s towards
building up foreign reserve portfolios, and therefore maintaining high current
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account surpluses. He coined the term of a Global Savings Glut in this regard.
Gordon (2010) on the other hand, points towards a lower investment demand
schedule in advanced economies, due to the less capital intensive business models
observable in the last two decades, especially in the tech-economy (see also Bean et
al. (2015)). Specically software companies only need a small fraction of nancing
in contrast to more traditional companies to generate the same added value. This
puts a downward pressure on interest rates, as less nancing is needed for the
same amount of added surplus.
Since the Global Financial Crisis another explanation has been given for the
occurance of low interest rates, the so called Balance Sheet Recession (see Koo
(2009), who tackled this subject for the aftermath of the burst of the housing
bubble in Japan in the early 1990s). Proponents of this theory stress that high debt
levels force most economic agents to deleverage. While most agents (especially
businesses and households) are trying to bring down their own debt levels, there
is a dearth of consumption and investment, which leads to stagnating economic
activity, and pushes down interest rate levels. Although this theory is also revealing
that high debt levels might be a cause for the low interest rate environment, the
reasoning as to why interest rates are low is dierent to the theory in this chapter.
The Balance Sheet Recession theory places an emphasis especially on the notion
that economic agents are not able to service their debt anymore or take on new
loans in the aftermath of a crisis caused by high levels of indebtedness. The focus
is thereby on the principal, and not necessarily on interest obligations, while only
looking at the ability to service debt, and not on how these payment obligations
are earned in the rst place. Furthermore, this theory cannot completely explain
the secular falling trend in interest rates before the Financial Crisis.
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According to Favero et al. (2013), demographics might also play a role in the
savings-surplus. The authors specically ascribe higher savings ratios due to the
life cycle hypothesis, which tries to explain the savings ratio of the population over
time. This hypothesis postulates that the working age population accumulates
savings over the time of their working age to life o of these during retirement and
to cater for intergenerational transfers. A higher proportion of the working age
population should therefore lead to a higher savings rate. Globally, the working
age population rose from around 50% to about 58% over the last 30 years, which
then contributed to higher savings rates, and therefore to lower interest rates.
Additionally, today there is more risk on the safety of pension systems due to
aging societies, especially in advanced economies, but also emerging ones like
China for example. This induces people to save even more during their working
age, as expected pensions become less and less secure due to the larger pool of
retirees (see e.g. Rachel and Smith (2015), von Weizacker (2015)).
Contributing to this trend is rising inequality within many advanced economies
(see e.g. Rachel and Smith (2015)). Since wealthier people save a higher proportion
of their income (see Saez and Zucman (2014)), a higher concentration of wealth
and income at the top means less mass consumption and higher desired savings,
which also puts a pressure on interest rates (see also Kumhof et al. (2015)).
A second line of reasoning explains lower interest rates by a shift in demand
from risky to more safe assets, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis, the
Dot-com Bubble and the Global Financial Crisis (see e.g. Caballero and Farhi
(2013), or IMF (2012)). Investors today are more reluctant to invest in riskier
assets than before, which suppresses interest rates, too. There is also a link to the
Savings Glut argument of Bernanke, as most of the reserve accumulation since
the middle of the 1990s occurred in safe government and high grade corporate
bonds, and less so in more risky assets (see also Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012)).
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The third strand in the literature (but mainly prevailing in the policy debate)
is pointing towards a central bank induced fall in interest rates. Proponents of
these theories ascribe the interest rate fall driven by expansive monetary policies
by the major central banks in the last three decades (see e.g. the overview and
argumentation in Homann and Schnabl (2016)). According to Bindseil et al.
(2015), such an argumentation is quite unconvincing, as permanent deviations of
central bank renancing rates far below the natural Wicksellian-rate would lead to
inationary pressures. But these have not materialised since the 1990s, as ination
is rmly anchored across the advanced economies (see also Consta^ncio (2016)).
However, central banks might have recently contributed to lower long-term rates
through their proclamations to hold rates low for a longer than usual time. But
this is certainly not ascribable to the more secular trend visible before the Global
Financial Crisis (see also Adrian et al. (2015)). Furthermore, a high deviation of
policy and market rates would be visible in the data, which is not, as risk-adjusted
long-term rates track policy rates quite closely (see e.g. De Bondt (2005), Hanson
and Stein (2015), or Illes and Lombardi (2013)).
While most of the above mentioned theories only look onto the demand side of
the distribution of interest, the following section accounts for the secular decline
in interest rates from the production side of interest payments.
2.3 Maximum Interest
Interest is a claim on a part of the produced output. By providing funding for
companies, households and governments, creditors receive a claim on a part of
future surpluses of debtors in the form of interest payments. But these have to be
earned rst through economic activity (the supply of interest). Interest can then
only be distributed from these surpluses. Therefore, there is a natural boundary
to how much interest can be distributed in an economy.
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Suppose that all added value would only ow towards interest payments. This
would imply that all other stakeholders (entrepreneurs, land owners and labour)
would be left without any compensation. Thus, the (theoretically) maximum
amount of paid out interest (at least in the long-run) can be abstracted empirically
by the amount of value added to the whole amount of interest bearing assets1:
Interestmax = V alue Added
Debt
(2.1)
But interest is not the only payment obligation which arises out of the added
value, as the generated surplus from economic activity has to be distributed
generally between dierent stakeholders. This is reected in national income
accounts statistics. Total factor income is represented as follows:
Total Factor Income = Employee Compensation + Rental Income +
Proprietor′s Income + Corporate Profits +
Net Interest
(2.2)
For reasons of clarity, throughout this chapter only three factor income groups
shall be considered. Prots, proprietor's income and rental income are considered
together as income from economic activity, which shall also cover dividends for
external capital providers, who do not receive income in the form of predened
interest payments. Thus, income is considered here to be divided between:
1 More conveniently, instead of the added value, GDP is applied in the empirical section, as
both amounts are almost identical in most (advanced) economies, since the amount of taxes
minus subsidies is quite small, and GDP data is available for a longer period of time and for
more countries.
40
1. Employees of the companies, who are rewarded for providing their services
in the production process. Generally this is compensated for at the amount
of their marginal productivity by wage payments.
2. Capital providers, who oer nancing in the form of credit, are compensated
in the form of interest payments.
3. Company owners and entrepreneurs, who are rewarded for their economic
activities through residual claims (e.g. dividends, self-employed income,
retained prots, rents). Their premium is a form of compensation for the
risks they conduct (see Knight (1921)).
With these three stakeholders all competing for a part of theGDP-pie, company
owners and entrepreneurs, and/or employees would need to abide from a part of
their claims in the production process, if the level of interest rates should be held
constant in an environment where the growth of interest bearing nancial claims
outpaces economic growth. If labour and entrepreneurs do not cut back in their
claims in the same magnitude as debt increases, then the individual interest for
each creditor has to be smaller, which implies that average interest rates have to
fall. This does per-se not imply that nominal interest rates have to be low in such
an environment. This observation could also occur in a higher interest, higher
ination paradigm with a fast growing economy, as only the relationship between
debt obligations and real economic growth is binding for this ratio.
It is certainly possible to meet the demand for interest payments in the
short-run by liquidating assets (living o the substance) or by issuing new debt
instruments, which moves the obligation to pay into the future. But in the long-run
this is not a viable option, as either capital is getting depreciated too much or
the debt burden is getting too large to service, if the productive capacity does
not keep up with the higher amounts of debt. Although it might theoretically be
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possible that GDP is growing with the same rate as interest bearing assets (even
if they grow substantially), this is not what is observable over the last 40 years.
Even if this would be the case, there is still a natural limit to debt and interest
payments in the long-run, which is bound by the added value in relation to the
nancial obligations which have to be met.
2.4 Empirical Observations
The previous section explained theoretically, why there might be a boundary
for interest payments in the long-run. Moreover, this long-run maximum fell
during the last 40 years, as the the debt-to-GDP ratio rose in almost all advanced
economies. Thus, even if all added value would have been redirected towards
interest payments, average interest payments would have needed to fall, since the
added value has to be distributed towards a larger base of interest bearing assets.
This trend alone put a pressure on interest payments, even without specifying
which stakeholders receive which amount of the added value.
Furthermore, as total nominal interest payments did not rise proportionally
with the outstanding amount of debt, each individual claim received a smaller
proportion of the total amount of interest paid out in a specic period. Thus,
actual average interest rates had to fall, too. This observed trend will be analysed
in more detail in this section.
Over the last 40 years, the debt-to-GDP ratio has risen in most advanced
economies. As laid out in Section 2.1, most value added is produced by non-
nancial corporations. Therefore, the main focus is on non-nancial corporate
debt data. Figure 2.2 shows the growing debt ratios by depicting the dispersion of
the non-nancial corporate debt ratios for 13 OECD countries. While debt levels
at non-nancial corporations where at between 50% and 70% of GDP in most
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countries in the early 1980s, this ratio has risen to around 100% today, with some
countries even having non-nancial corporate debt levels of above 150%.
Figure 2.2: Median non-nancial corporate debt ratio
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Note: Debt ratios as a percentage of GDP for the country sample ( ), with the 60/40 (dark
grey) and 80/20 (light grey) condence intervals. The country sample consists of Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Source: BIS.
As the debt-to-GDP ratio has grown exceptionally in the past, the maximum
interest, which can be distributed, has fallen considerably. Since 1980 the maximum
amount of interest, if measured by the non-nancial corporate GDP-to-debt ratio
(only including bank credit), has receded from around 180% to around 120% today
(see Figure 2.3).2 Using a broader denition, by also including debt securities
(like corporate bonds) issued by non-nancial corporations, then the maximum
2 Debt in the empirical section is assessed with the fair value. Movements in the debt stock
therefore do not allow to draw conclusions towards the amount of interest which has to
be paid. Falling debt levels would not per-se imply that interest payments are receding
automatically, since it might just be because of revaluations of the outstanding amount in
the balance sheet, while the debt burden for the debtor is staying constant (see the following
Chapter 3 for an in depth analysis of this problem). Empirically, the amount of outstanding
debt is therefore just serving as a proxy to which extent interest has to be paid (in relation
to the average interest rate), as data on the actual amounts of interest payments are not
available for this long period of time for many countries.
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interest stands at around 100% of GDP today.
Figure 2.3: Debt-to-GDP ratios for non-nancial corporations
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Note: Debt issued by banks to non-nancial corporations ( ) and including debt securities
issued by non-nancial corporations ( ), plus the corresponding maximum interest ( and
) in %. The country sample is as in Figure 2.2. Debt securities data missing for Japan until
1997 and Norway until 1995. Note, that this ratio is calculated as the total amount and not the
individual country median, thus the diering magnitude of the lines compared to Figure 2.2.
Source: BIS.
The rationale for focussing on debt levels of non-nancial corporations is that
they are the most likely entities which generate economic surplus from which they
can distribute interest payments, without sacricing current or future payments.
The exception is income generated by the state, the private non-corporate sector
and nancial corporations through their own economic activities. But the majority
of the added value is produced by non-nancial corporations. In Germany, around
70% of the production value is made by these (see Figure 2.4(a)). Quite the
same picture prevails in the USA. There, the non-nancial corporate sector also
contributes to around 70% of the added value, although nancial corporations
increased their share in the production from around 3% to about 7% of GNI since
the 1960s. The remaining 20% are produced by non-corporate private businesses
and the general government (see Figure 2.4(b)).
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Figure 2.4: Contribution to national income
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(b) USA (% of GNI)
Note: Non-nancial corporations ( ), nancial corporations ( ), government ( ), private
non-business sector ( )). Sources: Destatis, BEA.
Due to that reasoning, one would consequently need to apply the maximum
interest for the non-nancial corporate sector by dividing the added value in the
non-nancial corporate sector by the total amount of debt in this sector. This can
be done in the case of the US or Germany for example. But on an international
level, data availability does not allow for such a dierentiation, as such detailed
statistics are not available for a time horizon spanning back to the 1980s in many
countries. That is why, on the international level, total added value, respectively
total GDP, is applied as the denominator. But, as non-nancial corporate added
value is lower than total added value and quite stable over time, it would only
push down the maximum interest rate. In the US for example, the dierence
is uctuating stable at around 50% of the non-nancial corporate debt ratio as
measured to total and to only non-nancial corporate value added. Thus, the
maximum interest today would then be only 100%, instead of 150%, but with the
same falling trend being visible.
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As stressed above, most of the value added is produced by the non-nancial
corporate sector. Although there is still a decent amount of value added in the
other sectors, these sectors hold exceedingly more debt in relation to their own
economic activities. Thus, they are relying on other means to generate income, to
service their interest obligations.
For instance, the majority of households does not add value on their own
account. Households are predominantly employed in the corporate sector (to
which the surpluses are being ascribed) and earn income in the form of wage
payments. These household debtors pay interest by foregoing labour income,
which would otherwise be used for consumption or saving purposes. But these
incomes have also to be earned by companies in the rst place, and are then
distributed towards workers in the form of labour income. Growing debt in the
household sector therefore does primarily only contribute to a falling percentage
of income which can be used for consumption or savings purposes, as a larger
share has to be used for interest payments (if interest rates are presumed to be
stable).
The same reasoning applies to government debt, as interest on these are paid
primarily by taxing the private sector, which represents only a shift from income
of households and prots of rms, and is thus not owing out of the added value
generated by the state itself.
It is empirically not distinguishable to which part nancial corporations, the
non-corporate private sector and the government pay interest from funds received
through their own economic surplus generating activities, or merely by receiving
funds shifted from other sectors (like wages, taxes and interest income from the
non-nancial sector). Therefore, the main focus of the empirically distinguishable
binding interest payment constraint lies on the non-nancial corporate sector's
surplus.
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But to account for the whole picture, total debt has to be considered as well.
As the growth in the debt ratio of the non-nancial corporate sector was slower
than in the other sectors, the fall in the maximum interest becomes even more
drastic while applying broader debt denitions. In Figure 2.5, total private sector
and gross public debt are considered together. Leaving out nancial corporations,
the theoretically achievable maximum interest fell from around 75% in 1980 to
37% in 2013 for the country sample. Additionally integrating nancial sector debt,
the maximum would stand at 29% in 2013. Adding debt securities issuance on
the own account of the corporate sector, debt in the country sample would even
grow to above 400%, which would then result in a maximum interest of below
25% in 2013.
Figure 2.5: Debt-to-GDP ratios and maximum interest
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Note: Debt-to-GDP ratios for non-nancial corporations ( ), the non-nancial sector (non-
nancial corporations + private households + government) ( ), and all sectors including debt
securities ( ), plus the corresponding maximum interest rates for non-nancial corporations
( ), the non-nancial sector ( ) and all sectors including debt securities ( ). The country
sample is as in Figure 2.2. Government debt data for Belgium is missing in 1980 and 1981.
Therefore, a linear growth of government debt for Belgium from 1979 to 1982 is assumed and
interpolated values are taken there. Sources: BIS, Jorda et al. (2016).
This 25% maximum interest threshold would imply that if all surpluses are
redirected towards interest payments, each nancial claim could receive 0.25 times
47
the headline amount in interest, which is way down from the from the amounts
prevailing in the past. But as entrepreneurs and labour have also to be rewarded
adequately for their part in the production process, not all generated value can
ow to the creditors. The maximum interest is therefore only a theoretical concept,
but it shows the limits of interest distribution quite forcefully.
This general downward trend of the maximum interest over the last 40 years
alone put a pressure on average interest rates, as the pie from which interest can
be distributed is getting smaller for each individual debt contract, even without
specifying if labour and entrepreneurs are rewarded adequately. More specically,
today each amount of debt is facing a smaller share of the added value from
which interest can be paid out. Thus, in a higher indebted world there is a
natural tendency towards lower interest rates, if entrepreneurs and labour do not
signicantly cut back on their claims in the production process.
What Figure 2.6 shows quite emphatically is the lockstep with which the
decline in interest rates fell together with the fall of the maximum amount of
interest which can theoretically be distributed (for the country sample and the
USA). From the 1980s on, long-term nominal interest rates fell from above 10%
to around 2% today. This decline cannot be attributed to falling ination rates
alone, for which creditors want to be compensated, as real interest rates also
receded from around 6% in 1980 to around 0% today. During the same time, the
maximum distributable interest fell quite equally.
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Figure 2.6: Maximum interest and bond rates
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Note: Reference interest rates on 10-year government bonds as in Figure 2.1 (nominal ( ,
lhs) and real ( , lhs)), and the maximum interest for non-nancial corporations ( , rhs)
and the non-nancial sector ( , rhs). Sources: BEA, BIS, FRBNY, IMF, Jorda et al. (2016).
This evolution is also conrmed by a simple correlation analysis. In Table 2.1
the cross-correlations of the 10-year nominal interest rates with the dierent
maximum interest rate denitions are listed. The upper part for the whole country
sample applies the nominal interest rate as in Figure 2.1. Correlations from
the raw data (termed simple) are very high throughout, irrespective of which
maximum interest rate denition is taken. They are even higher while taking
a more long-term view using ve year averages, to eliminate yearly uctuations
which are not explainable by long-term trends. In the lower part of Table 2.1, the
same approach is applied for US data. Here, the 10-year nominal interest rate for
US Treasury bonds is taken as a reference. Additionally, AAA rated corporate
bond yields are also considered, to further reect the interest obligations for the
corporate sector. The same pattern as for the whole country sample emerges, with
only slightly lower coecients for the maximum corporate interest, irrespective of
the applied interest rate. The results also do not change much using short-run
interest rates, like 3-month Treasury bill or money market (LIBOR) rates.
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Table 2.1: Cross-correlations between interest rates and the maximum interest
10yr nominal rate
simple 5yr avg
Max. interest 0,9662 0,9794
Max. private interest 0.9468 0.9637
Max. non-n. corp. interest 0.8312 0.8207
Max. non-n. corp. interest* 0.8939 0.9109
*only France, Germany, UK, US
10yr nominal rate AAA corporate bond rate
simple 5yr avg simple 5yr avg
Max. interest 0.9669 0.9861 0.9681 0.9875
Max. non-n. interest 0.9501 0.9546 0.9534 0.9577
Max. corp. interest 0.7727 0.7733 0.7507 0.7581
Note: Upper part: country sample; lower part: USA. Sources: BEA, BIS, FRBNY, IMF, Jorda
et al. (2016).
However, these correlations do not mean that there are no other explanations
for low interest rates, as mentioned in Section 2.2. It merely adds to these theories
from another perspective. Additionally, no prediction is being made here about
possible causalities, as higher debt-to-GDP ratios do not strictly imply that the
percentage of interest paid out cannot remain stable or even rise. Merely a simple
indicator about the parallel secular trends of the ability to distribute interest and
actual interest rate levels over the last 40 years is given here.
2.5 Distribution of Factor Income
Until now, no observations have been made on how GDP has been distributed to
the dierent stakeholders. The maximum interest just laid out the basic concept
of how high interest rates can be, if all added value is owing towards inter-
est payments. This section now concentrates on the evolution of factor income over
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the last 40 years, to see to which extend the income distribution might have
shifted in light of the larger amount of debt obligations.3
So far, it could be seen that while the debt-to-GDP ratio rose, interest rates
likewise did fall over the last four decades. But, even if the credit-to-GDP ratio
is growing, interest rates could remain stable or even rise, if prots and labour
income would fall to compensate creditors.4 But if labour is going to be rewarded
at (or near) its marginal-productivity and entrepreneurs (including stockholders in
the form of dividends) should still be able to reap in benets for taking economic
risks, average interest rates have to fall, if debt-to-GDP ratios rise.5 This then
does not mean that total distributable interest has to shrink relative to the added
value. It only bears the consequence that the piece of the interest pie available for
each debt contract is getting smaller.
The rewards for each group of stakeholders, as outlined in Section 2.3, can be
seen in Figure 2.7 for the United States.6 It should be noted that interest payments
are only depicted as total net interest in the whole economy, which empirically is
not reecting that the gross amount of interest payments generated by economic
activity should really be the concept of choice here. This restriction has to be
3 There is no detailed long-run data for most OECD countries available, that is why the main
focus in this section is on the United States (and to a lesser extent Germany and Japan).
4 Or if for example a larger part of labour income is used to pay private debt obligations,
resulting in a reduction of consumption and/or savings.
5 To which extend factor income is distributed towards the dierent stakeholders is certainly
an outcome of a negotiation process between labour, land and company owners and external
capital providers. There is no natural law, which forces a certain primary distribution of
income.
6 Abstracting here that the US cannot be considered as a closed economy. More consequently,
an international perspective would have to be taken, to better reect cross-border capital
transfers. But this is not possible, since detailed long-run time series are not available in
many countries. Mostly, only the compensation of employees is available for such a long-term
perspective.
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made because more detailed data is not available for the US. Nevertheless, it
might reveal a general picture of the level of interest paid out.
What is apparent is that labour income has been quite stable in the US since
the 1950s, uctuating between 60 and 65% throughout. Interest income has
been growing from 2% of GNI in the 1950s to almost 10% in the late 1980s, to
subsequently fall to around 3% nowadays. Interest income in the 1980s ate up a
good proportion of entrepreneurial income. Consequently, prots and proprietor's
income fell to under 20% in the middle of the 1980s, before growing to around
25% today again.
Figure 2.7: Factor income as a percentage of GNI for the USA
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Note: Compensation for employees ( ), prots and proprietor's income ( ), net interest
( ) and rents ( ) for the USA. Source: BEA.
But only looking at the total amount of interest paid out gives no hint about
the level of interest rates. The following Figure 2.8 is thus quite enlightening, as
the amount of interest paid out is not only depicted in relation to GNI, but also
in relation to debt in the non-nancial corporate sector, the denominator in the
distribution of interest payments towards the specic nancial claims.
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Figure 2.8: Paid-out interest
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Note: Net interest as a percentage of GNI ( ), non-nancial corporate debt ( ), and
non-nancial corporate debt plus debt securities ( ), as well as nominal interest rates on
10-year Treasury securities ( ) for the US. Sources: BEA, BIS, FRBNY.
It can be seen that distributed interest as a percentage of total debt roughly
equals the nominal interest rate in the long run. Total distributed interest fell
from around 10% of GNI in the the 1980s in the US to around 4% today, while
non-nancial corporate debt rose from around 60% of GNI to around 80% in
the same span. Consequently, the interest rate distributable per non-nancial
corporate debt share fell from around 13% in the beginning of the 1980s to
roughly 4% today. The nominal risk free interest rate (illustrated by 10-year
Treasury bonds) matches this evolution almost one for one during this period.
Cross-correlation analysis also conrms the eye test here, as the coecients are
above 0.9 (see Table 2.2).7
7 It certainly might be that the nominal Treasury bond rate does not represent the actual
average amount of interest rates for all debt contracts payable by corporations, as market rates
do not per-se equal the 10-year Treasury bond rates. But loan rates (cross-correlation of 0.92
with 10-year Treasury rates), corporate bond rates (cross-correlation of 0.99) and estimates
of risk free natural interest rates (e.g. by Laubach and Williams (2015)) are matching this
trend quite equally.
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Table 2.2: Cross-correlations of paid-out interest
10yr nominal
rate
Interest/GNI 0.89354
Interest/Non-n. corp. debt 0.95261
Interest/Non-n. corp. debt + debt securities 0.92104
Note: Cross-correlations between the 10-year nominal government bond rate and the net interest
amount paid in relation to the specic denitions in the US. Source: BEA, BIS, FRBNY.
Consequently, interest rates are low today, because interest payments per
share of debt have receded, as total interest payments (the nominator) have fallen
as a percentage of value added and debt (the denominator) has risen faster than
added value. In sum, not only did the ability to distribute interest (the maximum
interest) fall, but also the actual relative amount of distributed interest, too.
Thereby highlighting the constraints on the ability to earn interest through higher
indebtedness, which lead to lower average interest rates over the last 40 years.
A problem with the US statistics is that they only show the net amount of
total interest payments in the economy. Interest paid out only by the non-nancial
corporate sector cannot be measured for the US in gross terms. But, more detailed
accounts can be found for example in German national income statistics. In those,
the gross amount of interest paid out by non-nancial corporations can be seen
more distinctly. Figure 2.9 shows the gross amount of interest in relation to net
national income (NNI) paid out by the non-nancial corporate sector to all other
stakeholders. This gross amount shrank from almost 4% in the early 1990s to
1.3% of NNI in 2015 (earlier data before the German unication is not available).
During the same time, yields on 10-year German government bonds (which can
be seen as long-term risk-free assets) shrank quite dramatically, too.
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Figure 2.9: Interest and debt for Germany
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Note: Interest paid out by non-nancial corporations as a percentage of NNI ( , lhs), nominal
interest rate on 10-year government bonds ( , lhs), and the maximum interest for non-nancial
corporations ( , rhs) for Germany. Source: BIS, Destatis, ECB.
For Germany, the fall in interest paid out by non-nancial corporations is also
visible, although this drastic decline certainly cannot be fully explained by a rise
in debt levels since 1990 (earlier data is not publicly available). Interest payments
from non-nancial corporations as a percentage of NNI fell from around 4% in
the 1990s to below 2% today. In the same time, non-nancial corporate debt
rose from around 65% to above 90% of NNI until 2009, while subsequently falling
to about 75% in 2015. Simultaneously, the maximum interest of non-nancial
corporations fell from around 150% to about 100% from the early 1990s until
2009. This rise in the debt level is mainly attributable to debt securities, as they
rose threefold between 1991 and 2009.
German data also shows, that labour and entrepreneurial income did not fall
during this time (see Figure 2.10), even as non-nancial corporate and also total
debt in the economy grew (from around 170% to above 250% of GDP since 1990).
This also implies that average interest rates had to fall, as entrepreneurs and
labour did not abide from their share of added value. In spite of growing debt
obligations, interest payments as a percentage of NNI even fell from about 4% to
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slightly above 1% since the early 1990s, leading to lower average interest rates.
Figure 2.10: Factor income for Germany
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Note: Compensation for employees ( ), corporate surpluses ( ), and interest paid out by
non-nancial corporations ( ) as a percentage of NNI for Germany. Source: Destatis.
This is also visible for Japan, which was one of the rst advanced countries,
where interest rates distinctly began to fall. The fall in nominal interest rates
fell together with drastically rising non-nancial corporate debt ratio. This is
depicted by the falling non-nancial corporate maximum interest in Figure 2.11.
Even as non-nancial corporations where able to delever after the housing
market crash in the early 1990s, interest rates did not rise, as other sectors
(especially the government) increased their indebtedness, which resulted in a
growing debt-to-GDP ratio for the whole economy, and thus in a lower total
maximum interest, as calculated by these broader denitions (see the green dashed
line in Figure 2.11; earlier debt data is not available for all other sectors).
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Figure 2.11: Interest and debt for Japan
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Note: Maximum non-nancial corporate interest rate ( , rhs), maximum non-nancial interest
rate (corporations, households and government) ( , rhs), and 10-year government bond rate
in % ( , lhs) for Japan. Source: BoJ.
Although the above described correlations between debt levels and interest
rates do not mean that there is a direct causation, the lockstep is quite striking
and certainly plausible. While it could be argued that the fall in interest rates
stems from the demand side (which is denitely true to a certain extent, see
the theories in Section 2.2), the ability of non-nancial corporations to supply
interest payments out of added value surely fell during the last 40 years, which
then contributed to the lower average interest rates through the channels laid out
above.
Additionally to the lower ability of the non-nancial corporate sector to
provide interest payments, the developments in the nancial sector itself lead to a
further pressure on interest income. This development will be described in the
following section.
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2.6 Impact on Interest from Financialisation
Once interest has been paid out by non-nancial corporations to (mostly) nancial
corporations, it can be used to cover costs for labour, operating expenses and
also for their own debt obligations (interest payments). Financial corporations
are therefore also bound to pass on interest by their ability to raise income. But
interest payments from the non-nancial sector are not the only income for nancial
corporations, as they can also generate income by undertaking intermediation
activities, from which they receive fees (providing payment services for the general
public for example), or advisory income (by doing investment banking activities).
The dierence between non-nancial and nancial corporations is that most
nancial sector intermediaries (mostly non-bank nancial intermediaries) do not
produce much of a surplus themselves. The nancial sector is accountable for only
4% to 7% of GDP in most advanced economies (see Figure 2.12). Most of the
nancial sector's business activities are in the form of redirecting funds within
the nancial sector itself, as for example roughly only 15% of the nancial ows
from banks in the US go to businesses (see Turner (2015)). The rest is spent
on buying and selling existing nancial instruments. This closed loop of nance
of buying and selling existing assets like stocks, bonds, or renancialisation of
existing mortgages, instead of going into new business investment, is mostly not
contributing to a large amount to GDP growth, and therefore does not enhance
the nancial sector's ability to earn interest themselves.
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Figure 2.12: Median nancial sector size
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Note: Contribution of the nancial sector to GDP (in % of total GDP) ( ), with the 80/20
(dark grey) and 90/10 (light grey) condence intervals. The country sample consists of Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Source: OECD.
The nancial sector is thus constrained in its ability to distribute interest by
their ability to raise non-interest income plus the interest income they receive
from the non-nancial sphere. In the US, the share of interest income to GDP
which ows from the private sector to the FDIC-insured commercial banks and
savings institutions fell drastically during the last 40 years (from about 9% in 1980
to around 3% today). Conversely, non-interest income could not make up this
fall (total income fell from around 10% to 4% of GDP for commercial banks and
savings institutions since 1980). As a result, total income has fallen. Figure 2.13
shows this development.
Although the nancial sector today is responsible for a higher share of value
added in most advanced economies (see again Figure 2.12), it might not be able
to generate enough non-interest income, to make up for the loss of interest income
from the non-nancial sector to keep their interest expenses at the same level as
before.
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Figure 2.13: Annual income of US banks
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Note: US FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions total income ( ), interest
income ( ), and non-interest income ( ) as a percentage of GDP. Source: FDIC.
Furthermore, not only did income from the non-nancial sector recede in
the last 40 years, outstanding debt in the nancial sector also grew faster than
nancial sector GDP during this period (see Figure 2.14). This puts, through the
same mechanism as for the non-nancial corporate sector, a further pressure on
interest payments, as a larger debt share is facing a smaller income share. The
ability to pass on interest on debt contracts, which the nancial sector issued
itself, has therefore also receded.
Additionally, it is not only commercial banks for which it becomes more
dicult to pass on interest themselves. Within the nancial sector, non-bank
nancial intermediaries (NBFIs) are bound by the same constraints. The size of
the shadow banking sector|measured by its outstanding liabilities|in the US
alone grew from 20% to about 140% in relation to GDP at the beginning of the
Global Financial Crisis (see Figure 2.15).8 The shadow banking sector is mainly
8 See Poszar et al. (2013) for a denition of the shadow banking system for the US.
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Figure 2.14: Bank debt
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Note: Debt for the country sample as in Figure 2.3 (except for Norway; Japanese data only
available from 1997 on) ( ), and the US ( ) as a % of GDP. Source: BIS.
depending on the surpluses which other nancial intermediaries (foremost banks
through credit extension) and the non-nancial sector generate, and which pay
them for their services. To a smaller extent, they generate added value themselves
by oering liquidity services for example. But as the shadow banking sector grew
much faster than GDP (and also GDP generated by the sector itself) and interest
income as a percentage of GDP fell, also their ability to pass on interest receded,
as labour and company owners of these NBFIs have to be compensated as well.
Not only has higher nancialisation lead to a lower ability to pass on interest
within the nancial sector through higher debt levels, there is growing evidence
that in many advanced economies nancial sectors might have become so big
that they are detrimental to economic growth (see for example Cecchetti and
Kharoubi (2015), Jorda et al. (2013), Philippon (2015), Philippon and Reshef
(2009), and Turner (2015)). Cecchetti and Kharoubi (2012) for example show that
from a certain point of nancial development, additional growth of the nancial
sector becomes a drag on economic growth. They argue, that the size of nancial
sectors in many advanced economies today might already be at a point where the
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Figure 2.15: Financial sector liabilities in the USA
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Note: Total liabilities as a percentage of GDP of commercial banks ( ), and the shadow
banking sector ( ) for the USA. Shadow banking liabilities are as in Poszar et al. (2013)
from government-sponsored enterprises, government-sponsored enterprises and federally related
mortgage pools, issuers of asset-backed securities, money market mutual funds, plus U.S.
government agency securities and open market papers. Source: FRBNY.
marginal costs are outweighing the marginal utility.
One reason is that much of the growth in debt has been in mortgage credit to
private households in the past. Many of these activities are contributing relatively
little to productivity growth (see Cecchetti and Kharoubi (2015)). This might
be the case because these credits are often just used to renance or buy existing
mortgages (see Philippon (2015)). Such transactions have little immediate eect on
economic activity, and thus do not enhance the ability to earn interest. Cecchetti
and Kharoubi (2015) therefore argue that by extending debt mainly towards low
productive investments, average productivity and economic growth fell during the
last decades. Through this, the GDP-pie from which interest can be distributed
additionally shrunk relative to the amount of interest bearing assets.
Furthermore, as more human capital in the nancial sector is redirected
from liquidity services towards credit activities, there is a shift in the form of
employment visible in the nancial sector (see Philippon and Reshef (2009)).
There is a reduction in routine work through technological progress visible, which
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is substituted by more complex jobs in credit monitoring, in designing, originating
and trading complex products, and in advisory services. These jobs have a higher
productivity, and are therefore remunerated higher. This has the eect that
average wages in the nancial sector have outperformed wages in all other sectors.
The majority of the benets thus go to a small group of highly skilled workers in the
nancial sector, who earn extraordinarily high wages. These wealthy individuals
save on average a higher proportion of their income, which is contributing to lower
interest through higher savings rates. Philippon and Reshef (2009) estimate that
the higher nancialisation since the 1970s is responsible for around 15-25% of
the total increase in the GINI coecient as well as the Theil index in the US.
Higher inequality in turn might have led to slower growth across the developed
countries in the last decades (see e.g. Rachel and Smith (2015), Stiglitz (2012)).
Furthermore, Cecchetti and Kharoubi (2015) show that these highly skilled workers
may generate negative externalities for other sectors, as they might be able to
persuade borrowers to invest in projects with lower productivity, which then could
lead to a slowdown of total factor productivity.
Additionally, technical progress in the nancial sector put downward pressures
on interest rates as well. Through better monitoring and risk management, and
lowered intermediation costs, nancial intermediaries are able to lower average
interest rates which they oer. Moreover, through better hedging, pooling and
monitoring nancial sectors have become more liquid in the last couple of decades.
This in turn implies that investors have to pay a lower liquidity premium, which
c.p. lowers interest rates (see e.g. Nagel (2016)). Furthermore, rising securitisation
activity increased loan supply through higher liquidity and increased protability
of banks (see Altunbas et al. (2014) for an overview). On the other hand, eective
credit demand also rose, as banks have lent to riskier borrowers. As similarly
alternative nancing demand has risen, total credit creation rose, which is visible
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in the higher debt-to-GDP ratios. Thus, securitisation activity and alternative
nancing also contributed to the increased pressure on interest rates.
The nancial sector might therefore be contributing to lower growth rates,
and as a consequence to lower interest rates twofold. By issuing more debt,
especially for unproductive uses, growth slowed and the ability to earn interest
receded. Furthermore, technological progress and changes in business models in
the nancial sector also put pressures on interest rates.
Nevertheless, even if these pressures were not present, nancial intermediaries
would still face the constraint of lower interest income from the non-nancial
corporate sector through their higher share of outstanding debt. Thus, the long-
run trend in lower average interest rates is not only explainable from demand side
induced progresses, but also by the aforementioned supply side developments.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter lays out an alternative supply side perspective as of why interest
rates have fallen considerably since the 1980s around the world. This view is based
on the premise that interest can only be sustainably distributed in the long-run
through the added value in the economy. Since a larger amount of debt is facing
a proportionally shrinking amount of added value, there is a pressure on average
interest rates.
Through higher indebtedness in the non-nancial corporate sector, the maxi-
mum interest for non-nancial corporations has receded from around 180% in the
1980s to around 100% today (and even lower, if only added value of non-nancial
corporations is considered). This alone puts a pressure on interest payments, even
if labour and entrepreneurs would cut back on their claims to the produced eco-
nomic value. Subsequently, the lower amount of paid out interest to the nancial
sector has led to a lower ability of these entities to pass on interest payments on
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their own debt securities as well, as the nominal amount of income from interest
shrunk and nancial institutes face a higher debt burden themselves, while not
being able to make up this shortfall by raising their non-interest income to the
same extent. Furthermore, the growing nancial sector supposedly contributed to
lower economic growth in the last couple of decades. This puts further pressure
on the denominator in the maximum interest, leading to lower average interest
available for each amount of debt. Additionally, higher liquidity through better
intermediation led to lower liquidity premia, which lowered interest rates, too.
If average interest rates shall for example rise by just one percentage point, a
shift from all other factor income groups of four percentage points towards interest
would be needed, as the maximum interest for all debt obligations stands at about
25% in the country sample (with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 400%).
On these grounds, the notion that central banks should just raise policy rates
to prop up interest rates in the nancial markets can be challenged. If central
banks would raise interest rates drastically and market rates would therefore rise
too, then a higher amount of added value would ow towards creditors, at the
expense of workers, and/or entrepreneurs and company owners. Either labour
income might then have to fall below their marginal productivity or workers could
only spend a lower portion of their income on consumption, which might lead
to slower economic growth, or entrepreneurs and company owners might not be
rewarded adequately for their engagement to take entrepreneurial risks anymore.
In the short-run it might certainly be possible to live o of the substance or
renance payment obligations by issuing more debt, if workers and entrepreneurs
do not cut back on their claims, but these are no viable long-run options, because
either the capital stock would be depreciated too much or default risks (because
of over-indebtedness) would rise. That would probably lead to lower growth and
ination in the long-run, as nancial instability risks would rise. Thus, central
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banks might be inclined to cut interest rates again. So, there might be no room
for central banks to raise rates, without other negative repercussions potentially
arising. Furthermore, market rates might not even rise in response to a policy
rate increase, as creditors might not be able to generate enough income to pay
all interest obligations, and simultaneously pay workers and reward company
owners.9
This has the consequence, that if employee compensation and prots shall
not fall below their fair share in the production process, interest can only rise
sustainably in the long-run by lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio either through
higher growth rates or by lower nominal amounts of debt. If none of these or a
combination of these options come to pass, then average nominal interest rates
are probably bound to be low for a longer period of time.
9 Although debt-to-GDP levels have slightly fallen during the last couple of years after the
Global Financial Crisis (at least in advanced economies), this might not be enough to lead to
a signicantly higher ability to earn interest.
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Chapter 3
Credit Measurement in Monetary
Transmission
This chapter reviews the application of credit variables in empirical estimations of
the transmission of monetary policy towards bank lending. Typically, to answer
such a question, one should be interested in how the amount of newly issued credit
develops in response to a monetary policy shock. But, contrary to the underlying
theory, the majority of empirical studies employs the outstanding stock|or the
change thereof|as the relevant credit variable. This chapter argues, that there
are several drawbacks in applying stock measures of bank loans in these settings,
as the change in the outstanding amount of credit is not only representing newly
issued loans, but also other factors, like repayments, revaluations, write-os, and
sell-os due to securitisation. The insights of this chapter are based on a previously
published paper (Behrendt (2016b)).
3.1 Introduction
As credit developments are getting more into the spotlight of research and the
policy discussion since the Global Financial Crisis, it can be asked, if the right
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measures of lending are used in empirical models of the credit channel. While
analysing the impact of monetary policy towards credit developments, empirical
studies predominantly use the outstanding stock of bank loans as their credit
variable (see e.g. Altavilla (2015), Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Carpenter
and Demiralp (2012), Carpenter et al. (2014), Ciccarelli et al. (2015), Driscoll
(2004), Gambacorta and Marques-Iba~nez (2011), Giannone et al. (2012), Jacobs
and Rayner (2012), Lown and Morgan (2006), de Mello and Pisu (2010), Nieto
(2007), Tabak et al. (2010)). But as the stock variable also contains information
about previously extended loans, the change in the stock amounts to the extension
of loans minus repayments, write-os, sell-os due to securitisation, and the net
of revaluations. But, in the assessment of central bank policies towards credit
creation, it is of primary interest how current and future lending evolves, and
not how the amount of previously issued credits change, because the eects of
prior extended loans already played out, and only new lending has a direct impact
on the real sector. Certainly, the real economy can be aected from previous
lending activities through monetary policy, as for example interest rates might
be linked to current policy rates, which might lead to higher default rates when
policy rates rise. But this is to a lesser degree in the direct control of central
banks, and should therefore probably be not as high on the policy agenda as
the more direct impact on current and future lending behaviour. This shall not
mean that the credit stock is a redundant variable, since it can contain valuable
information regarding sustainability of debt levels, or about stress in nancial
markets, but these repercussions might at best be dealt with by other instruments|
mainly macroprudential policies (see e.g. Claessens (2014), or IMF (2013b) for
an overview)|and/or by other empirical set-ups, rather than in the estimation
of the impact of monetary policy towards lending activity. Focusing only on the
stock of credit could thus potentially lead to inaccurate policy advice.
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Due to the inclusion of the other factors into the stock data, amounts of the
change of the outstanding stock of credit and of new lending can dier quite
substantially. What is visible in the data is that the change in the stock is highly
attributable to economic conditions, which is to a large extent not being explainable
by the underlying trends in new lending activity. It can therefore be expected
that the results from using the credit stock in empirical studies could dier from
the accompanying results using new loans. Thus, if parts of the composition of
the stock|other than new lending|correlate with other objectives of monetary
policy, the eectiveness of the credit channel might be overestimated. This might
have important implications for the assessment of monetary transmission, and
ultimately for the conduct of monetary policy.
The issues mentioned above are accounted for in this chapter. Moreover, the
dierent theoretical arguments for using the amount of new lending instead of
the growth in the outstanding stock of credit in econometric studies are laid out.
What is thereby shown is that results in empirical studies could change quite
signicantly, when newly extended loans are considered as the credit variable
instead of the outstanding stock of credit, especially in turbulent times.
This chapter is organised as follows: First, the theoretical case for using new
loans instead of the outstanding stock of credit in monetary policy analysis is
made in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 then lays out the points of criticism with the
other factors except new lending that comprise the change in the outstanding
stock. Section 3.4 presents literature which is accounting for some of the criticism
presented in Section 3.3. To investigate the soundness of the rationale empirically,
some stylised facts from credit data of the Euro area, the United States, and
Brazil are shown in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 then tries to nd out, if movements in
economic activity can even be explained by credit trends while using new lending.
Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 Motivation for using New Lending
Two arguments can be brought forward to justify the use of new lending instead of
the outstanding amount of credit in empirical studies of the monetary transmission
process towards bank lending. The rst one, sometimes mentioned in the literature,
is that there might be an issue of stock-ow consistency in the analysis of credit
developments (see Huang (2010), Biggs et al. (2009), also see Table 3.1). While
analysing monetary transmission mechanisms or business cycle uctuations in
the literature, the change in the outstanding stock of credit (a stock variable) is
often analysed in comparison to the change in the GDP (a ow variable) (see e.g.
Claessens et al. (2009)). But both are on a dierent level of integration.
Table 3.1: Stock vs. ow level comparison
Level of Integration GDP Credit Stock New Lending
1 D
2 GDP D L
3 GDP D L
Biggs (2008) and Biggs et al. (2009) specically draw their attention on this
stock-ow issue, while trying to explain movements in economic activity as a
result of underlying credit trends. Previous studies, like Calvo et al. (2006) and
Claessens et al. (2009), using the change in the stock of outstanding credit, only
nd a loose and lagging relationship between credit developments and economic
activity. Biggs et al. (2009) on the other hand try to remedy this puzzle. They
state that one has to compare ow with ow variables, and thus use a proxy
for new lending as the ow variable in their analysis, by applying what they
call the credit impulse (see also Biggs and Mayer (2013)). In their view, the
change of the credit stock represents the amount of new lending. This is then a
ow variable, which should be compared to GDP. As a result, they nd that the
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change in domestic demand is highly correlated with the change of their credit
impulse, which they measure as the second dierence of the outstanding stock as
a percentage of GDP. This was not the case in previous studies, as those applied
the rst dierence of the stock of outstanding credit, when comparing it to GDP
or domestic demand growth. Additionally, their results show that developments
in domestic demand can be explained by credit trends with a lag, and not the
other way around, as found in earlier studies like Calvo et al. (2006)).
While the credit impulse can tackle an important deciency in the literature,
another problem is still not accounted for, and also not rigorously brought forward
in the existing literature. Most empirical estimations of the transmission process
of monetary policy towards bank lending try to answer, how the amount of newly
issued credit changes (see e.g. Bernanke Blinder (1988, 1992), Carpenter et al.
(2014), ECB (2009a), Gambacorta and Marques-Iba~nez (2011), Lown and Morgan
(2006)). Most of these studies follow this argumentation in their theoretical
motivation, but apply the stock of outstanding credit instead of new lending in
their empirical sections. But, the change in the outstanding stock includes also
maturing loans, revaluations, securitisation activity, and write-os (see Equation
3.1 and Figure 3.1):
Stock of Credit = New Lending − Maturing Loans −
Write-os − Securitisation + / −
Revaluations
(3.1)
These inclusions most likely lead to either an under- or over-reporting of the
true amount of new lending in an economy, depending on the size of the other
factors in relation to new lending. This can have a crucial inuence towards the
conduct of monetary policy if a central bank wants to assess credit developments.
If, for example, c.p. more loans have to be written o because of an exogenous
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event, there would be a reduction in the growth of the credit stock visible. This
might induce the central bank to relax monetary policy in an anticipation of a
weaker economy, even though net new lending might not have changed.
Figure 3.1: Composition of the change of the credit stock
In this context, it should be asked what the economically important variable
is, which central banks try to inuence in their monetary transmission calculus.
As only the actually drawn loans have an immediate impact on economic activity,
the concern for the impact of monetary policy on bank lending should be on
the amount of newly extended (and withdrawn) credit in a specic period, as
otherwise, through the use of the credit stock in monetary policy analysis, all
changes to previously granted loans, which are still in the books of the banks,
would get incorporated into the estimation. Although repayment structures, and
the amount of revaluations and written o loans can contain valuable information
about nancial risks, these information are not really crucial to assess the impact
of monetary policy on current and future credit origination, which should be the
main objective of central banks in assessing the transmission of their policies into
credit markets (see also ECB (2009a) for a similar argumentation). An existing
credit might drain some purchasing power from the creditor as he repays the loan,
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but the impact on aggregate demand of the initial credit and the multiplier eect
already played out, and have therefore no immediate impact on new spending,
and thus on monetary developments and ination dynamics. The inclusion of
the other factors into the change in the stock variable could therefore lead to
inconsistencies in the conduct of monetary policy.
An easy solution to this problem would be to simply apply new lending data
instead of the stock. But there is the problem that data on new lending is not
readily available in many countries/country groups. Only a few central banks even
collect data on newly issued credits comprehensively, and if they do, these data
are mostly condential. Data availability for the other factors contained in the
change in the stock is available to an even lesser extent, if at all. Thus, calculation
of new lending out of the stock and the other factors is nearly impossible.
3.3 Factors Aecting the Change in the Stock
of Credit
The outstanding stock of credit could be a good proxy for new lending activity, if
the other factors that aect the outstanding amount of credit would be stable and
uncorrelated with other objectives of monetary policy, like ination or economic
output. But the change in the stock is misreporting the underlying amount of
new lending in the economy, since the other factors are highly correlated with the
state of the economy.
But rst, the validity for also incorporating each factor into empirical estima-
tions is shown in the following paragraphs for each factor.
Repayments in general lead to an underreporting of the true amount of new
lending while using the outstanding stock of credit, as they drag the change
in the stock downwards. Furthermore, as repayment structures do change over
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time, variations in the stock data are generated, which are not be attributable to
changes in loan creation. A slowdown of credit growth might be due to lower credit
extension, but it can also be due to earlier repayment. Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010) try to include these loan retirements in their analytical framework, but
have trouble to account for it by using data from the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors (FRB) on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. That is why they use
data from the Reuters' DealScan database on syndicated loans. Although these
loan data are a true ow data covering newly sold syndicated loans, it cannot
be traced back when the underlying loans where originally extended, which is of
main interest for the conduct of monetary policy.
In addition, the growth rate in the outstanding stock c.p. changes if the
average length of the granted loans uctuates (see Antoniades (2014)). But as
central banks do not have direct control over private sector contract arrangements,
repayment trends should also not aect the immediate decision set of central banks
while analysing credit developments. In this regard, Figure 3.2 depicts the average
maturity of C&I loans in the United States, as captured in the Survey of Terms of
Business Lending (STBL). As shown in this example, a movement towards longer
running loans would lead to a higher growth path of the outstanding credit stock
over the long-run, even if nominal new lending would remain at the same level, as
credits are repaid slower, and are therefore longer and for a higher value in the
books of the banks. Thus, the prediction of the bank lending channel, that tighter
monetary policy reduces loan supply, could stem from banks reducing average
maturities, and not necessarily because of a cutting back on loan origination. This
argument is also stressed by Black and Rosen (2007).
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Figure 3.2: Weighted-average maturity for all C&I loans for the USA
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Note: Duartion in days for the USA. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Write-os of existing loans also drag down the stock of credit, and therefore
lead to an under-reporting of the actual amount of new lending. As write-os are
quite volatile, policy makers cannot dierentiate which amount of the change in the
stock is due to new lending activity and which is due to unexpected loan failures.
Additionally, write-os are probably highly correlated with economic activity. If
the economy is on a downward path, more and more loans become non-performing,
as it gets more dicult for borrowers to service their debt obligations. This can
be seen in Figure 3.3. Here, the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, which is dened
as the percentage of loans that are 90-days or more past due or nonaccrual to the
amount of total loans, is depicted together with the yearly GDP growth for the
United States. Once economic growth falls (shown here as an upward movement of
the green dashed line, because of an inverse y-axis), more and more loans become
non-performing, and could lead to higher default rates. High default rates in an
economic crisis could then even lead to a contraction in the stock of credit.
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Figure 3.3: Non-performing loans and GDP growth in the USA
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Note: 4quarter sums of non-performing loans in % of total loans at commercial banks ( , lhs)
and yearly GDP growth in % ( , rhs, inverted axis) for the USA. Source: Fed.
Moreover, due to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) banks
have to account for specic risks in their loan portfolios, which have to be
recognised through an incurred-loss-model. If there is external, objective evidence
of a possible loss at the reporting date, this impairment has to be accounted within
the subsequent re-evaluation at the present amount of the estimated discounted
cash ows which seem reasonably feasible. This process is reversed if the origin of
the impairment dissipates. Regarding loan portfolios at banks, this means that
the credit stock is exposed to changes if there are any economic events which
signicantly lower or raise the probability of repayment. This in turn would lead
to movements in the outstanding stock of credit (see again Figure 3.3). These
movements do not have a direct eect on the real economy, but are just the
consequence of past events, although they can have an indirect impact on future
loan origination, as these risks might change the supply of credit due to changing
protability of banks. If such revaluations happen, central banks might be inclined
to change their policy, even though new lending might not be aected by these
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cautionary measures.
What is visible from seasonally unadjusted loan data of the Euro area is that
the stock often drops quite signicantly in December (see Figure 3.4). Banks adjust
their loan portfolio in December to recognise impairments before the reporting
date. Although this eect might disappear once seasonal eects are accounted for,
it might lead to undesirable reactions from central banks if not, especially since it
can be dicult to estimate seasonal eects in real time.
Figure 3.4: Monthly credit growth for the Euro area
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Note: Non-seasonally adjusted absolute change in the credit stock of the Euro area (billion
Euro). December data is highlighted by vertical lines. Source: ECB.
The ECB tries to account for write-os and revaluations in their stock data.
Their Manual for Balance Sheet Statistics states that data of outstanding amounts
should be net of revaluations and write-os. These shall be reported separately.
The ECB then calculates two dierent series from the balance sheet data of the
banks. The stock data contains the stock as reported on the banks' balance
sheets, while the transactions (ow variable) are net of the stock adjustments (see
ECB (2012)). Although the ow variable does then not suer from an inclusion
of write-os and revaluations|as evidenced in Figure 3.5 that the amounts are
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generally higher than the simple change in the outstanding stock, especially for
non-nancial business loans who are certainly more prone to be revaluated and/or
written-o|, they are still suering from the incorporation of repayments and
securitisation data. Additionally, absolute ows are negative in some periods.
But as new lending activity could only be zero at minimum, one cannot draw a
conclusion about new lending from the ow data of the ECB either.
Figure 3.5: Dierence of the ow and stock of credit for the Euro area
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Note: Dierence between the ow and the change in the outstanding stock of credit for households
( ) and non-nancial corporations ( ) for the Euro area (million Euro). Source: ECB.
Another component which aects the stock of outstanding credit is securitisa-
tion activity (see Poschmann (2012) for an overview of the securitisation process).
By ooading loans o the balance sheet through a nal sell of the loan portfolio,
the amount of credit extended gets underreported. Furthermore, it is conceivable
that a credit goes unreported completely in some frameworks. As credit data is
mainly published by using bank balance sheet reports, a credit which is extended
and then sold o-balance (even if only partially) in the same reporting period
may not be fully captured in the stock data at all.
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Some central banks, like the ECB, specically report securitisation additionally
to the balance sheet data of the banks. These data would have to be added to the
stock data in empirical analyses, to gain a more precise picture of new lending
activities. Because of securitisation activity, the actual amount of new lending
might therefore be underestimated using bank balance sheet data, if not accounted
for. Altunbas et al. (2009) specically gather these securitisation activities of
European banks. They add data on securitisation activities onto balance sheet
data of individual banks and subsequently estimate the eects of the bank lending
channel. They nd that securitisation may have a negative inuence on the
eectiveness of the bank lending channel (see also Loutskina and Strahan (2006)).
But securitisation strengthens banks' loan supply on the other hand through
additional liquidity and an ooading of risks, although it might also induce higher
risk-taking in the loan extension process (see e.g. Altunbas et al. (2014)).
Figure 3.6 (a) depicts the outstanding stock of credit for the Euro area. The
red dotted line represents the raw outstanding amount data and the blue line
is the adjusted loan data, which accounts for sales and securitisation (see ECB
(2015)) for an in depth explanation of this series). The adjusted data consequently
is higher than the raw data, reecting the amounts of derecognised loans no longer
on the balance sheets. But, even though the ow of the adjusted loan statistic of
the ECB shall cover data adjusted for sales and securitisation as well as write-os
and revaluations, it cannot account for repayments. Looking at the ow of the
adjusted data in Figure 3.6 (b) conrms this, as the values in specic periods are
still below zero. But as new lending cannot fall below zero, this variable still does
not reveal the exact amount of newly issued loans, either.1
1 There is another deciency in this variable. The adjusted loan series is constructed by adding
the amount of securitised loans mechanically on top of the reported balance sheet data. While
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Figure 3.6: Adjusted credit stock for the Euro area
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Note: Outstanding stock ( ) and adjusted stock of credit ( ) in trillion Euro in (a) plus
the absolute ow of the adjusted stock of credit ( ) in billion Euro in (b) for the Euro area.
Data is non-seasonally adjusted. Source: ECB.
Thus, it is evident that from only looking at the change of the outstanding
stock, one cannot easily recognize the level of new lending. The ECB for example
wrote in their Monthly Bulletin from February 2010 that "... in December 2009 ...
the annual growth in loans to the private sector was zero" (ECB (2010), p.5-6).
From the raw stock data one just does not know if for example there was no new
credit issued and no loans repaid, or if all loans matured and the same amount
was created in the specic period. Certainly, there was still a decent amount of
new credit extended, so the actual outcome had to be between the two extremes
above. But to which extend is not visible without data of the other factors.
then the additional amount of the securitised loans in the original period are represented
clearly, the eects for the following periods are not evident. Since most likely the length of
the securitised loans is not known, the trajectory of repayments is not obvious either. Even if
it would be and would be accounted for, the further development of these securitised loans is
also not known. If the loan has maybe already been paid back earlier or had to be written
o is inuencing the height of the added securitised loans in the subsequent periods in the
adjusted series.
80
A more general problem with credit data for the conduct of monetary policy
is that it is not identiable if a loan extension really led to spending in the real
economy. In the aftermath of the Lehman collapse there was quite a big spike in
C&I lending in the United States visible. The stock of outstanding C&I loans rose
by 56 billion US$ in the month of October alone (see Figure 3.7). This unexpected
spike is also visible in new lending data. C&I loans, as captured by the STBL,
rose from an average of 85 billion US$ in each of the rst three quarters 2008 to
105 billion US$ in the fourth quarter of 2008. This spike in both data series can
certainly not be explained by seasonal factors or rising economic activity.
Figure 3.7: Outstanding stock of C&I loans for the USA
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Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) explain it by the fact that many rms drew
down on their previously granted credit lines due to concerns on access to credit
in the future. As shown in Figure 3.8, unused credit lines fell quite drastically
during this period (see also Meisenzahl (2015)). The spike in lending activity
posed as insurance for rms in case of a credit market cut o, and does not
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represent new investments in the wake of this negative shock to the economy. As a
result, o-balance sheet commitments were converted into on-balance sheet loans,
without necessarily leading to new spending and investment. Delta Air Lines
for example noted that they want "to increase [its] cash balance", while General
Motors said that they want "to maintain a high level of nancial exibility in the
face of uncertain credit markets" (see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010, p.327); see
also Huang (2010) for the same reasoning). It probably makes a huge dierence
for the eects on economic activity, if a credit is just sitting idle in the vaults
of the rms, or if it is used for new investment projects. But this is certainly
not observable by only looking at aggregate stock or new lending data, if not
specically accounted for in the frameworks.
Figure 3.8: Unused commitments at US banks
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Note: For all loans ( , lhs) and C&I loans ( , rhs) for the USA in billion US$. Source:
FRB.
Because of the above mentioned reasons, these accounting issues should not
play a big role in monetary policy decisions, although developments in these
variables should be monitored for macroprudential and nancial stability purposes.
But this cannot be accomplished from looking at the stock data only, since this
82
does not provide clear indications as to which factor caused the stock to change,
although some central banks try to mitigate this issue by subtracting write-os,
revaluations and securitisation out of the stock data.2
3.4 Literature Accounting for the other Factors
in the Credit Stock
Recent literature in the line of Kashyap and Stein (2000) tries to capture new
lending activity more rigorously in micro banking settings, while analysing bank
lending and rm balance sheet channels. Jimenez et al. (2014) for example use
data from the condential credit register of the Spanish central bank on loan
applications to assess determinants for credit extensions or rejections (see also
Abuka et al. (2015) for an estimation of the bank lending channel in Uganda; and
Garcia-Escribano (2013) for an application to Brazilian data). They have access
to information on all business loans granted by all banks in Spain. Although
they present valuable insights to what determines credit supply and demand, the
impact of monetary policy decisions from a macro perspective is not analysed in
this and the other mentioned studies.
Even though some authors, who are applying macro data to depict the impact
of credit to the real economy, are aware of certain aspects of the issues with the
2 Furthermore, what is also not covered in conventional stock data, as reported by central
banks and used in many monetary transmission studies, is lending from non-bank nancial
intermediaries (NBFIs). As these lending activities to the private sector gain more and more
importance (see again Chapter 2), central banks should also focus on these developments while
formulating their monetary policy decisions. Although NBFIs have no direct access to central
bank renancing, their lending activities have an impact on economic activity, and therefore
ination dynamics as well. By only looking at the stock of outstanding credit|and also new
lending activities|from MFIs, valuable information about the transmission mechanism could
be lost. But this would be a topic for further research, and cannot adequately be analysed in
this thesis.
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stock data, they do not account for all mentioned arguments rigorously. As stated
above, Biggs (2008) and Biggs et al. (2009) are trying to avoid the stock-ow issue,
but do not use data for newly extended loans either. Although they are explicitly
stating that they use a variable of new lending: "consequently our preferred credit
measure is the change in new credit issued as a % of GDP" (Biggs (2008), p.2;
highlights by the author), their credit impulse data is just the second derivative
of the stock of outstanding credit in the economy, and therefore still contains
eects from the other mentioned factors. Thus, one would need to compare the
change in new lending to the change in GDP in such frameworks, to eliminate
the stock-ow issue, and to account for the inclusion of other factors than newly
extended credits in the stock data (see Table 3.1).
For most of the data, Biggs (2008) and Biggs et al. (2009) draw on the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which states the outstanding amount of credit. Regarding the U.S., they
use ows-of-funds data, which draws on data from the Reports of Condition for
U.S.-chartered depository institutions (the so called Call Reports), to construct
the credit impulse. Although the usage of the ow-of-funds data might seem like
applying new lending data, the ows of total credit market borrowing, as stated
by the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in the Financial Accounts of the United
States, is only the dierence between the credit market debt outstanding in each
period, adjusted for some general revaluations.3 Data from the IMF also does
3 As a technicality, revaluation accounts (labelled as FR) in the Financial Accounts framework
of the Fed do not exceed a magnitude of two million US Dollar in any particular quarter
during the period from 1990 to 2015 (see the Z1 Data as provided by the Fed at https://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/default.htm). Therefore, these revaluations
cannot explain the drastic dierences in the aforementioned data. It is furthermore implausible
that revaluations of all commercial banks amount to only such a small amount, while the
total loan portfolio exceeds well over 10 trillion US Dollars.
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not take into account the other factors, as they state only the published balance
sheet data by the banks. The data in the above mentioned papers therefore
still suers from the accounting of maturing loans, revaluations not captured in
the frameworks, securitisation, and write-os. What is also evident is, that the
ow of total credit market lending (table F.1 in the Financial Accounts of the
United States statement4) is negative in some periods, because maturing loans,
net revaluations, and write-os were higher in these periods (for example during
the GFC in 2009) than the amount of new lending plus other debt issuance.
Even literature of stock-ow consistent (SFC) models, who specically try to
avoid stock and ow inconsistencies, mostly use only the dierence of the stock as
their new lending variable. Many studies applying these SFC models to economic
data for the United States use data from the ow of funds framework of the Fed,
mentioned above (see for example Godley et al. (2007)). Papadimitriou et al.
(2013) motivate their stock-ow identity in a SFC model for Greece as
Stockt+1 = Stockt + Flowt + NCGt − DSt (3.2)
where the NCG stands for net capital gains and DS for the reduction in
the stock, for example defaults. Anyhow, they report that "annual borrowing
uctuated around 7 percent of GDP from 1998 to 2006" (p.18), but only calculating
the implied new borrowing from "the stock of loans outstanding" (p.18). While
trying to avoid stock-ow inconsistencies by calculating the ow of credit, they
still omit to account for the other factors aecting the change in the stock.
4 It is to be noted that the data in the F.1 table labelled as Total Credit Market Debt Out-
standing is constructed by adding up loans and debt securities. Instead of only incorporating
bank lending, this framework also considers other forms of debt creation, like commercial
paper and corporate bond issuance.
85
3.5 Stylised Facts of Lending Activity
As mentioned above, most central banks only disclose information from the aggre-
gated balance sheets|and therefore stock data|of commercial banks, and not
data on new lending activity. Therefore, most academic research still incorporates
stock data on bank lending.
The Fed tries to capture data on new bank lending in their quarterly Survey
of Terms of Business Lending (STBL), where they collect micro bank data. Every
13 weeks, the Fed asks a sample of commercial banks to provide certain price and
non-price information about their granted commercial and industrial loans during
the rst full week of the 2nd month of each quarter (see Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (2013)). Since it is only survey based at selected
institutions and covers only loans extended during one week, not all new loans
are captured. Nevertheless, Figure 3.9 compares the amounts of new lending, as
collected by the STBL and the stock of outstanding C&I loans on the balance
sheets of US commercial banks. On average, new lending comprises about 7.8%
of total loans for the period from 1997 until 2016 (although falling from about
15% to around 5%).
What is visible from this comparison is, that the level of new lending did
not rise since 1998, but the stock increased almost threefold during the same
period. New C&I loans are today about the same as 20 years ago. The rise in
the stock of outstanding C&I loans in turn is mainly the result of longer-running
loan contracts. As the amount of new lending did not grow, but in the same time
loans were granted with a longer maturity, these loans are for a longer time and
a higher amount on the books of the banks, and thus push up the outstanding
amount of credit. This lock-step between the maturity and the outstanding stock
can clearly be seen in Figure 3.10. The outstanding stock has a correlation with
the average maturity of 73%.
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Figure 3.9: C&I loans for the USA
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Note: New C&I loans ( ) and the stock of C&I loans of commercial banks ( ) for the USA
in billion US $. Source: Fed.
Figure 3.10: C&I loans and their average maturity for the USA
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Note: Four quarter rolling averages of the outstanding stock of C&I loans in billion US $ ( ,
lhs) and the weighted average maturity of C&I loans in days ( , rhs) at commercial banks in
the USA. Source: Fed.
Thus, these longer running loans are contributing overly to the rise of the
stock. Consequently, looking at the stock overestimates the rise of lending in
comparison to the actual amounts of newly issued credits. This overestimation of
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lending growth can certainly have signicant and far-reaching consequences for
the conduct of monetary policy. This is also validated by Figure 3.11. Except for
a few short episodes after the Dot-com Crisis and the Financial Crisis, the stock
grew quite noticeably throughout the observed period. The level of new lending
on the other hand did not really expand, as it is basically at the same height as
in 1997, although it dropped to lower levels in the time in between.
Figure 3.11: Change of C&I loans for the USA
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Note: New C&I loans ( , lhs) and the absolute change in the stock of C&I loans of commercial
banks ( , rhs) for the USA in billion US $. Source: Fed.
Furthermore, what can be observed is that the change in the stock does not
move in sync with the amount of new lending. This can certainly stem from the
selection of the reporting week in the new lending variable, as it might not be
exemplary for the whole quarter. But what seems to be more plausible is that
the other factors in the stock data inuence the change more than the underlying
trends in new lending activity. The correlation between the two series|new
lending and the change in the stock|is only about 0.3, which means that 70%
of the uctuation in the stock data are not explained by new lending. While the
stock shrank drastically after the Dot-com Bubble and during the Financial Crisis,
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the fall in new lending cannot explain the drop in the stock alone, especially
during the Financial Crisis after 2008. Remember, that the spike in new lending
in the third quarter of 2008 is because of precautionary borrowing from rms
in fear of a credit market shut-down. Without this, the subsequent fall in new
lending activity would not be as dramatic as it appears in the graph.
From 2005 on there is a huge acceleration in the growth rate of the stock
visible, growing with an average of almost 15% annually between 2005 and 2008,
while new lending only grew with an annual rate of about 10% during this period
(see Figure 3.12 for the growing gap especially since 2004). Additionally to longer
loan contracts, the sharp increase in the stock can probably be explained by a
fall in NPLs, and therefore lower revaluations and write-os after the turmoil
from the Dot-com Bubble and 9/11 vanished (see Figure 3.13). Due to these
lower write-os and upward-revaluations, the stock grew at a faster pace than
new lending afterwards. Therefore, the seemingly overly credit extension before
2008 can partially be explained by a higher growth in the credit stock due to
falling write-os, upward-revaluations of the loan portfolio and longer running
loans, and not due to drastically accelerating bank lending (at least in the business
sector), as new C&I lending did not grow with such a high rate. This, among
other things, might explain why the perceived lending boom before 2008 did not
lead to elevated ination, since new lending did not grow as fast as implied by
the change in the outstanding stock.
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Figure 3.12: Log C&I loans in the USA
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Note: Log new lending ( , yearly sum, lhs) and the log of the outstanding stock ( , average
yearly observation, rhs) for C&I loans in the USA. Source: Fed.
Figure 3.13: Non-performing loan ratios for the USA
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Note: Non-performing loans in % of total loans at commercial banks for the USA (all loans
( ) and commercial and industrial loans ( )). Source: Fed.
This observation might also explain the puzzle of the credit-less recoveries
mentioned by Claessens et al. (2009) and Calvo et. al (2006), and picked up by
Biggs et al. (2009). After nancial crises, NPLs make up a higher portion of the
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outstanding stock, which drags the outstanding stock downwards, mainly due to
revaluations. The change in the stock is therefore to a large extent inuenced
by the high negative correlation with the NPLs, which is not supported by the
underlying changes in new lending activity. This argument is also conrmed by
the fact that new lending rose again since the third quarter of 2003, while the
stock reached its low point not until the second quarter of 2004. This observation
is especially signicant for the paper of Claessens et al. (2009), since they only
consider the rst three years after a nancial crisis in their model set-up. As this
is precisely the time-span where downward revaluations are especially high. Even
while new lending might pick up, this must not translate itself through to the
stock data.
The same trends as after the Dot-com Bubble are also noticeable for the
period between 2009 and 2011. While the stock still fell until the third quarter
of 2010 (albeit slower than before), new lending already reached its low point
during the rst quarter of 2010. As a result, the stock generally can be expected
to drop steeper than the underlying new lending activity during crisis times, and
consequently recovers later, albeit if so with higher rates.5
Although there is no new lending data publicly available for consumer and
mortgage loans in the USA, the same picture probably might apply to a certain
extent, as is visible by a quite large drop in the total stock data in 2009, followed
by a quick recovery after the initial risks vanished.
The ECB also does not compile data on new bank lending in a comprehensive
credit register either. Therefore, data from the Monetary Financial Institution
Interest Rate (MIR) statistics of the ECB is used here. The ECB collects data
5 See for example Berrospide and Meisenzahl (2015) for an argumentation why new lending
did not drop that signicantly during the Great Recession.
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of "new business volumes" (basically new lending activity) as weights for the
calculation of the aggregated MIRs, i.e. the average interest rate which creditors
have to pay for a new loan. By doing this, the volume of the new loans is only
aggregated through a sample, and does not cover all new lending activity.
Although this dataset might pose as a better alternative to the adjusted stock
data, there are certain deciencies in this data for the conduct of the analysis in
this thesis. If for example a loan contract is renegotiated|i.e. if there was an
initial rate xation, but after several years the interest rate can be altered|this
loan contract would be counted as a new loan in the MIR framework, even though
there was no new loan creation, as the ECB is only interested in current interest
rate conditions while collecting this dataset (subsequently, the stock would not rise
on such a contract). The ECB only started publishing the amount of renegotiations
in December of 2014. What is visible from this brief period is that renegotiations
for loans to non-nancial corporations make up about 20%, for mortgage loans
35%, and for consumption loans 10% of all new lending for each loan type in this
set-up. Though, there are major dierences for the dierent Euro area countries.
As for example in Germany, the majority of loans are extended with a xed rate
over the whole duration, loan contracts in Spain or Italy are largely taken out with
a xed rate for a certain amount of time, which is then subject to renegotiations.
Anyway, for this short period of time data on renegotiations are quite stable, giving
rise to the assumption that they do not distort the new lending data severely in
any direction. For data before 2014, it is not identiable if these renegotiations
make up a huge amount of the new loans or if there is great uctuation.
Furthermore, a new loan that is just renancing an old one would also be
counted as an additional loan within this framework, even though no new spending
in the real economy would be nanced by this. Because of these shortcomings,
the exact value of new lending (which is also followed by a transaction in the
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real economy) might not be illustrated precisely, but should rather be seen as an
estimation of the true value. Despite these deciencies, the data from the ECB
MFI interest rate statistics on new business volumes might paint a more precise
picture of new lending, instead of the stock of outstanding credit, until better
data becomes available.
As for the USA, new lending does only make up a fraction of the outstanding
stock (see Figure 3.14). New lending makes up around 11% of the size of the stock
between 2003 and 2016. For non-nancial business lending the new lending share
is about 18% (the higher share is explainable by shorter durations of business
loans in respect to e.g. mortgage loans, who typically last more than 10 years).
These ratios show, that there is a high inertia in the stock. Even though amounts
of new lending might uctuate largely, this might not be translated into stock
changes to a large extent, as new lending is only a fraction of the stock amount.
Figure 3.14: Loans for the Euro area
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Note: New lending ( , quarterly sum) and the adjusted stock of credit ( ) for the Euro
area in billion Euro. Source: ECB.
Looking at ow data, quite the same observations as for the US data also
applies for the Euro area. While the stock of outstanding credit still exhibited a
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positive (albeit slower) growth trajectory until the middle of 2009, new lending was
already contracting in the end of 2008. As Figure 3.15 (a) shows by comparing the
credit stock to total new lending, it becomes apparent that the stock began to fall
in the second quarter of 2009, while net new lending already peaked in the third
quarter of 2008. With default rates probably coming down again by the end of
2009 (visible by a stop in the growth of the percentage of NPLs (see Figure 3.16)),
the growth in the stock of outstanding credit slowly recovered and grew from the
rst quarter of 2010 on. However, one has to be aware that movements in the
NPL-ratio cannot be interpreted cleanly, since e.g. a fall in the NPL-ratio could
be the reason because of a reclassication of NPL-loans as performing loans or by
complete write-downs of previously non-performing classied loans. But contrary
to the growth in the stock, new lending still contracted further. This apparent
return to growth visible in the outstanding stock was therefore not due to higher
credit creation, but rather due to the high volatility in revaluations and write-os,
as default rates certainly came down after the initial stages of the Financial Crisis.
Figure 3.15: Change of loans for the Euro area
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(b) Loans to non-nancial corporations
Note: New lending ( , quarterly sum, lhs) and the absolute change in the adjusted stock of
credit ( , rhs) for the Euro area in billion Euro. Source: ECB.
94
Figure 3.16: Non-performing loans for the Euro area
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Note: Non-performing loans in % of total loans. Source: IMF, ECB.
This is also evident while looking at business loans in Figure 3.15 (b). The
outstanding stock of credit to non-nancial corporations began to fall in the
second quarter of 2009, while new lending already reached its peak during the
third quarter of 2008. The stock did not fall signicantly from the second quarter
of 2010 onwards, while new business lending still fell at quarterly rates of between
ve and ten percent until the end of 2010, and still contracted further afterwards,
albeit at a slower pace.
Evidently, the ECB stated that "the annual growth of credit to the private
sector gradually strengthened further in the rst four months of 2011, albeit
remaining moderate. The expansion seen in credit to the private sector
during the rst few months of 2011 was driven mainly by MFI loans, with the
annual growth rates of both MFI loans to households and MFI loans to non-
nancial corporations continuing to gradually increase" (ECB (2011b), p. 28-29),
and "the annual growth rate of MFI loans to the private sector ... continued its
modest upward trend, increasing to 2.6% in April, up from 2.4% in the rst quarter
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of 2011 and 1.7% in the fourth quarter of 2010... Thus, the recovery observed
since early 2010 in private sector loan dynamics is continuing, albeit at a gradual
pace. ... The annual growth rate of lending to non-nancial corporations turned
positive to stand at 0.5% in the rst quarter of 2011, up from -0.4% in the fourth
quarter of 2010, and reached 1.0% in April." (ECB (2011b), p.31). Thereafter they
note that "the annual growth rate of loans to non-nancial corporations remained
weak in the rst four months of the year, but steadily increased further, continuing
the gradual recovery observed since the second quarter of 2010. This increase in
borrowing is in line with business cycle regularities and reects improvements in
business condence and a gradual increase in the annual growth rate of gross xed
capital formation." (ECB (2011b), p.32; highlights by the author). But as shown
above, this apparent return to growth was probably just due to a slowdown in the
contraction-rate of new lending and lower write-os and downward-revaluations,
and not due to an increase in borrowing, as stated by the ECB.
The Banco Central do Brazil (BCB) is one of only a few central banks who
compile data on new lending activities for public access, as they publish series
on new credit operations in the economy. One can therefore compare the new
lending data to the stock data directly (see Figure 3.17). It becomes visible, that
the absolute change is signicantly smaller than actual new lending, as the other
factors in the change of the stock predominantly drag the stock downwards. New
lending activity amounts to only about 12% of total outstanding loans.
Additionally, while looking at the growth rates in Figure 3.18, it becomes
visible that on average new lending basically did not grow anymore since the
beginning of 2014. But by looking at the growth in the stock data, one would
still see growth rates of over 10%, even though new lending is falling. But as a
credit is only slowly repaid, it stays on the balance sheets for a certain amount of
time. Therefore, the stock does not contract as much and as fast as it did rise
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while loans were extended. Furthermore, the correlation between new lending and
the absolute change in the stock is also not that high at only 0.35.
Figure 3.17: Change of loans for Brazil
07
/2
01
1
01
/2
01
2
07
/2
01
2
01
/2
01
3
07
/2
01
3
01
/2
01
4
07
/2
01
4
01
/2
01
5
07
/2
01
5
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Note: New lending ( ) and the absolute change in the outstanding stock of credit ( ) for
Brazil in billion R$. Source: BCB.
Figure 3.18: Yearly loan growth for Brazil
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Note: Yearly growth in new lending ( ) and the total outstanding stock of credit ( ) for
Brazil in %. Source: BCB.
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On the basis of the above observations, it can be argued that premature or
delayed movements in the stock data could lead to responses of central banks
which are not justied by the underlying fundamentals in new lending activity.
This overestimation, among potential other factors, might be a reason why the
ECB raised policy rates in the summer of 2011, amid still falling new lending in
the Euro area. While giving high emphasis to the second pillar of the mandate, the
monetary side, the ECB might have reacted too early with raising rates, and had
to unwind this rise later that year. Specically, they based a part of their decision
on a strengthening growth of loans, citing in their Monthly Bulletin of June 2011:
"The annual growth rate of MFI loans to the private sector . . . [increased ] to 2.6%
in April" (ECB (2011b), p.31; additions by the author). Since this underlying
pace of monetary expansion (together with ample liquidity) seemed to have "the
potential to accommodate price pressures in the euro area" (ECB (2011a)), they
raised their policy rates. But, new lending was still falling in the middle of 2011
with annual rates of about 10%, albeit at a slower pace than before. If the ECB
would have looked on the underlying credit creation instead of the change in the
stock, it might have come up with a dierent decision.
The example of Sweden in 2010/2011 might also support this argumentation.
The Riksbank had fear of nancial instability due to perceived risks of overheating
in credit markets, especially in the housing market, because of high and rising
growth data in lending. Therefore, they tightened policy to contain ination and,
as noted by the deputy governor Stevan Ingves, to curb the "excessive risks in the
nancial system" (Riksbank (2010)). While raising the policy rate from 0.25 to 2
percent in less than a year, the Riksbank wanted to bring down the "household
credit growth [which] was about 9 percent" (Carlstrom (2015); additions by the
author). Although this number can be challenged (see Figure 3.19 and also
Svensson (2014)), it might nevertheless again be the result of a pick-up in the
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stock growth due to falling downward revaluations and write-os after the Global
Financial Crisis, and not per-se due to a pick-up in new lending activity.
Figure 3.19: Yearly loan growth for Sweden
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Note: Yearly growth of lans to non-MFI (Total ( ) and to households ( )) for Sweden in
%. Source: Riksbank.
3.6 Lending and Economic Activity
So far, we have seen how new lending behaves in relation to the outstanding stock.
Coming back to the stock-ow discussion of Section 3.2, the application of new
lending certainly has an inuence on the relation between credit and economic
activity. The question now becomes, as to how the other factors are correlated
with economic activity, and therefore possibly overestimate the ndings of previous
studies. Applying the methodology from Biggs et al. (2009), it becomes visible
that their credit impulse measure moves generally in line with GDP growth.
Figure 3.20 shows the year-on-year growth rates for GDP and new lending, as well
as the credit impulse as a percentage of GDP (calculated from the outstanding
stock). The credit impulse and GDP growth have a high correlation of 0.85, which
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would underline the argumentation of the authors. But what can be expected is
that the movement in the impulse generally stems from the volatile behaviour of
revaluations and write-os, which certainly have a high correlation with economic
activity. This is underlined by the observation that the year-on-year growth in
new lending has only a 0.57 correlation with GDP growth, which is still quite
high, but not as robust as the correlation while using the stock.
Figure 3.20: Credit impulse for the Euro area
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Note: Yearly GDP growth ( ) in %, the credit impulse for the Euro area calculated from the
stock ( ), and the change in new lending ( ) (as % of GDP). Source: ECB, Eurostat.
By calculating the equivalent of the credit impulse for new lending (using only
the absolute dierence as a percentage of GDP), the same picture prevails, as
there is a correlation of 0.60 with GDP growth (see Figure 3.21 in the Appendix
A3 on page 103).6 Due to the co-movement of the other factors in the stock data
with real economic events, one could reach the false impression that (new) lending
moves closely in line with economic activity, as predicted by Biggs et al. (2009).
6 The correlation of the new lending and the stock impulse is only 0.45, further highlighting
the distortions of the other factors in the change of the stock.
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3.7 Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter identies potential problems for monetary policy
conduct when using the outstanding stock of credit while formulating policy
decisions. Volatility in the stock does not need to arise from underlying trends
in new lending activity, but can merely be a result of other factors, namely
revaluations, write-os, securitisation activity, and maturing loans, which are
highly correlated with the state of the economy. As shown above, monetary
authorities could formulate decisions which might not be in line with current and
future developments in credit markets, if taking the outstanding stock of credit as
its measure instead of looking at the underlying trends in new credit creation.
While the standard literature on monetary policy eects on bank lending is
mostly looking at the change of the outstanding stock of credit in their empirical
parts, the theoretical argumentations in the literature are certainly devised having
new lending in mind. But most studies do not follow this thought process rigorously
in their empirical sections (see e.g. literature in the line of Bernanke and Blinder
(1988)). With a focus on the change in the outstanding stock of credit in almost
all empirical studies and communications of central banks, two potential problems
are identied in this chapter. First, the outstanding stock of credit incorporates
data of maturing loans, revaluations, sell-os due to securitisation, and write-os.
Second, problems can arise because of a mix-up of stock and ow variables.
By using the amount of new lending, these two problems can be mitigated,
as they do not suer from distortions of the data due to information which are
not in the direct control of central banks, and are therefore less crucial for the
impact of monetary policy decisions on current and future lending activity, and
their eects on the economy. Deviations arising from the incorporation of these
additional factors into the stock data might therefore lead to diverging responses
of central banks to monetary developments, which might stand in contrast to the
101
implications of actual new lending activity.
Recent studies (f.e. Jimenez et al. (2014), Abuka et al. (2015), Garcia-
Escribano (2013)) try to remedy the above mentioned issues by drawing on
data from credit registers of certain central banks. In their micro-level studies
about determinants of bank lending they incorporate approved new credit (lines),
and try to answer questions about what are the specic determinants of loan
extension. But these are generally not applied to macro studies of monetary policy
transmission. One problem can be that the use of new lending in macro studies
poses to be quite dicult, especially for academics outside of central banks, as
most central banks have no publicly available credit register. While some have
detailed credit registers, most central banks only publish data on the outstanding
amount of credit, with data of the credit registers only available to the central
bank's sta, if at all. Although the Federal Reserve publishes survey data on
commercial and industrial loans in their STBL, not all loans are incorporated
in this framework. Especially, crucial loans on mortgages, which can pose large
threads to the economy because of possible over-indebtedness in the private sector,
are not collected through this framework. Therefore, only a fraction of total new
lending is being reported. In the Euro area data on new business lending in the
MIR framework also possesses the same diculties as the U.S. data, as mentioned
before.
This chapter highlights, that it is crucial to assess to which extent new lending
is responsible to the change of the outstanding stock of credit and which amount
is aected from repayments, revaluations, securitisation activity, and write-os.
The built-up of explicit credit registers is therefore seen as important to formulate
thorough analyses about lending and credit developments, and the monetary
transmission towards bank lending.
102
Appendix A3
Figure 3.21: New lending credit impulse for the Euro area
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Note: Credit impulse as calculated from new lending in % of GDP ( ) and yearly GDP
growth ( ) in % for the Euro area. Source: ECB, Eurostat.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of Lending Activity
in the Euro Area
Chapter 3 laid out the theoretical argumentation for using data on newly extended
loans instead of the outstanding amount of credit (or its change) in empirical
estimations assessing the eectiveness of monetary transmission towards bank
lending. This chapter applies these insights in a panel model of eight Euro
area countries, which estimates determinants for loan extension, by comparing
estimations using the outstanding stock of credit and new lending. Thereby,
specic determining supply and demand side factors are identied in a simultaneous
equation set-up using an instrumental variable approach. This chapter is based
on Behrendt (2016a).
4.1 Introduction
Empirical models of determinants of bank lending mostly apply the change in the
outstanding stock of credit as the dependent variable. This approach might be
prone to inaccuracies. In Chapter 3 it is argued that to understand the transmission
of monetary policy shocks and its eects towards bank lending, one should look
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at the amount of new lending in an economy, rather than the outstanding stock
of credit. By taking the credit stock, empirical estimations might be distorted
because of the inclusion of other factors in the stock variable, namely repayments,
write-os, securitisation activity and revaluations, over which the central bank has
almost no inuence. Furthermore, these are in part not attributable to economic
developments, but are quite random, although e.g. write-os and revaluations
are highly correlated with the state of the economy. One mentioned example is
the length of loan contracts, which has an impact on the speed of repayment and
thus on the height of the outstanding stock, which consequently aects its growth
trajectory. This chapter tries to take this argumentation to the data and estimate
to which extent determinants of bank lending dier in regard to the model set-up.
For this, dierent empirical models are applied. Estimations using the amount
of new lending, proxied by new business volumes from the Monetary Financial
Institution Interest Rate (MIR) statistics of the European Central Bank, are
compared to estimations applying the outstanding stock of credit. Due to the
dierent behaviour of these two time series, it can be expected that the specic
estimation coecients vary in their signicance, magnitude and possibly in sign.
This would have important consequences for the conduct of monetary policy, and
could lead to a more robust estimation of monetary policy transmission through
the credit channel.
In most empirical analyses regarding such a question, the log change in the
outstanding amount of credit in an economy is applied as the dependent variable,
while mostly modelling AR(1) processes, with various supply and demand side
determinants as independent variables. What is found in the literature is that
there are certain bank and macro specic variables which determine bank lending
in the aggregate. Generally, economic performance and ination dynamics (past
and expected) aect lending positively (Bernanke and Blinder (1988)). These are
105
mainly determining factors for the demand side, while bank specic factors play a
crucial role for the supply of bank loans. Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Kishan
and Opiela (2000), among others, show that more well capitalised, less leveraged
and more liquid banks have a higher lending capacity, and react to tightened
monetary policy less severely, by shrinking their lending volumes less drasticly.
Most of these earlier studies rely on single equation estimations to capture
the eects on bank lending. While these studies reveal the impacts of dierent
determinants on nal bank lending, they cannot show to which extent supply
and demand eects aect the market outcome. It would be preferable to apply
micro banking data to this problem (like e.g. Jimenez et al. (2014)), but this
is not possible for the whole Euro area, since the ECB does not collect data in
an European-wide credit register, like for example available in Spain or Italy.
Therefore, this chapter has to draw on aggregate data, and model the empirical
estimations for the demand and supply side in two dierent equations using two
and three stage least squares set-ups, thereby taking into account the simultaneous
behaviour of restrictions to bank lending on both market sides (see e.g. Carpenter
et al. (2014)).
What is found in this chapter is that it does indeed make a distinct dierence
which credit variable is applied, as could be expected by the dierent behaviour
of the change in the outstanding stock of credit in comparison to the underlying
movement in new credit extensions. Not only do the magnitudes of the estimated
coecients dier, also signicances and even the sign of the coecients may
change. This result has serious implications for the conduct of monetary policy,
as central banks might react to changing credit conditions in a dierent|and
maybe not justied|way while looking at the stock data, given the underlying
trends in credit creation.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the
empirical literature of the bank lending channel, with a special focus on what
determines bank lending. The empirical model is then presented in the Section 4.3.
The crucial determinants, which are applied in the dierent specications, are
motivated there. In Section 4.4 the dierent empirical models are estimated.
Thereby, a panel model for eight Euro area countries, to account for the specic
country eects, is estimated, to reveal if there are indeed dierences using the
specic credit variables. To account for certain demand and supply determi-
nants separately, a two equation simultaneous estimation is applied. Section 4.5
concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
The analysis of monetary policy eects towards bank lending faces two crucial
problems. The rst refers to how banks are able to insulate their loan portfolio
from monetary policy shocks. The main analysis here deals with the question on
how banks can adjust their internal funds in a way to not be aected negatively
to a changing monetary policy stance. Secondly, from an economical point of view
it is quite complicated to disentangle demand from supply side factors in credit
markets. The question here is, if a reduction in lending stems from a reduction in
loan demand or from a decline in loan supply (see Peek and Rosengreen (2013)
for an overview).
Regarding the rst issue, evidence of empirical studies on the adjustment
process of the loan portfolio of banks towards a monetary policy shock show that
monetary tightening leads to a reduction in the asset portfolio through shrinking
securities. Only with a delay a reduction in lending sets in (see Bernanke and
Blinder (1992)). Although some studies nd an increase in lending in the short-run
(see e.g. Morgan (1998), Ivashina and Sharfstein (2010)), this can be traced back
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on the delayed response of the loan portfolio, as the negotiation process of credit
extension is generally quite long. Furthermore, lenders could have concerns to
access credit in the future, whereby they draw down on loan commitments and
previously established lines of credit. But in the longer-run, the decrease in loan
supply should outweigh demand reactions.
Banks who can respond to monetary policy tightening by raising non-reservable
liabilities are less aected as other banks, and therefore do not shrink their loan
portfolio as much (Kashyap et al. (1996)). Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that
more liquid banks have easier access to external nancing and can thus insulate
their loan portfolio with more ease to a monetary tightening. Therefore, less liquid
banks and banks with an inferior capital base have to shrink their loan portfolios
to a greater extent (see also Kishan and Opiela (2000), Peek and Rosengreen
(1995)). Also, smaller banks are less likely to nd alternative sources of funding,
if not aliated to a large multibank holding company (see Campello (2002)).
Since it cannot easily be dierentiated to which extent the change in the
loan portfolio is attributed to supply or demand eects, recent studies try to
draw on data on a micro level from detailed credit registers. These panel studies
relate bank balance sheet data to other bank and rm specic characteristics.
With regard to linking rm characteristics to loan supply, Jimenez et al. (2012b)
nd that short-term interest rates and loan approvals are negatively correlated,
which is more pronounced with weaker bank health, especially in crisis times.
Additionally, rm health also plays a restraining role in the supply of credit, as it
has stronger eects on lending than bank balance sheet strength in crisis times.
Ciccarelli et al. (2015) show that loan supply restraints are more pronounced than
demand restraints following a negative monetary shock by using condential bank
surveys for the Euro area and the United States.
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While micro level data linking rm to bank characteristics are not available
for the whole Euro area, a dierent methodology of disentangling supply from
demand eects is applied in this chapter. As credit supply and demand are
determined contemporaneously on one market, a simultaneous equation model
using two equations is estimated. Therefore, an instrumental variable approach
similar to Carpenter et al. (2014) and Calani et al. (2010) is applied. By using
only one equation models (like e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988)), it cannot
be distinguished to which extent supply and demand factors react to changing
economic conditions. Calani et al. (2010) for example are able to show that loan
demand is negatively inuenced and supply is positively associated with the loan
rate, which is in line with conventional theory.
Generally, empirical research nds evidence in the importance of the credit|
and especially the bank lending|channel in the transmission of monetary policy.
In addition to eects on the liability side through the standard interest rate
channel mechanisms, there are signicant eects through a restructuring of the
asset portfolio of banks in response to a monetary tightening. Moreover, there is
empirical evidence that liquidity and capital constrained banks react more severely
to monetary policy shocks, as well as the adverse impact on bank dependent
borrowers, with a more pronounced eect of supply over demand constraints.
On the demand side, expectations of future returns on investment play a
crucial role for the debtor. If these are positive, loans are more likely to be repaid,
which leads to higher loan demand. These expectations are formed on the basis
of past experiences, which are then updated into the future on the basis of recent
data. Therefore economic growth is viable for the demand side decision to request
loans (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Maddaloni and Peydro (2011)).
Furthermore, ination dynamics play a role in the credit demand decision, as with
c.p. higher ination debt looses its worth more quickly, therefore loans can be
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repaid quicker, which would lead to higher loan demand.
One problem with the empirical research, with an exception of recent studies
using data from detailed credit registers, is that they still incorporate balance
sheet data of loans, and the results are therefore prone to distortions due to the
incorporation of factors in the change of the outstanding stock, which are not
reecting the underlying trends in credit extension. Chapter 3 already laid out a
detailed analysis of this critique. The following empirical application of data on
new lending tries to remedy this deciency.
4.3 Empirical Model
4.3.1 Methodology
There is one particular issue with using aggregate data on lending, because of
which the use of detailed data from explicit credit registers would be preferable.
While applying aggregate lending data, only the amount of actual new lending
is quantiable. This nal amount is therefore only the result of the minimum
of supply and demand decisions on credit markets. But given the question of
this chapter, that it shall be shown which are the determinants that inuence
loan supply and demand, one would have to apply more profound data of the
notional plans, and not only on the nal, realised amounts. As loan requests that
were rejected are not visible in the aggregate credit data, it cannot be seen which
market side was the constraining one. Although new lending data of the ECB, as
well as data of the outstanding stock of credit, cannot account for this critique,
data on credit extensions certainly represents the conditions on credit markets
better than data of the outstanding stock of credit in an economy. Additionally,
adding survey based data on perceived lending conditions, as done in this chapter,
can mitigate this problem partially.
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The empirical estimation in this chapter tries to account mainly for the iden-
tication issue prevalent in the literature. The bank specic internal adjustment
cannot be analysed in this macro setting and is therefore left out.1 Additionally,
the critique of Chapter 3 is taken up again, where it is argued to use data on new
lending activity in empirical estimations of determinants of lending activity. The
strategy is to estimate the model twice. Once with the new lending variable and a
second time with the change in the stock as the dependent variable, respectively,
to examine to which extent empirical investigations might dier with a more
precise variable for new lending activity. Therefore, a simultaneous equation panel
model will be estimated for eight Euro area countries.2
Along the lines of recent literature (see e.g. Carpenter et al. (2014), Calani
et al. (2010)), supply and demand equations are estimated separately in the
panel model, due to the simultaneity of the formation of loan rates, functioning
as the price for both supply and demand decisions on lending. Following the
literature on bank credit determinants, specic variables, which are important
for the supply and demand side, are controlled for, notably macroeconomic
determinants, expectations of future economic performance, and nancial market
and bank specic determinants, like the policy rate, stress indicators, bank balance
sheet determinants and survey based data on lending standards of banks (see e.g.
Ciccarelli et al. (2015), Everaert et al. (2015), or Maddaloni and Peydro (2011)).3
1 The reader shall be referred to the micro bank level literature like Abuka et al. (2015),
Jimenez et al. (2012a), or Jimenez et al. (2014).
2 The countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. The sample had to be restricted to these eight countries because of data availability.
3 Due to the nature of the aggregate data, this study cannot reveal the specic bank reactions
in their loan supply to changing economic conditions, but merely shows a country wide
aggregate, which is prone to outliers. Therefore, the estimates shall not be interpreted as a
direct reaction function under which condition a specic bank grants a new loan application,
but rather be seen as an industry wide response to changing conditions. Nevertheless, valuable
information as to which extent market conditions aect bank lending can be drawn from this
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4.3.2 Supply Factors
Commercial banks try to maximise their prots while taking into account several
constraints, which are specically funding, liquidity and capital constraints, while
simultaneously managing their optimal asset structure given the macroeconomic
environment (see Mishkin (2012)). In their supply decision of additional credit,
banks have to weigh the revenues of an additional credit against the costs. The
loan rate of extended credits is the determining revenue factor for a bank, and
will be modelled on the supply side as the revenue factor. Higher loan rates would
be expected to lead to higher credit supply, as|if one abstracts from any market
frictions|there would be higher margins available, which would result in a better
prot outlook.4
On the other hand, banks face costs for renancing, and are subject to capital
and reserve requirements. A proxy for the costs of renancing can be the policy
rate, for which banks have to renance themselves to meet specic requirements.
Higher policy rates should suppress loan supply, because of higher costs for
renancing. Additionally, the policy rate can also be seen as a proxy for future
economic conditions, respectively expectations about the future path of the policy
stance. Upward deviations would lead to expectations about a slower future
growth path of the economy, which would also lead to lower credit extension.
Furthermore, bank balance sheet specic determinants are analysed. The
literature shows that well capitalised and liquid banks are more likely to extend
method. Moreover, while the incorporation of the specic determinants are motivated by
micro level considerations, they are also valid at the aggregate level.
4 While an individual higher loan rate could also be the result of higher risks of loan extension
for the bank, this might not be a big concern in the instrumental variable set-ups, because
movements of the loan rate due to higher risk perceptions are removed in the rst stage
regression by incorporating risk measures.
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loans. Therefore, capital ratios and liquidity measures are added to the estimation.
Higher values on these should have a positive eect on bank lending. However,
identication becomes dicult, since only aggregated data is applied in this study,
which is therefore prone to outliers. Additionally, the capital ratio might also
cause some problems in this estimation, since during the estimation period the
Basel regulations were extended further, requiring banks to hold more capital. The
capital ratio might therefore be vulnerable to estimation biases, and higher capital
ratios might not directly be attributable to a higher capacity to extend loans.
Although this problem might be mitigated while using a broad capital denition
as applied here, since the requirements for total capital were already at 8% since
the introduction of Basel I in 1992 and were not raised during the observation
period.5 While there is a markedly increase in (especially risk-weighted) capital
visible after the Lehman crash in 2008, this is not per se due to the higher capital
requirements of the Basel regulations. It is mostly due to market discipline eects
and to self interests of the banks, as only the capital ratios with respect to risk
weighted|and not total|assets increased after the Financial Crisis (see Brei
and Gambacorta (2014)). Anyway, it can be that since during this period bank
lending declined, the estimation could potentially show a negative relationship
with regard to new lending.
Moreover, banks with higher credit exposure are less likely to extend further
loans. Therefore, the loan ratio is added as an additional supply side variable,
which should have a negative impact on loan supply. While these arguments
mainly stem from micro level analyses, they are generalisable to the aggregate
5 Nevertheless, it might be appropriate to apply a dummy for the Tier 1 capital requirements,
but since the requirements for the Basel I and II were all risk weighted, it is dicult to ascribe
a numerical value during the early observation period. Thus it is left out here.
113
level. A better capitalised and less leveraged banking system would lead to lower
risk exposure for the individual institute, and would in general result in a higher
capacity to extend loans for a specic bank.
Additionally to the individual banks' risks, market risks also play a determining
factor in loan supply decisions. These risks lead to a reduction in loan supply, since
average real returns shrink, and it becomes less attractive for banks to extend loans.
The market risk is modelled by the Composite Indicator of Systematic Stress
(CISS) of the ECB (see Hollo et al. (2012) for an overview of this indicator). The
general CISS is an aggregation of 15 indicators, which covers risks in 5 markets|
money market, bond market, equity market, the foreign exchange market and
risks for nancial intermediaries. But due to data limitations, only the Sovereign
CISS indicator can be used, as the general CISS is only available for the whole
Euro area. The Sovereign CISS compiles spreads and volatilities from the short
(2 year) and long (10 year) end of the yield curve.
It would be preferable to also incorporate data about the individual balance
sheet risk of banks, and thereby applying the ratio of non-performing loans to total
loans as an individual's risk variable. Unfortunately, such data is not available
for individual Euro area countries and the time-frame considered in this chapter.
NPL-ratios are therefore left out in this chapter. However, it can be expected,
that the CISS and NPLs are highly correlated, since higher market risk would
lead to more loan failures. Therefore, the CISS can also be seen as a noisy proxy
for balance sheet risk.
As Lown and Morgan (2006) and Ciccarelli et al. (2015), among others, note,
information from survey data can contain valuable information about changes in
lending standards of banks. The ECB performs the Bank Lending Survey (BLS),
where they ask senior loan ocers about changes in their lending practices (see
Ciccarelli et al. (2015) for a detailed explanation of the methodology). In this
114
chapter, past developments are of interest. Therefore, backward looking questions
for changes in the lending standards are taken. What can be expected is that
with tighter lending standards, loan extension decreases, and vice versa.
4.3.3 Demand Factors
The loan rate constitutes the main determining factor on the demand side as well.
It represents the cost of lending for borrowers. The decision to demand loans is
based on the net return of investments with respect to the interest of loans on the
one hand and, once the investment decision is made, on the costs of alternative
nancing (like bond issuance) on the other. A higher loan rate would suppress
loan demand, as lending gets more costly with respect to other forms of nancing,
and thus becomes more unattractive.
Additionally, macroeconomic conditions need to be incorporated to adequately
capture loan demand from the public. Borrowers look at previous economic
conditions, from which they draw on expectations about the future. Furthermore,
good economic conditions in the past imply that borrowers are more condent to
request a loan, as their likelihood to repay a loan is stronger if they have faced
better economic positions in the past.
On top of that, expectations about future economic conditions play an im-
portant role on credit demand. Better expectations for the future would also
lead to more condence to repay a loan and would therefore strengthen demand.
Thus, lagged economic growth and lagged ination dynamics are modelled as
backward-looking variables, while survey data on the expected future path of
economic growth and ination expectations are used as forward-looking indicators.
It can be expected that demand responds to all these variables in a positive way.
Information from the BLS are also modelled for the demand equation. Replies
to the question of the change in the demand for loans and credit lines at banks
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are captured here. Higher demand visible at the banks should also translate into
higher credit creation, absent supply constraints.
4.3.4 Data
To be in line with the literature, the logarithmic change in the amount of loans
extended by MFIs vis-a-vis the Euro area (excluding ESCB) is taken as refer-
ence.6 To account for the critique on the use of the stock variable, data from
the MIR statistics of the ECB on new business volumes is applied for new lend-
ing. To not over-dierentiate, the simple logarithmic change is used, as new
lending is a ow variable in itself. To have the estimation technique correspond-
ingly, the second order change in the log of the outstanding amount of bank
credit is additionally applied in a further model (see Biggs and Meyer (2013),
Huang (2010) for a reasoning on this).
The main independent variable is the loan rate on new business lending,
as collected in the MIR framework. The loan rate is a determining factor for
both market sides, as it is a revenue factor for the supply and a cost factor for
the demand side. Since the loan rate is only collected for dierent sub-groups,
these individual loan rates are multiplied by the proportion of the respective loan
category with respect to the whole amount of new business loans.
To account for a varying monetary policy stance, the change in the policy
rate is applied on the supply side, to cover the forward looking aspect of banks in
their decision to extend loans. For this, the one quarter lagged change in the real
EONIA rate, which is the average overnight rate for unsecured interbank lending,
6 Data denitions, sources and the expected signs can be found in Table 4.5 in the Appendix
A4 on page 138, while summary statistics are found in Table 4.6 in the Appendix A4 on
page 139.
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is used in the model. This is in line with standard macroeconom(etr)ic models
(see Ciccarelli et al. (2015) for a reasoning as of why the EONIA rate might be
an appropriate variable for the stance of the monetary policy even during the
Financial Crisis). A tightening of monetary policy would lead to expectations
about slower economic growth, which would then induce banks to cut back on
lending. It can thus be expected that the change in the policy rate is negatively
correlated with the growth of lending.
For the market risk, the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) of
the ECB is taken. The sovereign index is applied in the panel model. In time
of economic stress, this index rises. Therefore, the CISS is to be assumed to be
related negatively to bank loan supply, as in time of stress it can be expected that
credit extension falls due to uncertainty about the future path of the economy and
due to possible arising balance sheet stress for banks, which would then depress
bank loan supply.
Bank balance sheet specic determinants are added to the supply side equation.
The amount of securities and cash to assets is used as a liquidity indicator (see
Gambacorta and Marques-Iba~nez (2011)).7 It can be expected that higher liquidity
in the banking sector leads to higher loan extension. The same applies for better
capitalisation in the banking system. To capture bank capitalisation, a capital
ratio is calculated, as the ratio of capital and reserves to total bank assets (see
Gambacorta and Shin (2016)). As a risk variable for the loan portfolio, the
7 It can also be argued to model excess reserves additionally to cash and securities, as these are
also indicators for liquidity. Especially after the Financial Crisis the ECB used unconventional
monetary policies to guarantee enough liquidity for banks by issuing more reserves than
necessary for the maintenance of required reserves. Although specic eects of unconventional
monetary policies associated with an expansion of the ECB's balance sheet will be analysed
in more detail in Chapter 5, additional specications will be estimated using also excess
reserves due to this reasoning here.
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outstanding stock of credit in relation to total bank assets is calculated. This loan
ratio is expected to have a negative eect on bank lending, as higher leverage
in the economy might induce banks to cut back on lending, because of internal
balance sheet weakness and because of a possible over-leveraging in the private
sector. Contrary, a positive sign may be the result of credit trends reinforcing
themselves in the light of good or bad economic conditions.
In the demand equation, past and expected future economic activity is mod-
elled. Annual GDP growth is taken as a proxy for past performance. The majority
of other studies use the log dierence of economic growth. But since the private
sector is mainly focussed on annual growth rates, as being the most visible pub-
lished source, it is taken here to reect the decisions of private sector agents better
(see also Ciccarelli et al. (2015)). Due to the delayed publication of the quarterly
growth data and to account for the duration of the loan application process, GDP
growth is modelled with a three quarter lag. This is in line with the literature
(see Carpenter et al. (2014)). Additionally, the choice of the lag length is also con-
rmed by looking at the cross-correlations between GDP growth and new lending
growth. For forward looking economic trends, business condence is modelled.
For this, the log change in the Economic Sentiment Index (ESI) is used, which is
compiled through a survey undertaken by the European Commission to capture
expectations for future economic activity in the private sector (see European
Commission (2016)).
Ination dynamics also play a role in the decision of loan demand. With
higher ination, nominal debt looses its worth more quickly and private sector
agents can therefore delever faster. This might induce higher credit demand. For
the backward-looking behaviour, the headline ination rate is applied with a one
quarter lag. The same rationale as with GDP growth also applies here. Ination
from the consumer survey of the European Commission are applied for the panel
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models, because data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is only
publicly available for the Euro area as a whole. The European Commission gathers
data about the one year ahead price dynamics.
For the survey data on bank lending standards, the changes in the demand
for loans are captured in the demand equation (question 4 in the BLS), while
taking the change in the credit standards of banks (question 1) for the supply side
equation. The demand variable shows the dierence between banks reporting an
increase and a decrease in loan demand. Therefore, positive values indicate higher
demand for loans. On the supply side, the BLS data is calculated as the net
percentage of banks answering that they have tightened credit standards minus
banks reporting an easing. Positive values therefore show a tightening in credit
supply. Thus, for the demand side a positive sign would be expected with regard
to loan demand, while a negative sign is expected for the supply side BLS variable.
The variables on the supply side (except for the policy rate) are captured
without a lag, since banks have data about their balance sheet strength contempo-
raneously available while extending loans. However, there might be methodological
problems, especially with regard to business loans. As the main question in this
chapter is what determines the decision to request or extend a loan, respectively,
one would need to apply the prevailing data at the time of the inquiry on the
demand side and on the nal decision by the bank on the supply side. Micro
banking studies looking at applications from detailed credit registers can capture
this due to the availability of the specic dates of the request more stringently.
With aggregate data, this cannot be modelled specically. In regard to the supply
side, especially for established credit lines to businesses, one does not know when
the underlying loan contract between the bank and the private sector agent was
nalised. Since it can be that these loans sit idle for months and only get drawn in
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the future, the underlying economic trends might have changed in the meantime.8
Additionally, there is a time gap between the application for a loan and the nal
decision of the bank, as the process often takes some time. These issues cannot
be accounted suciently in model set-ups using aggregated data. But, by using
quarterly data, they can be mitigated to a certain extend.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Panel Model
Most empirical studies that try to determine factors for bank lending apply single
equation autoregressive models with the logarithmic change in the outstanding
stock as the dependent variable (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988), or Garcia-
Escribano (2013), among others). In addition to several determining factors, as
discussed in the last section, one lagged term is included on the right hand side
equation, due to the autoregressive behaviour of the outstanding stock.
In general, interpretation of the results using such a set-up is dicult, since
both demand and supply determinants are modelled in one equation, where the
specic eects for each market side cannot be analysed suciently. This would be
especially vital for the interpretation of the coecient for the lending rate. From
a single equation model, it cannot be detected to which extent which market side
is impacting the nal results. Thus, to account for the simultaneity of credit
supply and demand decisions, and for the simultaneous determination of the loan
rate, a typical AR(1)-model set-up is not sucient for a thorough estimation of
credit determinants. Thus, a two equation model is analysed for eight Euro area
8 Using U.S. data, it can be seen that the average length between the date when the terms are
set and the date on which the loan is drawn is around 12 months for C&I loans.
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countries from 2003Q3 till 2014Q2. Through this, it is possible to isolate supply
from demand eects (see Greene (2012), chapter 15). The model is then specied
as follows:
Demand Equation:
logLoans1it = 0 + 1 ⋅ Loan Rateit + 3 ⋅ Growthit−3 +
4 ⋅ Inflationit−1 + 5 ⋅ Economic Expectationsit +
6 ⋅ Inflation Expectationsit + 7 ⋅ BLSit + 1it + u1it
(4.1)
Supply Equation:
logLoans2it = 0 + 1 ⋅ Loan Rateit + 2 ⋅ rEONIAit−1 +
3 ⋅ CISSit + 4 ⋅ Liquidityit + 5 ⋅ Loan Ratioit +
6 ⋅ Capital Ratioit + 7 ⋅ BLSit + 2it + u2it
(4.2)
with i and i as the to be estimated coecients, nit as the country xed
eects and unit as the error terms.
Due to the simultaneity, an instrumental variable approach is applied using
two stage least squares (2SLS), while treating the loan rate as the endogenous
variable, and regressing it over the included exogenous variables and the
instrumental variables from the equation of the other market side in the rst
stage, to obtain the tted value for the loan rate:
First stage regression:
̂LoanRateit = 0 + 1 ⋅ Zit + 2 ⋅ Wit + it (4.3)
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where i are the unknown regression coecients, Zit are the instruments
(exogeneous variables from the equation of the other market side), Wit are the
exogeneous variables from the equation to be estimated and it is an error term.
In the second stage, the estimate of the loan rate from the rst stage (Equa-
tion 4.3) is used as a regressor in each Equation (4.1 and 4.2 respectively) as the
instrument, and performing an OLS regression of the specic equation together
with the included exogenous variables Wit (see Wooldridge (2002), chapter 5).
By doing this, the tted value of the loan rate from the rst-stage regression is
net of inuences from the other supply and demand variables, and reveals the
movements of the amount of lending resulting from the simultaneously determined
loan rate, and is therefore not correlated with the disturbances anymore.
Furthermore, a simultaneous system model using 3SLS is estimated, with
Equation 4.4 as the equilibrium condition (see Greene (2012), chapter 10.6 for a
discussion of simultaneous equation models). The logic behind this is that the
amount of new lending is representing the quantity and the loan rate the price.
The third equation is then equating supply with demand:
Credit Demand = Credit Supply: (4.4)
The dierence between the two instrumental variable approaches is that 3SLS
contains an additional second step, where, after using the tted values from
the rst stage (the same as in 2SLS), a consistent estimation for the covariance
matrix of the equation disturbances is obtained, because of possible correlation
of the disturbances across the two equations, thereby improving the eciency of
the estimator. The third stage then performs a GLS estimation instead of OLS
estimation. A second dierence is that while applying a 2SLS technique, not all
exogeneous variables have to be used to obtain the instrumental values for the
endogenous variables in the rst stage, in contrast to the 3SLS set-up.
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4.4.2 Panel Results for New Lending
The model analysed here is the one with the new lending variable. The results
using the outstanding stock are discussed in the next section. The results from
the main regressions using new lending are shown in Table 4.1 for the demand
side and in Table 4.2 for the supply side.
For each equation several model set-ups are considered. Model (1) in each
equation shows a simple panel OLS model without restrictions. In column (2)
country-xed eects (it) are added. For column (3), time-xed eects are
considered, in addition to the country xed eects. Columns (4) to (6) depict
the results for the 2SLS IV approach, with the respective instrumental variables
shown below the table, using country-xed eects. The approach is to rst use all
exogenous variables in the rst stage, and then to sort out the weak instruments
and check for over-identication, until the "nal" estimation in (6) is reached.
Column (7) depicts the estimation for the 3SLS model.
The results reveal that it is indeed appropriate to use the instrumental variable
approach to account for the endogenous behaviour of the loan rate. For both
equations the expected signs for the loan rate are obtained, which is not the case
for the OLS and the xed-eects models, as the demand side estimates are positive
there.
For the demand side, the loan rate only shows the expected negative signs in
the IV specications, and only being signicant in models (6) and (7). Previous
economic growth and ination have a positive, mostly signicant impact on lending,
as expected.9 Expectations about future economic trends exhibit no signicance
in determining lending for the more sparsely instrumented specications, although
9 The results are robust even if the month-on-month change or dierent lags (1 or 2 quarters)
for GDP growth are applied.
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they still have a positive impact on lending. Ination expectations on the other
hand reveal an ambiguous picture, having small estimates and no signicance,
except for the 3SLS model. The BLS data is positive and signicant at conventional
level, except for model (3) with time-xed eects. Positive values for the BLS
demand question stipulate a net increase in demand. Therefore, signs are as
expected.
Table 4.1: Demand side new lending models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS FE FE IV IV IV 3SLS
Loan Rate 0.129 0.407 0.763 -0.379 -2.168 -4.062∗ -1.286∗∗
(0.40) (0.94) (0.71) (-0.45) (-1.61) (-1.77) (-2.47)
GDP 0.404∗∗ 0.358∗ 0.390 0.453∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗ 0.361∗∗
(2.25) (1.86) (1.10) (2.14) (2.63) (2.57) (3.09)
Ination 0.638 0.931∗ 0.530 1.020∗ 1.221∗∗ 1.434∗∗ 0.323
(1.28) (1.68) (0.67) (1.81) (2.04) (2.10) (1.16)
ESI 0.225∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.024 0.217∗∗ 0.149 0.078 -0.000
(2.60) (2.82) (0.15) (2.36) (1.44) (0.59) (0.00)
Ination 0.142 -0.031 0.083 -0.013 0.029 0.073 0.287∗
Expectations (0.63) (-0.10) (0.18) (-0.04) (0.09) (0.20) (2.16)
BLS Demand 0.504∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.430 0.563∗∗ 0.580∗∗ 0.597∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(2.38) (2.49) (1.56) (2.51) (2.46) (2.32) (3.91)
Constant -2.529∗ -3.637∗∗ -4.079 -0.940 5.200 11.70 3.355∗
(-1.82) (-2.14) (-0.77) (-0.32) (1.10) (1.48) (1.72)
F-Statistic 20.97 14.51 16.80
Sargan-Hansen 5.442 1.543
p-Value 0.364 0.462
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments:
(4): rEONIA; CISS; Liquidity; Loan Ratio; Capital Ratio; BLS Supply
(5): CISS; Capital Ratio; BLS Supply
(6): CISS
The F-Statistic depicts values for the Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F test of weak instruments. Values below 10 would
indicate that the applied instruments are weak (see Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)). The Sargan-Hansen test checks for
overidentication. The null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are valid, which means that they are uncorrelated
with the error term. A rejection would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments.
Turning to the supply side, the expected positive sign for the loan rate
can be observed. Higher loan rates thus lead to higher credit supply, as prot
opportunities for banks might rise. Looking at the IV models, a rise of the loan
rate of one percentage point would induce higher loan supply of at least 3.5
percentage points, with higher coecients than the respective estimates on the
demand side. The policy rate also has the expected sign and is signicant of at
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least 10% in almost all IV specications. Furthermore, the coecient is also in
the range (around -1.5) of other studies which try to nd out to which amount a
change in the policy rate accounts to a change in lending (see e.g. Gambacorta
and Marques-Iba~nez (2011), Ehrmann et al. (2001)). An increase of the real
EONIA rate of one percentage point would therefore lead to a 1.5 percentage
point drop in the growth of new lending. The CISS also has the expected sign,
with high signicance of at least 10% in most IV estimations.
Table 4.2: Supply side new lending models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS FE FE IV IV IV 3SLS
Loan Rate 1.003∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗ 1.311 3.536∗∗ 3.453∗∗ 4.551∗ 3.469∗∗∗
(2.74) (2.13) (1.12) (2.39) (2.30) (1.72) (3.62)
rEONIA -0.591 -0.598 0.747 -1.554∗ -1.522∗ -1.941 -1.550∗∗∗
(-0.84) (-0.83) (0.71) (-1.70) (-1.66) (-1.55) (-2.98)
CISS -3.847∗ -3.820 -4.039 -8.084∗∗ -7.942∗∗ -9.810∗ -3.663∗∗∗
(-1.78) (-1.57) (-1.18) (-2.34) (-2.28) (-1.92) (-2.70)
Liquidity -0.093 -0.092 -0.073 0.165 0.156 0.268 0.059
(-1.42) (-0.79) (-0.45) (0.88) (0.83) (0.92) (1.41)
Loan Ratio -0.108∗∗ -0.099 -0.150 -0.107 -0.107 -0.110 -0.182∗∗∗
(-2.38) (-0.67) (-0.92) (-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.69) (-4.03)
Capital Ratio 0.305 0.159 0.287 0.531 0.519 0.682 0.591∗∗∗
(1.44) (0.44) (0.62) (1.24) (1.21) (1.25) (3.48)
BLS Supply -0.396∗ -0.451∗ -0.137 -0.729∗∗ -0.720∗∗ -0.841∗∗ -1.010∗∗∗
(-1.72) (-1.88) (-0.47) (-2.49) (-2.45) (-2.18) (-4.09)
Constant 0.960 1.543 0.371 -15.05 -14.50 -21.77 -10.94∗∗
(0.35) (0.27) (0.05) (-1.37) (-1.30) (-1.19) (-2.94)
F-Statistic 8.66 10.45 13.57
Sargan-Hansen 4.62 4.55
p-Value 0.33 0.20
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments:
(4): GDP; Ination; ESI; Ination Expectations; BLS Demand
(5): GDP; Ination; ESI; BLS Demand
(6): BLS Demand
The F-Statistic depicts values for the Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F test of weak instruments. Values below 10 would
indicate that the applied instruments are weak (see Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)). The Sargan-Hansen test checks for
overidentication. The null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are valid, which means that they are uncorrelated
with the error term. A rejection would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments.
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The IV models also support the assumption that higher liquidity in the banking
sector contributes positively to higher lending.10 Higher loan ratios happen to be
negatively correlated with lending, but only showing a signicant impact in the
3SLS model. The same applies for the capital ratio, although with the expected
positive sign. The supply side BLS variable also has the expected negative sign
(higher values for the BLS supply variable indicate tighter lending standards) for
all models, with high signicance of at least 5% in the IV specications.
Furthermore, it might be suspected that the models are prone to a regime
change because of the Financial Crisis after 2008. This is not evident in the data.
Although adding a dummy variable for the break in 2008 reveals the expected
negative sign, it shows no signicant eect on the results of the other variables.
The reason may be that the CISS already accounts for most of the impacts of the
Financial Crisis.
Additionally, using loans to non-nancial corporations as the dependent
variable in the new lending set-up does not change the results substantially, except
that the loan rate on the demand side becomes less signicant in specication
(6) and is positive in specication (4) (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9 in the Appendix
A4 on pages 141 and 142, respectively). This might be attributable to the more
inelastic reaction of business lending towards loan rates, as the main rationale for
credit demand lies in the immediacy of the investment decision, and possibly in
the long duration between the loan application and the draw down of the credit
line. Further, the negative impact of monetary policy through EONIA changes is
not visible anymore, as the sign is positive, except for the 3SLS specication. A
10 Adding excess reserves as an additional liquidity variable does not change the results. The
estimation is robust with regard to the other variables, while excess reserves do not add any
explanatory power to the estimation, as the coecients are near zero with low signicance.
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possible reason might be the argument of Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), already
mentioned in Chapter 3, that in case of a monetary tightening, corporations draw
down their pre-existing credit lines in fear of rising rates and/or a credit market
cut-o. Additionally, dierent lags are considered as a further robustness check
also for the previously not lagged variables, except the BLS data. Results do not
vary signicantly. Furthermore, what could also distort these results is the nature
of corporate lending. Most short term loans are in the form of bridging loans,
which are certainly very inelastic to the dierent determinants, as the immediacy
of paying outstanding bills probably has higher priority and is very random. To
eliminate these loans from the estimation would be preferable, but data about
such loans is not available. Additionally, business loans can be seen to be more
pro-cyclical, which could imply that while loan rates rise because of a rise in the
policy rate, the economy is still on a sucient growth path and economic agents
might assume further robust growth, which would support credit extension.
As a preliminary conclusion, it can be assessed that the model with the new
lending variable performs quite well, as signs and signicances are predominantly
in line with conventional theory.
4.4.3 Panel Results using the Stock
Because of the autoregressive behaviour of the stock variable dynamic panel
techniques have to be considered, while using the change in the outstanding
stock as the dependent variable in the panel set-up. Typically, a generalized
method of moments (GMM) type estimation would be applied. Since these only
lead to unbiased estimates for panels with a large number of individuals, several
estimation techniques are considered here. A lagged term of the loan amount is
included in the single dierenced stock model, due to the autoregressive behaviour.
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As a starting point, simple OLS regressions are considered. First without
xed eects (model (1), labelled OLS, while adding country xed eects in model
(2) (labelled FE) (see Equations 4.5 and 4.6):
Demand Equation:
logLoans1it = 1 ⋅ logLoans1it−1 + 2 ⋅ X1it + 1i + u1it (4.5)
Supply Equation:
logLoans2it = 1 ⋅ logLoans2it−1 + 2 ⋅ X2it + 2i + u2it (4.6)
with Xnit being a matrix containing the independent variables, ni as the
country xed eect, and unit again as an error term.
Additionally, due to the simultaneity of the determination of the loan rate,
the xed eects model is also extended using an instrumental variable setting.
This is done similar to the new lending panel model in model (3) (labelled FEIV).
The approach is the same as for the 2SLS models for new lending, with the loan
rate as the endogenous variable, while using the exogenous variables from the
other equation as instruments together with the exogenous variables of the same
equation in the rst stage.
Because of the lagged credit stock variable on the right-hand-side of the
equation, OLS estimates can become inconsistent because of the correlation
between the individual country eects and the lagged dependent variable. These
should diminish with a higher panel length, but can nevertheless still be signicant.
The disturbances from country xed eects can be eliminated using least square
dummy variable estimates, but this estimation suers from the small sample size
(see Baltagi (2008)).
128
Due to this, dynamic panel techniques using GMM-type estimations are
applied, to account for most of the shortcomings from the OLS estimations.
However, they are designed for panels with many individuals, and therefore might
still suer from small-sample bias (see Judson and Owen (1999)). Nevertheless,
two models using GMM estimation are considered here. First an Arrelano-Bond
(AB) estimator is applied in model (4) (see Arellano and Bond (1991)). The
rst-dierenced equation for this is given in Equation 4.7 in a generalised form:
Yit = 1 ⋅ Yit−1 + 2 ⋅ Xit + uit (4.7)
with Yit as logLoansit − logLoansit−1.
Through rst dierencing, the constant country xed-eect () disappears.
For the estimation, a GMM estimator with lagged-levels of the dependent and
endogenous variables, and rst-dierences of the exogenous variables in the levels
equation have to be applied as instruments, because OLS would be inconsistent
otherwise due to the correlation between Yit and uit. The dierenced dependent
variable in the levels equation is then not correlated with the error term anymore,
and can thus be used as an instrument.
But if the autoregressive process is too persistent, the lagged-levels instruments
become weak. Therefore, a second GMMmodel (5) is estimated, using the modied
Blundell-Bond (BB) GMM estimator. Here, a system GMM estimator with lagged
rst-dierenced instruments of the dependent and endogenous variables in the
levels equation in addition to the previously used lagged-levels instruments in the
rst-dierenced equation is used (see Blundell and Bond (1998)). Both GMM
models apply the same instrument set as the FEIV estimation.
To reduce the small sample bias, Kiviet (1999) proposes a least square dummy
vector corrected (LSDVC) estimator (model (6)), which performs better in terms of
the bias for models with a small number of individuals, than the GMM estimators
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for strictly exogenous regressors. For this estimation, the Anderson-Hsiao (see
Anderson and Hsiao (1981)) estimator (AH) is applied to initialize the bias
correction. This AH estimator lagges the dependent variable twice and uses it as
an instrument for the rst-dierenced model with no intercept. Unfortunately,
this estimation is not able to implement endogenous variables as instruments,
which is a major drawback for the use in simultaneous model set-ups.
Although Monte Carlo tests reveal the most ecacy and accuracy for the LS-
DVC estimation regarding the lagged dependent variable and exogenous regressors
(see Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999), Bruno (2005)), it does not account for
the simultaneity of the estimation of the loan rate. Flannery and Watson Hankins
(2013) account for endogenous variables in such simulations, and reveal that some
set-ups indeed exhibit signicant errors. They show that xed eects models
have low errors for the endogenous variables, but not for the lagged dependent
variable. On the contrary, the BB model is reliable regarding the endogenous and
the lagged dependent variables. Due to the dierent drawbacks of each model for
estimations with a small population, all six models are estimated and analysed
(Table 4.7 in the Appendix A4 on page 140 depicts the specic drawbacks of
each estimation more clearly). Arrelano-Bond tests for autocorrelation reveal a
rst-order autocorrelation structure throughout the GMM and LSDVC models,
as expected. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results for the stock estimations for the
demand and supply equations, respectively.
The same variable set-up as in Equations 4.1 and 4.2 apply also for the stock
model, with the added one period lagged credit variable on the right hand side of
the equation. All instrumental variable approaches applied in the dierent stock
models (FEIV, AB, BB) only use the smallest set of instruments, as in model (6)
for the new lending variable, resulting in the use of the CISS for the demand side
equation and the BLS Demand variable for the supply side equation. Results do
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not change signicantly while applying dierent and/or more instruments, and
are therefore omitted here.
Table 4.3: Demand side stock models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FEIV AB BB LSDVC
 Stockt−1 0.687∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗
(17.37) (15.60) (11.48) (15.16) (17.86) (16.24)
Loan Rate -0.009 -0.051 -1.265∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.077 -0.082
(-0.19) (-0.74) (-3.22) (-0.73) (-1.44) (-0.99)
GDP 0.172∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(5.20) (5.49) (5.05) (5.31) (6.91) (4.96)
Ination -0.008 -0.035 0.111 -0.036 -0.014 -0.0228
(-0.10) (-0.40) (0.85) (-0.40) (-0.19) (-0.24)
ESI 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.005 0.051∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(3.80) (3.75) (0.19) (3.61) (4.61) (3.71)
Ination -0.005 0.030 0.057 0.032 0.049 0.037
Expectations (-0.13) (0.62) (0.83) (0.62) (1.22) (0.70)
BLS Demand 0.069∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.076∗
(2.01) (2.11) (1.69) (2.06) (2.79) (1.91)
Constant 0.021 0.155 4.305∗∗∗ 0.158 0.206
(0.10) (0.58) (3.18) (0.58) (0.97)
Observations 344 344 344 336 344 344
Hansen test of over-
identication (p-value)
0.686 0.214 0.533
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments in (3), (4), and (5): CISS
20 repetitions are used for the calculation of the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix in model (6).
It is apparent that the results dier considerably with respect to the results
for the new lending models. Especially for the Blundell-Bond model (5), which is
deemed to be the most accurate regarding the endogenous variable, the loan rate
estimate diers quite substantially. The signicant impact of the loan rate, as
seen in the new lending estimations, vanishes in the stock models, except for the
FEIV model, which might perform with a low error in regard to the endogenous
variable (see Flannery and Watson Hankins (2013)). Also, the negative impact
of monetary policy decisions cannot be seen in the stock models, except for the
FEIV model, but without being signicant. This result might emerge because of
the high inheritance in the stock, as new lending comprises only a fraction of the
outstanding stock (see again Chapter 3).
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Table 4.4: Supply side stock models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FEIV AB BB LSDVC
 Stockt−1 0.733∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
(20.21) (13.90) (7.56) (13.82) (18.47) (13.51)
Loan Rate 0.068 0.033 1.193∗∗ 0.032 -0.001 0.024
(1.13) (0.44) (2.04) (0.42) (-0.02) (0.26)
rEONIA 0.072 0.114 -0.321 0.117 0.094 0.112
(0.64) (1.03) (-1.23) (1.05) (1.03) (0.75)
CISS -1.325∗∗∗ -1.181∗∗∗ -3.247∗∗∗ -1.186∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗∗ -1.137∗∗
(-3.73) (-3.12) (-2.85) (-3.09) (-2.66) (-2.00)
Liquidity -0.011 -0.021 0.092 -0.020 -0.048∗∗∗ -0.012
(-0.99) (-1.10) (1.51) (-1.04) (-3.24) (-0.48)
Loan Ratio -0.000 -0.060∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.009 -0.060∗
(-0.01) (-2.51) (-2.28) (-2.49) (-0.72) (-1.91)
Capital Ratio 0.012 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.160∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.174∗
(0.34) (-2.69) (-0.26) (-2.67) (-1.35) (-1.78)
BLS Supply -0.024 -0.031 -0.154∗∗ -0.030 -0.028 -0.032
(-0.67) (-0.84) (-1.97) (-0.81) (-0.85) (-0.62)
Constant 0.468 4.139∗∗∗ -2.686 4.174∗∗∗ 2.357∗∗∗
(1.06) (4.11) (-0.74) (4.09) (3.95)
Observations 344 344 344 336 344 344
Hansen test of over-
identication (p-value)
0.495 0.038 0.554
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments in (3), (4), and (5): BLS Demand
20 repetitions are used for the calculation of the bootstrapped variance-covariance matrix in model (6).
Additionally, the capital ratio and liquidity estimates are negative in the stock
model for almost all specications, which is not the case for the new lending
models, and is hardly explainable by theory. Furthermore, the supply side BLS
indicator becomes insignicant, although still exhibiting a negative sign. This
might be due to the high inheritance of the stock, as changes in credit standards
do not show up immediately to a large extend in the change of the stock. Although
the sign and signicance for the BLS demand question is still as expected, the
magnitude is exceedingly smaller.
Further, it is also evident that the economic sentiment is far more signicant
for the stock variable than for the richer models using the new lending variable.
The stock is to a large extend driven by other factors, in this case especially
revaluations and write-downs, which uctuate highly with economic activity and
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future economic expectations. As a consequence, the stock variable might not be
optimal for analysing models which try to depict the rationale for loan extension.
This seems to underline the argumentation from Chapter 3.
The stock model is also estimated with the second dierenced outstanding
stock variable (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the Appendix A4 on pages 143 and
144). Due to the stationarity of the variable, the same model set-ups as for the
new lending variable are applied, with the respective instruments depicted below
the table. What is apparent is that the models using the second dierenced stock
perform notably worse in regard to the underlying theory. Coecients for the loan
rate are negative in both equations, being even signicant at the 5% level for the
supply side IV models (5) and (6). The demand side variables (except ination in
the models (1), (2), (3) and (4)) are positive, albeit mostly insignicant (except
GDP growth for models (5) and (6) at the 10% level). Expectations about the
future path of economic growth are only signicant in models (1), (2), (3) and (4).
On the supply side, all other variables are insignicant, except the policy rate,
which is positive throughout and signicant at least at the 10% level in models (5)
and (6), and the liquidity measure, which is negative throughout and signicant
at least at the 10% level in models (5) and (6). For the IV models, the capital
ratio also has a negative sign, while the BLS supply variable turns positive. The
estimations also do not improve by taking other variables as instruments.
The second dierenced stock model does not only perform poorly from the
point of view that many estimates have signs which are not in accord to theory, it
has furthermore little explanatory power. This observation gives more validation to
the observation that the stock, especially here the change in the growth trajectory,
is not suited to estimate determinants for new lending behaviour. This may be
due to the reason that the other factors comprising the change in the stock hide
valuable information about the underlying trends in credit extensions.
133
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter takes the observations presented in Chapter 3 to the numbers. There,
the observed dierences between the behaviour of the outstanding stock of credit
and data for new loans gave rise to the hypothesis that empirical estimations of
credit determinants might dier. As the question of this chapter was to nd out
which variables determine loan extension to what extent, the conjecture from the
observation of the stylised facts could be armed in the empirical part here.
Applying standard techniques using the change in the outstanding stock of
loans as the dependent credit variable, past research found several determining
factors to be important for credit extension. However, these estimations might be
imprecise, given that the eect from the change in the outstanding stock may be
distorted by repayments, write-downs, revaluations and securitisation. Therefore,
a more thorough picture about what determines credit extension by applying data
on new lending is given here.
For this, a comparison of empirical estimations using the outstanding stock on
one hand and on the application of the new lending variable on the other is carried
out. Although the estimations with the new lending estimate from the ECB MIR
statistics suer from a few shortcomings, they might give better insights into the
factors inuencing loan extensions.
Due to the simultaneous determination of the loan rate on both the supply
and the demand side, single equation set-ups, as deemed reasonable in previous
studies, seem not appropriate for such an estimation. Therefore, a simultaneous
two equation panel model for eight Euro area countries is estimated, using an
instrumental variables approach. For the stock variable, dynamic panel techniques
are considered as well.
While the models for the new lending variable mainly reect estimates ac-
cording to theory, the regressions for the stock reveal ambiguous results for some
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variables. What is especially striking is that the loan rate, which is seen as one of
the major determining factors, has no signicant impact on lending in the stock
models (except for the xed eects model using instrumental variables), while it
is highly signicant in the new lending models, especially for the supply side.
These dierences in the estimations might have vast implications for monetary
policy. If the central bank wants to react to certain economic events to anticipate
future credit market trends in a way which is based on the estimations of a stock
model, it might react dierently to these, than if it would base its policy on the
estimates of a model using new lending. Reactions by the central bank could
therefore become inaccurate.
If for example the economic outlook is getting better, the central bank might be
inclined to tighten it's policy in an anticipation of higher ination as a consequence
of higher credit extensions. But since the stock is highly correlated with economic
activity due to revaluations and write-downs, which are by itself highly dependent
on the performance of the economy, credit trends might be overstated. In such a
case, new lending might not react as vividly to the better economic outlook as
the stock. This then overstates the eects on future economic activity, as upward
revaluations in the stock should have a negligible impact on future economic
activity.11
This overestimation, among potential other factors, might be a reason why
the ECB raised policy rates in the summer of 2011 amid still falling new lending
data in the Euro area. While giving high emphasis to the second pillar of the
mandate, the monetary side, the ECB might have reacted too early with raising
11 Clearly, the resulting better bank health would exert a positive impact on the ability to extend
new loans, but there is no direct impact on real economic activity due to this, especially not
in the magnitude as postulated by the rise in the stock.
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rates, and had to unwind this rise later that year. Specically, they based a part
of their decision on a strengthening growth of loans, since this underlying pace of
monetary expansion (together with ample liquidity) seemed to have "the potential
to accommodate price pressures in the euro area" (ECB (2011a)). As Chapter 3
showed, new lending was still falling in the middle of 2011, albeit at a slower
pace than before, and the growth of the stock was mainly due to the inuences of
higher upward revaluations and falling write-downs after the initial stages of the
Financial Crisis.
The other important implication of the results is the feed-through of changes
in the policy rate towards lending. While certain estimations show a negative eect
of the change in the real policy rate of between -1% and -2% (see e.g. Gambacorta
and Marques-Iba~nez (2011)), the estimation here does not nd any evidence to
underpin this using stock data. Surprisingly, the coecients for the policy rate in
the new lending models are in the expected vicinity of those from other studies.
Additionally, the magnitudes of most coecients are exceedingly smaller in
the stock model, than in the new lending model. While this is expected because
of the high inertia due to the incorporation of previously extended loans in the
outstanding stock data, it can certainly aect monetary policy decisions. As shown
in the estimation results, higher GDP growth of 1% would lead to an increase of
new lending of around 0.4% and 0.9%, while the growth of the stock would only
accelerate by around 0.2%. These two estimates probably have dierent feedback
eects to real economic activity, and therefore to ination dynamics. Other
determinants are also suering from this problem, as magnitudes, signicances
and even signs dier for certain variables.
This does not mean that the conduct of policy should change, but only that
the rationale on which monetary policy decisions are based while looking at
credit developments should be revised, as dierent determining factors are deemed
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crucial for credit developments while looking at new lending, rather than by only
analysing stock data.
This chapter thus highlights the importance of the choice of the credit variable
in empirical estimations of determinants for bank lending. Previous studies using
the outstanding stock may have under- or overestimated the impact of certain
variables for credit extension, due to the disturbing factors inherent in the stock.
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Appendix A4
Table 4.5: Data denitions and sources
Variable Description Calculation Method Exp. Sign Source
New Lending Loans to households and non-nancial
coorporations - bank new business vol-
umes (MIR framework)
mom log change ECB
Stock Loans vis-a-vis euro area MFI exclud-
ing ESCB - outstanding amounts
mom log change ECB
Stock Loans vis-a-vis euro area MFI exclud-
ing ESCB - outstanding amounts
change of the mom log
change
ECB
Loan Rate Bank interest rates for new business
loans (MIR) (annual agreed rate)
weighted average of the
loan rate in relation to
the amount of new busi-
ness loans for each cate-
gory
-/+ ECB
GDP Gross domestic product in mill. Euro yoy change + Eurostat
Ination Harmonised index of consumer prices
(overall index)
yoy change + ECB
ESI Economic Sentiment Index mom change + European
Commission
Ination
Expectations
Price trends over next 12 months (Con-
sumer Survey question)
+ European
Commission
rEONIA change in the real EONIA rate Ination rate as refer-
ence value
- ECB
CISS Sovereign Systemic Stress Composite
Indicator
- ECB
Liquidity Securities and cash in relation to total
assets of MFIs
+ ECB
Loan Ratio Outstanding amount of loans in rela-
tion to total assets of MFIs
- ECB
Capital Ratio Capital and reserves in relation to total
assets of MFIs
+ ECB
BLS Demand Bank Lending Survey question 4:
change in demand for loans to enter-
prises - backward looking 3 months -
Diusion index
+ ECB
BLS Supply Bank Lending Survey question 1:
change in credit standards to enter-
prises - backward looking 3 months -
Diusion index
- ECB
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Table 4.6: Summary statistics for the panel model
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
New Lending 352 -0.265 6.336 -21.952 19.161
Stock 352 0.905 1.721 -4.889 7.262
Stock 352 -0.034 1.048 -4.034 6.319
Loan Rate 352 3.855 1.11 1.93 6.958
GDP 352 1.872 2.305 -5.764 6.156
Ination 352 1.504 0.87 -1.573 4.404
ESI 352 0.205 4.911 -20.027 14.086
Ination Expectations 352 1.703 1.642 -2.84 6.213
rEONIA 352 -0.028 0.484 -1.727 1.34
CISS 352 0.235 0.227 0.011 0.96
Liquidity 352 23.086 6.438 12.737 38.316
Loan Ratio 352 34.711 10.744 18.305 60.264
Capital Ratio 352 6.637 2.055 3.435 13.829
BLS Demand 352 -0.476 1.658 -6.3 3.6
BLS Supply 352 0.820 1.793 -2.5 8
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Table 4.7: Overview of the stock models
Model Explanation Drawback
(1) OLS Ordinary Least Sqares Estimation Upward bias for the coecient of
the lagged dependent variable due
to the unobserved heterogeneity +
only exogenous variables
(2) FE Country xed eects estimation Downward bias for the coecient of
the lagged dependent variable due to
the correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the error
term + only exogenous variables
(3) FEIV Country xed eects estimation
using instrumental variables
Downward bias for the coecient of
the lagged dependent variable due to
the correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the error
term
(4) ABIV Arrelano-Bond GMM estimation
using instrumental variables
small sample bias
(5) BBIV Blundell-Bond GMM estimation
using instrumental variables
small sample bias
(6) LSDVC Least Squares Dummy Variable
Correction
only exogenous variables
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Table 4.8: Demand side new lending models for corporate loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS FE FE IV IV IV 3SLS
Loan Rate 0.340 0.718 0.708 0.722 -0.680 -2.743 -0.506
(0.94) (1.44) (0.51) (0.78) (-0.49) (-1.28) (-0.93)
GDP 0.369∗ 0.291 0.315 0.317 0.483 0.765∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(1.67) (1.22) (0.71) (1.21) (1.61) (2.00) (2.95)
Ination 1.040∗ 1.144∗ 0.547 1.136 1.293∗ 1.514∗∗ 0.391
(1.69) (1.68) (0.56) (1.63) (1.84) (1.99) (1.29)
ESI 0.207∗ 0.229∗∗ -0.0833 0.238∗∗ 0.169 0.0794 0.0109
(1.95) (2.13) (-0.42) (2.09) (1.38) (0.54) (0.21)
Ination 0.302 0.281 0.452 0.220 0.320 0.378 0.300∗∗
Expectations (1.10) (0.74) (0.82) (0.57) (0.83) (0.92) (2.08)
BLS Demand 0.537∗∗ 0.577∗∗ 0.375 0.559∗∗ 0.621∗∗ 0.686∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗
(2.06) (2.09) (1.11) (1.98) (2.20) (2.27) (3.67)
Constant -4.163∗∗∗ -5.485∗∗∗ -6.735 -5.380∗ -1.059 5.469 -0.0686
(-2.74) (-2.93) (-1.05) (-1.75) (-0.23) (0.80) (-0.04)
F-Statistic 22.82 16.85 22.19
Sargan-Hansen 4.15 1.99
p-Value 0.53 0.37
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments:
(4): rEONIA; CISS; Liquidity; Loan Ratio; Capital Ratio; BLS Supply
(5): CISS; Loan Ratio; BLS Supply
(6): CISS
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Table 4.9: Supply side new lending models for corporate loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS FE FE IV IV IV 3SLS
Loan Rate 1.066∗∗ 1.096∗∗ 1.367 2.895∗∗ 2.550∗ 2.704 3.855∗∗∗
(2.55) (1.97) (0.83) (1.98) (1.69) (1.44) (4.02)
rEONIA 1.131 1.145 1.028 0.447 0.581 0.521 -1.635∗∗∗
(1.30) (1.29) (0.79) (0.43) (0.55) (0.46) (-2.83)
CISS -3.186 -3.307 -4.495 -6.896∗ -6.209 -6.514 -4.279∗∗∗
(-1.17) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-1.68) (-1.49) (-1.38) (-2.62)
Liquidity -0.103 -0.147 -0.0755 0.0819 0.0380 0.0575 0.0746
(-1.25) (-0.98) (-0.36) (0.36) (0.16) (0.21) (1.58)
Loan Ratio -0.132∗∗ -0.0121 -0.0652 -0.0206 -0.0190 -0.0197 -0.175∗∗∗
(-2.33) (-0.06) (-0.31) (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-3.65)
Capital Ratio 0.336 0.124 0.326 0.328 0.289 0.306 0.423∗∗∗
(1.28) (0.28) (0.56) (0.68) (0.60) (0.62) (2.70)
BLS Supply -0.0941 -0.150 0.201 -0.349 -0.311 -0.328 -1.012∗∗∗
(-0.33) (-0.50) (0.55) (-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-3.67)
Constant 1.422 -0.336 -0.521 -12.19 -9.915 -10.92 -10.93∗∗∗
(0.44) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-1.07) (-0.85) (-0.79) (-3.23)
F-Statistic 11.46 13.13 16.14
Sargan-Hansen 7.854 7.222 2.758
p-Value 0.0971 0.0652 0.0968
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments:
(4): GDP; Ination; ESI; Ination Expectations; BLS Demand
(5): GDP; Ination; ESI; BLS Demand
(6): ESI; BLS Demand
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Table 4.10: Demand side  stock models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS FE FE IV IV IV 3SLS
Loan Rate -0.047 -0.074 0.003 -0.126 -0.341 -0.492 -0.202∗∗
(-0.87) (-1.01) (0.02) (-0.98) (-1.54) (-1.39) (-2.43)
GDP 0.032 0.039 0.050 0.046 0.072∗ 0.090∗ 0.011
(1.06) (1.21) (0.82) (1.30) (1.72) (1.67) (0.93)
Ination -0.047 -0.042 0.005 -0.037 -0.012 0.005 0.007
(-0.56) (-0.45) (0.03) (-0.39) (-0.13) (0.04) (0.38)
ESI 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.032 0.039∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.025 -0.000
(2.83) (2.78) (1.17) (2.55) (1.82) (1.25) (-0.04)
Ination 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.021 0.026 0.030 0.010
Expectations (0.52) (0.39) (0.31) (0.41) (0.49) (0.54) (0.79)
BLS Demand 0.017 0.014 0.032 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.023
(0.49) (0.36) (0.69) (0.37) (0.42) (0.44) (0.95)
Constant 0.125 0.207 -0.238 0.384 1.123 1.640 0.706∗∗
(0.54) (0.72) (-0.27) (0.83) (1.45) (1.34) (2.28)
F-Statistic 32.32 14.51 16.80
Sargan-Hansen 1.971 0.347
p-Value 0.7410 0.8407
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments:
(4): rEONIA; CISS; Liquidity; Loan Ratio; Capital Ratio; BLS Supply
(5): CISS; Loan Ratio; BLS Supply
(6): CISS
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Table 4.11: Supply side  stock models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS FE FE IV IV IV 3SLS
Loan Rate -0.049 -0.102 -0.042 -0.230 -0.455∗∗ -0.658∗∗ -0.043
(-0.80) (-1.26) (-0.21) (-1.32) (-2.02) (-2.36) (-0.28)
rEONIA 0.097 0.111 0.365∗∗ 0.160 0.248∗ 0.326∗∗ -0.050
(0.81) (0.91) (2.05) (1.18) (1.66) (1.97) (-0.84)
CISS -0.537∗ -0.499 -0.648 -0.383 -0.178 0.006 -0.121
(-1.72) (-1.39) (-1.13) (-0.99) (-0.43) (0.01) (-0.94)
Liquidity -0.005 -0.019 0.030 -0.034 -0.061∗ -0.084∗∗ 0.002
(-0.36) (-0.81) (1.10) (-1.15) (-1.76) (-2.11) (0.71)
Loan Ratio 0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.009 -0.015 -0.006
(0.19) (0.11) (-0.24) (-0.06) (-0.35) (-0.57) (-0.89)
Capital Ratio 0.015 0.014 0.057 -0.011 -0.056 -0.095 0.020
(0.42) (0.23) (0.73) (-0.17) (-0.75) (-1.16) (0.90)
BLS Supply -0.043 -0.042 -0.032 -0.023 0.012 0.043 -0.035
(-1.13) (-1.04) (-0.66) (-0.48) (0.22) (0.72) (-0.95)
Constant 0.214 0.496 -0.511 1.384 2.951∗ 4.356∗∗ 0.206
(0.59) (0.50) (-0.38) (0.94) (1.66) (2.05) (0.39)
F-Statistic 21.61 25.60 30.37
Sargan-Hansen 4.961 4.046 1.101
p-Value 0.291 0.257 0.294
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0:10, ∗∗ p < 0:05, ∗∗∗ p < 0:01
Instruments:
(4): GDP; Ination; ESI; Ination Expectations; BLS Demand
(5): GDP; Ination; ESI; BLS Demand
(6): ESI; BLS Demand
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Chapter 5
Unconventional Monetary Policy
Eects on Bank Lending
This chapter employs a structural VAR framework with sign restrictions to estimate
the eects of unconventional monetary policies of the European Central Bank since
the Global Financial Crisis, mainly in their eectiveness towards bank lending.
Using a variable for newly issued credit instead of the outstanding stock of credit,
the eects on bank lending are smaller than found in previous similar studies
for the Euro area. The results of this chapter have been previously published as
Behrendt (2017b).
5.1 Introduction
Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 central banks in many advanced
economies have resorted to unconventional monetary policies, as traditional mone-
tary policy of steering market interest rates by calibrating the policy rate have
become less eective due to the zero lower bound. Central banks have since then
relied more and more on policies like asset purchases, credit easing and forward
guidance, to try to maintain working transmission mechanisms. The primary
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intention of these policies is to boost economic activity, through, amongst other
channels, elevating bank lending.
Similar to other central banks, non-standard monetary policies by the Euro-
pean Central Bank were mainly aimed at reviving bank lending in the aftermath of
the Global Financial Crisis through more favourable lending conditions, especially
for non-nancial corporations (see Draghi (2011)). As bank lending is the main
source of external nance for non-nancial corporations in the Euro area (see
ECB (2008), Trichet (2009)), a functioning transmission mechanism through the
bank lending channel is vital for working credit markets.
Central banks try to aect bank lending through unconventional monetary
policies by lowering market yields to make renancing cheaper and by strengthening
commercial banks' balance sheets through additional provision of further liquidity.
While there is an extensive literature on the eects of unconventional monetary
policies towards nancial market yields and prices (see e.g. Borio and Zabai
(2016) for an overview), less is known about the pass-through of non-standard
policies towards bank lending. Bank lending is supposed to be stimulated through
such policies by providing commercial banks with more liquidity than needed for
reserve requirement reasons. Additionally, central banks might engage in outright
purchases of securities (quantitative easing), to reduce impairments in specic
nancial market segments.
There are several theories, as to how these policies work through the bank
lending channel. Most central bankers and more Keynesian-leaning economists
see this channel working because the increased supply of reserves oers banks
a cheap form of renancing, and therefore enables banks to supply more loans
because of lower riskiness and higher liquidity of their balance sheets, and better
capital positions (see e.g. Borio and Disyatat (2009), Joyce et al. (2012)).
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In contrast, more monetaristic-leaning scholars postulate that through the
provision of central bank reserves, bank lending and hence ination must conse-
quently rise, given the static money multiplier theory and the quantity theory
of money. This argumentation is frequently brought forward in macroeconomic
textbooks and the literature (see e.g. Freeman and Kydland (2000), Meltzer
(2010)).
Previous studies are inconclusive to which extent UMPs in the aftermath
of the Financial Crisis were able to spur bank lending. Some studies nd a
clearly positive impact of UMPs on bank lending, as for example Peersman (2011),
Gambacorta et al. (2014), or Hachula (2016) for the Euro area, while others,
like Butt et al. (2015), and Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) for the UK, nd no
clear cut positive impact of UMPs on bank lending and broader macroeconomic
variables. But, what all of these mentioned studies have in common is that they
consider the outstanding stock of credit or the change of it as the relevant credit
variable. As this variable is consisting of several other factors besides newly
issued loans, results of these studies might be distorted (see again Chapter 3 for a
discussion of this issue).
This insight shall be reviewed in this chapter, while simultaneously attempting
to answer two main questions. The rst deals with the eectiveness of the
unconventional monetary policy actions of the ECB since the beginning of the
Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 towards stimulating bank lending to non-
nancial corporations. A main focus there is on policies which aect the size of
the ECB's balance sheet. The second question picks up the critique of Chapter 3,
namely if it makes a dierence which lending variable is applied. Typically,
empirical studies use a variant of the outstanding stock of credit as the bank
lending indicator. But to quantify the transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
the exact amount of new bank lending volumes is more important. To answer
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both questions, dierent structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models for the
Euro area are estimated using monthly data since the Financial Crisis on both
credit variables.
Furthermore, this chapter tries to account for another shortcoming in the
literature. Most empirical studies which estimate eects of non-standard monetary
policies that aect central banks' balance sheets, apply a measure of the size
of the unconventional monetary policies which either corresponds to the total
amount of the central bank's balance sheet or the monetary base. This has
important eects on the estimation results, due to the inclusion of more than the
amount of unconventional monetary policies into these series. Estimations of the
eects of unconventional monetary policies which aim at the size of the central
bank's balance sheet should only be concerned with the excess amount of liquidity
provided by the central bank. Taking for example the monetary base|which
consists of currency in circulation, required reserves and excess reserves|as an
UMP indicator, has several drawbacks. For one, the central bank does not have
full control over the amount of currency in circulation, which the public wants
to hold. Additionally, there are possible cointegration issues between currency in
circulation and economic output variables. Further, required reserves can hardly
serve as an indicator of the amount of additional liquidity, and there exist crucial
feedback eects between required reserves and bank lending. Beyond that, the
total balance sheet size of the central bank is inuenced by even more factors,
which have no link to UMPs. Revaluations of for example gold reserves on the
central bank's balance sheet certainly have no immediate eects on bank lending
by commercial banks. The same can be said for provisions and non-distributed
prots. All such examples have an eect on the size of the balance sheet, which
would be incorporated into the UMP series and thus distorting the variable, but
can hardly be ascribed to have an eect on lending decisions by commercial banks.
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While analysing the eects of unconventional monetary policies, it needs to be
accounted for that unconventional monetary policies were overlapping with interest
rate decisions, at least in the beginning of the crisis. The crucial task is therefore
to identify exogenous monetary policy shocks to quantify the eects on economic
variables. To guarantee orthogonality of both conventional and unconventional
monetary policy shocks, this chapter resorts to estimation specications within
SVAR frameworks, which incorporate standard and unconventional monetary
policy shocks via sign restrictions. Therefore, a model set-up similar to Peersman
(2011) and Gambacorta et al. (2014) is estimated in this chapter. This approach
has the advantage that it imposes less rigid constraints on the underlying economic
theory in contrast to a Cholesky decomposition. By applying a classical Cholesky
decomposition, which orders the variables from fast to slow reacting (see e.g.
Christiano et al. (1998)), it would be postulated that the unconventional monetary
policy variable is not inuencing most other variables contemporaneously within
the shock period. Using sign restrictions on the other hand, specic eects, also
of contemporaneous nature, can be modelled more stringently to the underlying
economic theory (see Uhlig (2005)).
The chapter highlights two important results. First, unconventional as well
as conventional monetary policies during the Financial Crisis were not able to
stimulate bank lending in the Euro area to a large extent, while on the other hand
not leading to unintended consequences, especially on resulting in greatly elevated
ination rates, as postulated by some monetarist models.1 While several previous
studies found signicantly positive reactions of bank lending to unconventional
monetary policy shocks, these ndings cannot be conrmed here, as reactions of
1 See also IMF (2013a), White (2012) for a discussion on unintended consequences from UMPs.
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bank lending|specically on newly extended loans|to unconventional monetary
policy shocks are only showing a positive, signicant response in the short-run,
which dies out fast. Furthermore, there are slight dierences between the reactions
of the new lending and the stock variable towards (unconventional) monetary
policy shocks, highlighting the relevance of the insights from Chapter 3. It can
also not be conrmed either that the unconventional monetary policies have a
clear-cut positive eect on output and ination, as several previous studies found.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 gives a theoretical overview
of the transmission process of unconventional monetary policies towards bank
lending. The eects of such policies on bank lending shall be analysed on the basis
of a SVAR model in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Section 5.5 draws several conclusions
from the empirical estimations.
5.2 Transmission of Unconventional Monetary
Policies towards Bank Lending
Traditionally, monetarists see unconventional monetary policies as working through
the supply of central bank reserves. This money view postulates that monetary
policy decisions result in changes of bank lending through open market operations,
which change the available amount of central bank reserves. Through unconven-
tional monetary policies, which increase the amount of reserves, commercial banks
are equipped with more reserves than required. The money view now postulates
that banks put these reserves "to work". It is assumed that banks increase their
lending activity as a consequence of the excess reserve provision. This will be
done as long as there are excess reserves. The reserve provision by the central
bank would therefore lead to a likewise increase in lending. This argumentation
rests on the notion of a static money multiplier theory, which postulates that
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central banks set an amount for the high-powered monetary base and then the
stock of money is only a multiple of that (see for example Freeman and Kydland
(2000), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), or Meltzer (2010)).
With excess reserves rising by a multiple, which by denition expands M0,
M1 needs to rise simultaneously, according to this static view. From the rise
in the money stock through higher lending, this theory is then being expanded
through the quantity theory of money to a consequent rise in ination, as the static
quantity theory requires a rise in the price level if the money stock increases (at
least in the long run). Taking the equation of exchange and the money multiplier
in their static form seriously, one can only conclude that an over-allotment of
reserves by the central bank leads to higher bank lending and consequently to a
higher price level. Asness et al. (2010) for example certainly base their critique of
the rst quantitative easing programme of the Fed on these grounds.
But what this theory overlooks is the fact that there is no causality in these
equations. These are merely ex-post identities. In a fractional reserve banking
system, as existing today, the causation does not go from the creation of bank
reserves to credit expansion, but the other way around (see Werner (2014) for
a real-world experiment and subsequent validation of this notion). If a bank
extends a credit it acquires reserves afterwards, either on the interbank money
market or through the standing facilities at the penalty rate, whenever there is a
shortage in the money market (see Carpenter and Demiralp (2012)). As Dudley
(2009) notes: "If banks want to expand credit and that drives up the demand for
reserves, the Fed automatically meets that demand in its conduct of monetary
policy. In terms of the ability to expand loans rapidly, it makes no dierence
whether the banks have lots of excess reserves or not." Hence, banks extend loans
and acquire reserves afterwards to full the average reserve requirement over the
maintenance period. With abundant reserves, additional loans are only matched
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by extra deposits (the amount of reserves does not necessarily have to change).
They are not mechanically multiplied into new loans, as predicted by the money
multiplier theory. Additionally, as central banks will always allot enough reserves,
commercial banks can therefore never be reserve constrained over the maintenance
period, at least by amount. So there is no bottleneck on reserves, which would
suddenly be lifted by higher reserve allotment.2
A sudden increase in reserves does therefore not induce commercial banks
to increase their lending for no apparent reason, although excess reserves might
induce slightly more lending at the margin, as reserves become cheaper for banks,
since interbank market rates most likely fall down to near the deposit facility
with abundant reserves (at least in the Euro area, where there is an interest
rate corridor). Additionally, banks do not need to pay the penalty rate, if they
are not able to acquire reserves on the interbank market, as most central banks
have resorted to a full allotment policy after the Financial Crisis. However, this
slightly cheaper nancing is not suciently large to make any lending reasonable.
Banks still face an internal risk-return calculus on their lending decisions, which
is based on the credit worthiness of the borrower, the cost of funding and capital
requirements (see e.g. Georg and Pasche (2008), Jakab and Kumhof (2015),
or Singh and Stella (2012)). Additionally, they have to nd willing borrowers
for their potential credit supply. It is therefore not reasonable to assume that
the additional provision of reserves by the central bank drastically aects the
incentives of commercial banks to lend to the public. Hence, the money multiplier
is to be seen as an ex-post identity and not as a rigid ex-ante relationship (see
also McLeay et al. (2014), Tobin (1963), von Hagen (2009)).
2 If the central bank would shut down the reserve window, this could potentially lead to
unwanted bankruptcies and market turmoil, as reserve allotment is no longer guaranteed.
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This is also conrmed by the fall of money multipliers in the aftermath of the
Global Financial Crisis, as shown in Figure 5.1. Money multipliers have fallen
distinctly since then in many economies, as broad money aggregates have not
held up with the rise in the monetary base due to the over-supply of central bank
reserves.
Figure 5.1: Money multipliers and central bank assets
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Note: Data for the Euro area ( ), Federal Reserve ( ), Bank of England ( ), Bank of
Japan ( )). The vertical lines indicate the time of the Lehman crash in 9/2008. Sources:
ECB, Fed, BoE, BoJ.
If central banks are not able to directly support lending and therefore economic
activity through the transmission postulated by the money view, how might
unconventional monetary policies work then? To answer this question, this chapter
predominantly concentrates on two policies that aect liquidity in the banking
sector through the supply of additional reserves by the central bank, namely bank
reserves policy and quantitative easing. These are the two unconventional policies
on which the ECB laid its focus in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis.
Bank reserves policies are directly aimed at providing banks with large amounts
of excess reserves via longer-term reverse-repurchase operations. After the Finan-
cial Crisis interbank markets experienced a drastic decline in overnight lending
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activity, because of mutual doubt of commercial banks about their nancial health
(see e.g. Frutos et al. (2016)). This led to a reserve shortage of some banks,
who had to borrow these at the ECB with a penalty, while others built up large
amounts of reserves without providing them on the interbank market. This in
turn led to an increase in the interbank market rate, which made renancing for
reserve constrained banks more expensive. In order to lower market rates, the
ECB supported liquidity in the interbank market by switching to a xed-rate,
full-allotment strategy. Furthermore, the ECB oered longer-term renancing
on several occasions and under dierent conditions to mitigate bottlenecks in
the interbank market and give banks balance sheet relieve (see e.g. Rogers et al.
(2014) for a short overview). The expansion of the ECB's balance sheet through
these policies is due to an increased demand for liquidity, as banks requested
higher amounts of additional reserves, while providing the ECB with the required
collateral in exchange. The eects on commercial banks' and the central bank's
balance sheets from reserve policies are illustrated in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Impact of reserves policy on balance sheets
Commercial Bank Central Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
+ Reserves + + Securities + Reserves
- Securities
On the other hand, quantitative easing (QE) policies are purposefully supply
driven by the central bank. Through such outright asset purchases, specic
securities from banks and the non-bank public are bought and taken onto the
central bank's balance sheet, via open market operations. Such purchases can
consist of government bonds, covered bonds or asset backed securities, for example.
Central banks aim to purchase these securities mainly from the non-bank public,
such as insurance companies or pension funds. But since these are not eligible to
transact with the central bank directly, such purchases have to be intermediated
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through depository institutions. The bank of the non-bank public credits them
with a deposit in exchange for the asset. Then the central bank swaps this asset for
newly created reserves with the depository institution. Banks therefore not only
gain central bank reserves, but also a corresponding increase in customer deposits
(see Table 5.2 for a schematic illustration, and Benford et al. (2009), McLeay
et al. (2014), or Joyce et al. (2012) for a more in depth discussion). Thus, the
dierence is that through the intermediation activity of the banking sector, their
balance sheets expand, while this is not the case for direct purchases or reserves
policy. But in both scenarios, the private sector's net worth remains unchanged.
QE can therefore merely be seen as an asset swap, which changes the composition
of outstanding private sector assets. So, the aim of these purchases is to support
liquidity in specic nancial market segments, and not to add net nancial assets,
as often-times assumed by using the term money printing equivalently to QE
purchases. Thus, QE is mostly aimed to provide liquidity to lower interest rates
in specic nancial market segments.3 Additionally, by buying securities from the
private through the banking sector, central banks take risks o the balance sheets
of the public onto their own balance sheet. The higher liquidity and lower risk
in turn might indirectly induce banks and the public to engage in more lending
activity.4
3 Further, through higher liquidity, non-banks shall be incentivised to invest their newly received
deposits in higher yielding assets, such as bonds and shares. This in turn will raise the values
of these assets and thus lower funding costs of corporations. This might then induce the
private sector to spend more through wealth eects.
4 Whereas, bank lending could also potentially shrink due to QE measures, if companies issue
more alternative funding (bonds and equity), to pay back bank credits (see McLeay (2014)).
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Table 5.2: Impact of QE on balance sheets
Non-Bank Commercial Bank
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
- Securities + + Reserves + Deposits
+ Deposits + Securities
+ - Securities
Central Bank
Assets Liabilities
+ Securities + Reserves
So, while QE policies are designed to expand the liability side of the central
bank balance sheet by a pre-dened amount, reserves policies are demand driven
and (in the case of the ECB) are virtually without a limit.5 While diering in
their implementation, both policies are supposed to aect the economy through
similar transmission channels (see also Altavilla et al. (2016a)). In essence, both
are designed to give balance sheet relief to banks and the public through lower
interest rates and higher asset prices.
The following section shall empirically evaluate to which extend the UMPs by
the ECB were able to revive the transmission of monetary policy, with a special
focus of these balance sheet policies towards bank lending.
5 Although there is an implicit limit by the amounts of credible collateral held by the public,
which the central bank deems worthy for the operations.
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5.3 A SVAR Model for the Euro Area
5.3.1 Baseline Specication
Structural VAR models typically try to estimate eects of standard monetary
policies towards economic variables (see e.g. Christiano et al. (1998), or Peersman
and Smets (2001)). In contrast to classical monetary policy SVARs using a
Cholesky decomposition on the ordering, SVARs with sign restrictions are able to
impose very little economic theory to the structure of the data, and are therefore
more exible in regard to the concrete research question.
SVAR models with sign restrictions estimate a simple reduced-form VAR
model and then dene a set of sign restrictions on specic variables in the impulse
response functions (IRFs) to identify one particular shock. For the shock in
question, a random draw of a given number (at least enough to be necessary to
identify the model) of IRFs satisfying these restrictions is realised. If enough
IRFs are estimated, the median response and the condence bands can then be
obtained through inference in a typical fashion (see Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010),
Uhlig (2005)).
The baseline reduced-form VAR model has the following representation (see
Lutkepohl (2005), Kilian (2013) for the following):
yt =  + A1yt−1 + ::: + Apyt−p + ut (5.1)
with y t as a k×1 vector of the endogenous variables, A(L) as the autoregressive
lag order polynominal,  = A(L)0 as the vector of the intercepts, and ut as
the one-step ahead prediction error of the disturbances, with a zero mean, zero
autocorrelation, and variance covariance matrix
∑ = E(utu′t): (5.2)
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But as the elements of ut might still be correlated across the equations, there
is, in principle, no structural interpretation out of this system possible. This is
accounted for in structural models, where the structural innovations are assumed
to be mutually uncorrelated. A structural VAR model can then be represented
by:
B0yt =  + B1yt−1 + ::: + Bpyt−p + "t; (5.3)
with Bi, i=0,...,p, as a k×k matrix of parameters and "t as the structural,
mutually uncorrelated shocks following a standard-Normal distribution with zero
mean and unit variance. Without loss of generality and to keep the notation
simple, let's assume that yt is zero mean. Thus, the shocks are uniquely identied
and can be interpreted in an economic context.
The reduced form Equation 5.1 and the structural model Equation 5.3 are
linked by the matrix B0, which describes the contemporaneous relation between
the variables. The link between both expressions is given by:
Ap = B−10 Bp: (5.4)
The estimation of B0 requires restrictions on some parameters, given that
without these only k(k+1)/2 parameters can be uniquely identied. This is done
by applying identifying assumptions on specic relations, so that the innovations
and the IRFs are just-identied (see Lutkepohl (2005), Uhlig (2005)). Doing this,
the mutually correlated reduced form innovations ut are weighted averages of the
structural innovations "t, with B−10 serving as the weights:
ut = B−10 "t: (5.5)
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The structural innovations "t, which are obtained from Equation 5.5, are
assumed to be orthonormal, i.e. its covariance matrix is an identity matrix
E("t"′t) = I: (5.6)
The baseline model at hand contains six variables: the log of the industrial
production index (IPI), the log of the consumer price ination index (HICP),
lothe g of bank lending (new lending and the outstanding stock, respectively)
(Lending), MFI lending rates (MIR), the EONIA rate (EONIA) and the level
of excess reserves (monetary base minus currency in circulation and required
reserves (Reserves)).6 The model is estimated in log levels, since all variables
are integrated of order one, and thus the estimators remain consistent and the
marginal asymptotic distributions remain asymptotically normal (see Sims et al.
(1990)).
Variable choices are mainly following the model of Peersman (2011), whose
main interest is also on the eects of unconventional monetary policy on lending
volumes. The frequency of the main model is monthly from 2007M08 to 2016M07.
The start of the estimation period is restricted to the beginning of the liquidity-
providing longer-term renancing operations (LTRO) up to three months by the
ECB in August 2007. Several robustness checks on dierent indicators for the
UMPs are performed (specically with the shadow rate proposed by Wu and Xia
(2016), as well as monetary policy announcement eects on bond yields and on
term spreads), although the main focus is on operations that aect the excess
amount of liquidity through reserve accommodation and QE. The lag length is set
to 2, according to the Schwarz Information Criterium (SIC), and is also in line with
6 Data sources and details can be found in Table 5.6 in the Appendix A5 on page 182.
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the majority of the related literature. The Akaike Information Criterium (AIC)
proposes a longer lag length. Therefore, longer lag lengths are also considered as
a robustness check.
For the output variable, industrial production (IPI) is applied, as the focus
is on lending activity to the non-nancial corporate sector. Prices are proxied
by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). The estimations contain
bank lending and interest rates on lending to non-nancial corporations. Two
lending variables are applied for each specication and ultimately compared, to
account for the insights of Chapter 3. For new lending, new business volumes
of loans to non-nancial corporations from the MIR statistics are taken. The
stock amount of credit is the outstanding volume of MFI loans to the private
sector. Lending rates are also from the MIR statistics and cover new business
loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit
card debt. The policy rate is proxied by the EONIA rate, as the ECB conducts
its policy by steering interest rates around the overnight money market rate. The
EONIA thus captures standard monetary policy decisions (see also Ciccarelli et al.
(2015) for example). It is justiable to apply the EONIA rate instead of only the
rate for main renance operations of the ECB, as the ECB policy rate virtually
approached the zero lower bound in 2014 and there would be no movement visible
afterwards. Contrary, the ZLB is not binding for the EONIA rate. There was
still sucient movement in the EONIA down to almost the deposit facility rate
since 2014, which further reects the more expansionary stance of the ECB on
its policy rate decisions to additionally lower the deposit facility while keeping
the main renancing operations rate constant|as for example done in December
2015. The movement in the EONIA can also be accounted through the extended
forward guidance policies by the ECB, which were able to further suppress market
rates, despite little movements in the policy rate (see Altavilla et al. (2016a)).
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As the unconventional monetary policy indicator, excess reserves are taken
in the baseline estimation. These are calculated as the monetary base less
currency in circulation and required reserves. This stands in contrast to similar
studies estimating the eects of unconventional monetary policies on bank lending.
Peersman (2011) for example applies the monetary base as the UMP variable,
while Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Boeckx et al. (2014) apply total assets
of the central bank. The application of these broader denitions has several
drawbacks. Firstly, the monetary base includes currency in circulation, which
leads to a co-movement of the lending and UMP indicator before the Financial
Crisis, as both grow similarly with economic activity. Further, as decisions of the
private sector to hold cash are not really inuenceable by monetary policy, it is not
quite clear as to why to incorporate them into the UMP variable. Additionally,
the monetary base also includes required reserves. As they need to increase
with loan extension, because a certain percentage of each new loan needs to be
underwritten with reserves, there is a feedback loop between lending and reserves,
which further contributes to the co-movement of the stock of outstanding credit
with the monetary base. A positive movement of the UMP variable induced
by higher required reserves would have therefore by denition already increased
lending, absent all other inuences. Thus, by excluding required reserves from
the estimation, the true unconventional monetary policy decisions, which aect
additional liquidity provision, are reected more compellingly. With regard to
total assets, they include even more operations by the central bank, which have
if any, then only a loose eect on additional intra-Euro area bank lending, as
mentioned before in Section 5.1.
For the calculation of the excess reserves, the method as mentioned above is
applied, which is the monetary base minus currency in circulation minus required
reserves. Since the monetary base at the ECB is including reserves parked in the
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deposit facility and the current accounts, taking the excess reserves data directly
from the ECB would be incomplete, as this statistic only incorporates amounts
parked in the current accounts (less minimum reserves). With the reduction of the
penalty rate to zero on the 11th of July 2012, banks transferred a large amount of
excess reserves into the current accounts, to not have to book it anew into the
deposit facility on each working day (see Figure 5.2 (a)). But as the amounts
in the deposit facility do not appear in the excess reserves series of the ECB,
this would then be reected as an unconventional monetary policy easening, due
to the sudden rise in the ocial excess reserves statistic. This would give an
incomplete picture, as the amounts in the deposit facility are still representing
excess liquidity which banks hold (and are also counting towards the monetary
base). The transfer into the current accounts can therefore not be seen as an
unconventional monetary policy decision, but was only done by banks to avoid a
re-booking of excess liquidity into the deposit facility at the end of each working
day. Because of the zero penalty rate, this need vanished. By only taking the
excess reserve statistic as provided by the ECB, this series would eectively be
zero until July 2012 (see Figure 5.2 (b)), which does not reect the expansive
monetary stance by the ECB directly after the Financial Crisis adequately. Thus,
the amounts in the deposit facility are also considered for the excess reserves
variable in the estimation, to better cover the ample liquidity in the banking
sector.
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Figure 5.2: Excess reserves in the Euro area
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Note: Figure 5.2 (a) depicts the deposit facility ( ) and current accounts less minimum
reserve requirements ( ). Figure 5.2 (b) compares the excess reserves statistics as calculated
in this chapter ( ) and provided by the ECB ( )). The vertical lines depict the month
when the ECB lowered the penalty rate to zero, thus inducing a large transfer of funds from the
deposit facility into current accounts. All data are in trillion Euro. Source: ECB.
5.3.2 Identication Strategy
In recent years, SVARs using sign restrictions have become increasingly popular
in response to some critical points about simple Cholesky orderings (see e.g.
Rudebusch (1998), or Kilian (2013)). Sign restrictions are seen as superior to
Cholesky decompositions, as they do not impose as rigid constraints on the
underlying economic theory. With the added exibility, it is possible to reect the
feedback eects more rigorously in comparison to the recursiveness assumption.
To accomplish this, qualitative restrictions on certain shocks for some variables are
used as an identication scheme. Most notably is the restriction method proposed
in a monetary policy setting by Uhlig (2005).
Due to the identifying assumptions, it is possible to isolate exogenous UMP
shocks. To identify these exogenous innovations to excess liquidity, a mixture
of sign and zero restrictions on a specic set of shocks in the contemporaneous
163
matrix B0, as depicted in Table 5.3, is applied. These restrictions are similar to
those in Peersman (2011).
Table 5.3: Sign restrictions for the shocks in the baseline estimation
IPI HICP Lending MIR EONIA Reserves
UMP/Reserves shock 0 0 ≥0 ≤0 0 ≥0
Standard MP shock 0 0 ≥0 ≤0 ≤0
It is assumed that an unconventional monetary policy shock only impacts
output and consumer prices with a lag. The contemporaneous impact is therefore
set to zero for both variables. This assumption can be validated using monthly
data in order to disentangle monetary policy shocks from disturbances originating
in the real economy (see e.g. Christiano et al. (1998), or Peersman and Smets
(2001)). On the other hand, innovations of output and prices can impose an
immediate eect on excess reserves. Shocks in the real economy can therefore
exert a contemporaneous impact on the credit market.
In the baseline specication, there is a non-negative restriction on the sign
for bank lending in response to an UMP shock. Peersman (2011) restricts the
response of bank lending to only the third and fourth lag after the disturbance. He
validates this by the notion that lending to non-nancial rms can potentially react
positively to a policy rate hike in the short-run due to drawdowns of pre-existing
credit lines in a worry of rising lending rates in the medium term. Giannone
et al. (2012) conrm this by showing that lending to rms responds negatively
only with a lag. But, for the estimation here, the specic lag restriction does not
make a dierence, as the immediate response is in line with the responses of the
subsequent periods in the estimations. As only unconventional monetary policies
which inuence the volume of new lending in a positive way are of importance for
this study, the imposing non-negative sign in only the rst period can be validated.
Negative innovations to lending are therefore captured by the other variables and
shocks in the system. For example, if a fall in lending is due to a fall in output,
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these reactions should be visible in the data.
UMP shocks are further assumed to have a non-positive impact on bank
lending rates, as looser monetary policies should lead to lower lending rates,
because of cheaper renancing and lower nancial risks (see Woodford (2003)).
To clearly identify non-monetary policy innovations, orthogonality between
UMP and standard interest rate disturbances have to be ensured. By imposing a
non-contemporaneous response of the EONIA rate (zero sign), orthogonality of
both types of monetary policies can be guaranteed.
While looking at unconventional monetary policy shocks during the estimation
period after the Financial Crisis and their eects on bank lending is helpful to
understand the transmission mechanism of these policies, it might also be helpful
to analyse if standard monetary policies were able to inuence bank lending.
Especially for the Euro area, where the zero lower bound on the policy rate
was not reached until 2014, there were still enough movements in the policy
rate to potentially have an eect on lending and economic activity in the earlier
stages after the Financial Crisis. Such standard interest rate innovations|labelled
Standard MP shock in Table 5.3|are represented by a fall in the EONIA rate, to
have the signs corresponding to the easing of monetary policy by expanding excess
reserves. The standard monetary policy shock is assumed to have a negative eect
on lending rates, meaning a fall in the EONIA is identied with a likewise fall
in lending rates. Conversely, credit volumes are assumed to not fall on impact.
Responses to output and ination are, like for the UMP shock, assumed to not
react contemporaneously. These restrictions are also in line with those in Peersman
(2011).
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5.4 Estimation Results
5.4.1 Baseline Estimation
The benchmark VAR model is estimated from 2007M8 to 2016M7 using two
lags on the endogenous variables. A Bayesian approach, as proposed by Uhlig
(2005) and applied in a similar setting by Peersman (2011), is used for estimation
and inference. Normal-Wishart prior and posterior distributions of the reduced
form VAR are applied, as well as a random possible decomposition B of the
variance-covariance matrix (see Baumeister and Hamilton (2015)). If the IRF
of the specic draw satises the restrictions, it is kept. Otherwise, the draw is
rejected. In total, 2000 successful draws from the posterior are applied to produce
the IRFs, which show the median values, while also depicting the 68 percent
posterior probability bands.
Figure 5.3 shows the impulse response functions for the unconventional mone-
tary policy shock using the new lending variable. The blue straight lines show
the median responses to an unconventional monetary policy shock, while the
grey areas around it represent the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior
distribution of the estimated responses.
The UMP shock is characterised by an increase of excess reserves between
0.5 and 2.5 percent. The shock is positively signicant for up to about nine
months, with a peak in the median response after three months. Output and
prices are restricted to have a zero contemporaneous response for the rst month
after the shock. For the following months, this restriction is lifted. Instead of
immediately positively contributing to economic activity, output falls for the
rst ten months after the shock, although turning positive in the medium term.
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Figure 5.3: UMP shock on new lending
0 12 24 36
−5
0
5
⋅10−3
Output
0 12 24 36
−1
0
1
⋅10−3
Ination
0 12 24 36
0
2
⋅10−2
New Lending
0 12 24 36
−1
−0:5
0
0:5
⋅10−3
Lending Rate
0 12 24 36
−1
−0:5
0
0:5
⋅10−3
EONIA
0 12 24 36
0
0:2
Excess Reserves
Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
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Additionally, there is no signicant impact on prices visible.7 For both variables,
the results stand in contrast to estimations of similar studies for shorter time
horizons after the Financial Crisis, as for example found by Boeckx et al. (2014)
or Gambacorta et al. (2014).
Further, bank lending rates are falling for about one year and a half after an
UMP shock. The response of the EONIA rate is characterised by a medium term
fall after an UMP shock, with a low after about nine months.
More interestingly for the aim of the chapter is the response of lending
to an UMP shock. Imposing a non-negative contemporaneous restriction, the
new lending IRF shows a positive response for the rst three months after the
shock. While having no sign restriction for the new lending variable, the response
becomes insignicant, although the median response is still positive for the rst
three periods after the shock.
Constraining the estimation period to the rst few years after the Financial
Crisis (until December 2012), the results qualitatively stay the same, only with
a more pronounced negative median response of prices. The eect on all other
variables, especially bank lending, stay qualitatively the same. Also, using longer
lag lengths does not alter the general results of the estimation.
The IRF analysis here is able to show that the provision of excess liquidity by
the ECB after the Financial Crisis has no signicant long-term impact on lending
activity. Although these policies might have contributed to lower lending rates and
higher liquidity on bank's balance sheets, they did not induce banks to signicantly
increase lending. This might be explainable by the high uncertainty after the
Financial Crisis, as well as bad economic conditions constraining credit supply
7 This holds also true if instead of consumer prices producer prices are applied.
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and demand. As shown by the ECB in their Bank Lending Survey (BLS), banks
increased their credit standards signicantly after the crisis, thus constraining the
availability of bank loans. This was mainly due to worsening capital positions, as
well as negative impacts of reduced general economic activity (see ECB (2014a)).
Additionally, credit demand receded simultaneously after the crisis. The main
factor for reduced credit demand was|as mentioned by enterprises in the survey of
Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE)|given by concerns of nding customers
and the subdued general economic outlook, while access to nance played an
elevated role only in the beginning of the Financial Crisis. These constraints
were especially pronounced in crisis hit countries. Respondents in these countries
(mainly Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were also discouraged to demand credit
by too high interest rates, as this was the main reason for enterprises to not
demand loans in these countries (see ECB (2014c)). Real economic impacts thus
might have oset the positive eects of the UMPs by the ECB, resulting in only
small short-run positive impacts of these policies on bank lending.
While using the outstanding stock as the lending variable, the response of
the bank lending indicator is markedly more positive and for a longer horizon
signicant (for about eight months), with the median response being positive
throughout (see Figure 5.4). Previous similar studies found a strictly positive
response of the credit stock. But this result can also not be validated with this
study. All other responses are qualitatively the same as for the specication with
the new lending variable. Without a restriction on the credit variable, the response
of the outstanding stock of credit to an UMP shock also becomes insignicant
(although the median response is still distinctly more positive than for the new
lending specication).
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Figure 5.4: UMP shock on the credit stock
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Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
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Comparing the responses of both credit variables, it is visible that the positive
impact of an UMP shock on new lending dies out much quicker than for the stock
variable. Analysing the eects of UMPs on bank lending using the stock might
therefore overstate its impact, as the positive eect on new lending is not that
long-lasting as the stock variable might indicate. Taking the same variable and lag
restriction approach as Peersman (2011), i.e. the policy rate (MP Rate) instead
of the EONIA and the monetary base instead of excess reserves, the reaction of
the stock would be positively signicant for an even longer time (eleven months).
The responses to the conventional monetary policy shock are qualitatively the
same for both lending variable set-ups (see Figure 5.11 and 5.12 in the Appendix
A5 on page 183 and 184). As for the QE shock, new lending responds positively for
a signicantly shorter period of time, in comparison to the credit stock. Likewise,
output and ination does also not react positively to a standard monetary policy
shock.
Three main insights come out of the IRF analysis. First, the clearly
positive and increasing impact of UMPs on bank lending visible in other
studies cannot be conrmed here. The positive reactions die out fairly quickly
after the UMP shocks for the period after the Financial Crisis. Second,
the positive reaction is even less pronounced while using the new lending
variable instead of the stock variable. And lastly, monetary policy shocks
after the Financial Crisis seem not to be able to stimulate output and elevate prices.
Taking the model set-up as in Peersman (2011) for the time-frame before
the Financial Crisis (2003M01 to 2009M12; earlier data is not available for the
new lending variable), but with new lending, the response of new lending is only
positively signicant in the third and fourth period, those where the restrictions
apply. Taking the restrictions as in the baseline representation in this chapter,
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the positive response already becomes insignicant in the second period, although
lending recovers after about a year and becomes positive again for about another
year and a half (see Figure 5.5). Applying the stock for this period yields quite
the same results as in Peersman (2011). The positive credit response, especially in
the short run, is thus mainly driven by the stock variable, mostly irrespective of
before or after the crisis. Applying the new lending variable leads to a breakdown
of this strictly positive result for lending to an UMP shock.
Figure 5.5: UMP shock on bank lending for the period 2003-2009
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Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
Consequently, using the ow of the credit stock yields similar results as for
the new lending variable, as shown in Figure 5.6 (see Chapter 3 for a reasoning on
this). The ow variable here only contains new loans, repayments and revaluations.
Securitised and written-o loans do not fall into the estimation (see ECB (2012)).
Thus, a large amount of the disturbances are already out of the estimation.
Furthermore, repayments are probably distributed fairly evenly in the short-run,
so they do not distort the ow too much. Additionally, revaluations might not
even be that large in relation to new lending, thus probably also not distorting
the ow variable that heavily.
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Figure 5.6: UMP shock on the credit ow for the period 2003-2009
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Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
In essence, the positive response of lending in response to UMPs found in other
studies is due to the choice of the credit variable. Taking new lending instead
of the stock leads to a partial breakdown of these ndings. Several reasons are
responsible for this. For one, the use of the outstanding stock of credit might
lead to stock-ow inconsistencies (see Biggs and Meyer (2013), or Huang (2010)
for a discussion of this problem). This notion is validated by the fact that the
response of the ow variable of the credit stock is showing similar results as the
new lending variable. Further, results are also likely to be skewed by the other
factors except new lending comprising the change of the credit stock variable.
And lastly, the high inertia in the stock, as newly issued credits make up only
about 15 to 23% of the outstanding stock of loans to non-nancial corporations
in the Euro area, is contributing to the higher positive response of the stock IRF
in the later periods after the shock.
5.4.2 Further Specications
Eects of UMPs on bank lending only dening by the size of the amount of excess
reserves might miss out on important central bank policies, which go further than
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interest rate decisions and manipulations of provided liquidity. In addition to
these tools, central banks have also resorted to enhanced communication policies,
better known as forward guidance. Their aim is to lower market rates on the longer
end of the yield curve through credible communication strategies (see Filardo and
Hofmann (2014)). The ECB for example resorted to forward guidance in a way as
to promise to keep rates low for a long period of time, to reduce ination premia
on long-lasting contracts. This in turn should lead to higher credit demand, as
lending becomes relatively cheaper.
Typically, announcement eects of monetary policy are accounted for by using
high frequency nancial market data and employing them on lower frequency
data (see e.g. Rogers et al. (2014)). Such studies identify surprise components
of monetary policy announcements, using changes in money market future rates
around the days of ECB policy meetings. Due to the lack of market futures data to
the author, a more simplied approach is taken here. The assumption here is that
surprise announcements by the ECB of either unconventional monetary policies or
enhanced forward guidance lead to a fall in risk free interest rates (Altavilla et al.
(2016b)). Typically the prices of nancial indicators who are associated with the
policy rate already incorporate expected responses of the policy rate. But as above
mentioned announcements are typically unforeseen, market rates typically do not
incorporate such information. Variations on these surprise policy announcement
days can therefore be seen as the response to these. They can then be treated as
exogenous with respect to other economic events (see Gurkaynak et al. (2005)).
According to Altavilla et al. (2016b), changes in two-year government bond yields
can be seen as a reasonable proxy to reect such announcements, as the target
horizon of these announcements lies in the medium-term. Here, only two-year
German Bund yields are considered, as they can be seen as relatively risk free (see
also Hachula et al. (2016)). Subsequently, the change of the yield of the closing
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date before the announcement day to the closing yield on the announcement day
is considered to be the eect due to the policy announcement.8 Decreasing yields
are seen to be associated with a further monetary easing. Therefore, signs are as
for the UMP shock in the baseline specication, except that the announcement
here has a non-positive sign.
Alternatively, Meinusch and Tillmann (2014) take another approach, in which
they determine the policy announcements as a binary system. In a month
with a further easing announcement, the variable takes the value 1, in all other
months it is set to zero.9 The reason for such a strategy is that announcements of
unconventional monetary policies might have already been incorporated into yields
before the announcement, if market participants expect such announcements, even
though most announcements can still be seen as surprising. A movement on
the day of the announcement can thus not represent a surprise response to such
an event. On some announcement days yields rose, even if a fall would have
to be anticipated. This might be because market participants expected further
easing than ultimately announced, and therefore revised their expectations. Only
taking this simple approach can mitigate such anticipated movements before the
announcements. The same dates as in the above mentioned methodology are taken
here, too. The sign for the announcement is non-negative, meaning a positive
response is associated with a policy easing.
Results for new lending to both announcement shocks can be seen in Figure 5.7.
The blue straight lines depict the 68% probability bands for the rst announcement
variable (daily changes), while the red dotted lines show the bands for the second
8 The dates are taken from Rogers et al. (2014) and Hachula et al. (2016). Until August 2016
there were no further announcements, which would validate the addition of another event.
9 There are no contractionary announcements. Thus no event has been identied with a value
of -1.
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announcement methodology (binary values). Both estimations show a similar
pattern as the baseline specication for the reserves shock. For the rst three
months, responses are signicantly positive, while dying out quickly. Responses
to the other variables are also similar (not being reported here).
Figure 5.7: Announcement shocks on new lending
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Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
Shock 1 ( ) and Shock 2 ( ).
An alternative methodology applies spreads between long- and short-run
interest rates. Here, specically the dierence between the 12-month and 1-
month Euribor rate is considered. This term spread is supposed to decline with
enhanced forward guidance policies, as longer rates react considerably stronger
to announcements to keep interest rates low for a longer period of time, than
short-run rates (see ECB (2014b)). The term spread is added into the system
instead of the reserves variable and is restricted with a non-positive sign. All other
signs are as in the baseline specication (see Table 5.4). New lending is reacting
to this shock only in the impact period positively, which is due to the restriction
(see Figure 5.8). Without the restriction, new lending is insignicant throughout
all lags. All other variables are again similar in their response, instead that the
output variable is not reacting negatively signicant all throughout.
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Table 5.4: Sign restrictions for the shocks in the term spread estimation
IPI HICP Lending MIR EONIA Spread
UMP shock 0 0 ≥0 ≤0 0 ≤0
Figure 5.8: UMP shock using the term spread
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Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
Furthermore, a dierent approach of modelling UMPs is added. Generally,
there is the challenge of modelling standard and unconventional monetary policies
together. With policy rates approaching the zero lower bound, they no longer
contain information about the monetary policy stance. Thus, typically two
separate indicators have been applied to capture additional monetary policy
actions. One way, which is presented in the models before, is to use an indicator
for standard policy rate decisions (e.g. the EONIA rate) and to add another
indicator for unconventional measures (e.g. excess reserves).
Wu and Xia (2016) try to combine both policy measures by constructing a
single indicator which captures both kinds of monetary policies. It subscribes
amounts of quantitative and qualitative easing policies in a way to add them to
the policy rate once they reach the ZLB via a shadow rate term structure model
(SRTSM)|rst proposed by Black (1995). Since the UMPs provide the economy
with further monetary easing, their indicator can fall below the ZLB, to allow for
this structural break. They call their indicator the shadow rate. This indicator
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can then better capture the more expansionary monetary policy stance than only
taking the central bank renancing rate, which is constrained by the zero lower
bound (see Figure 5.9).
Figure 5.9: Shadow rate for the Euro area
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The benchmark model here is then estimated with the shadow rate as the only
policy tool, leading to a SVAR model with ve variables. The sign restrictions are
the same as in the baseline model for the other four variables. The sign for the
shadow rate is assumed to be non-positive, to also estimate a policy easing (see
Table 5.5). Results are again almost the same as for the other specications. New
lending reacts positively for the rst three periods and is insignicant afterwards
(see Figure 5.10). Output shrinks for the rst eight periods after the shock, while
ination is not reacting signicantly for the rst two years after the shock, and
becoming positive afterwards. Further, the lending and shadow rate are reacting
negatively, which is in line with the further monetary easing.
Table 5.5: Sign restrictions for the shocks in the shadow rate estimation
IPI HICP Lending MIR Shadow
UMP shock 0 0 ≥0 ≤0 ≤0
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Figure 5.10: UMP Shock using the shadow rate as the policy indicator
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Note: Impulse responses from an UMP easing shock. 68% condence intervals (2000 replications).
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Irrespective of the specic unconventional policy variable applied in this
section, lending reacts similarly to all of them. All responses of the other variables
are also qualitatively the same in comparison to the baseline specication.
5.5 Discussion
This chapter identies eects of the unconventional policy measures taken by the
European Central Bank after the Financial Crisis on bank lending on the basis of
a structural vector autoregressive model using sign restrictions. While taking some
improvements to the estimation set-up in contrast to the existing literature, it is
shown that the impact of the UMPs on bank lending had no signicant long-term
impact on new credit issuance. One reason is given by the application of the credit
variable. By taking a measure of the outstanding stock of credit, as previous
studies did, the response of lending to UMP shocks is signicantly greater, than
for the new lending variable. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that taking an
indicator as the monetary base or total central bank assets for unconventional
monetary policies could lead to distorted results.
Additionally, the mechanical money multiplier perspective could be refuted
from a theoretical standpoint and is also not conrmed by the empirical ndings.
The notion that bank lending can be driven by an over-allotment of reserves can
thus not be armed. Rather, the propositions as postulated by the endogenous
money view, that lenders still have to nd willing borrowers, even though they
might be excessively equipped with reserves, is endorsed in this chapter. There is
still a certain risk-reward analysis prior to loan extension at banks, to which the
cost of further acquisition of reserves plays only a minor role. Thus, by lowering
the price and increasing the availability of bank reserves, central banks are not
able to mechanically control private credit issuance.
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Although the unconventional monetary policies taken by the ECB were able to
lower market yields and provided balance sheet relieve, they did not signicantly
boost economic activity (at least in the short-run; see also Mallick (2017) for
similar ndings for the US) and bank lending. They probably had a stabilising
eect directly after the Financial Crisis, but were not really able to sustainably
aect economic activity in the long-run. This argument is also similarly stressed
by Goodhart and Ashworth (2012), for example.
Furthermore, bank lending in the Euro area remains subdued due to the fallouts
of the Financial Crisis. While the UMPs of the ECB have given banks some
balance sheet relief, they were not able to lift economic expectations suciently
to induce signicantly more bank lending. One major problem for banks after
the Financial Crisis was to nd willing borrowers. A reason for the lacking credit
demand can be seen in the deleveraging activities by many private and also
public sector agents, as they were still highly indebted for the most part. This
observation is also similar to the one Koo (2009) made for Japan and also stressed
for the Euro area in Koo (2011, 2013), that after a debt-induced recession, loan
origination cannot be jump-started by monetary policy to a large extent, since
many economic agents still try to pay down their debts (a so called Balance Sheet
Recession). Additionally, uncertainty about the recovery prevailed during the rst
years after the Financial Crisis subsequently constrained bank lending.
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Appendix A5
Table 5.6: Summary statistics for the baseline SVAR model
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
IPI 108 4.618 0.050 4.539 4.754
HICP 108 4.566 0.039 4.486 4.609
New Lending 108 4.420 0.207 4.143 4.900
Credit Stock 108 4.772 0.045 4.690 4.844
MFI Rate 108 0.030 0.011 0.017 0.057
EONIA 108 0.009 0.014 -0.003 0.043
Reserves 108 11.560 1.871 6.837 13.614
Monetary Base 108 14.093 0.250 13.637 14.569
MP Rate 108 0.012 0.013 0.001 0.043
Shadow Rate 108 0.001 0.022 -0.049 0.043
Spread 108 0.551 0.253 0.082 1.052
Announcement 108 -0.003 0.032 -0.219 0.144
Announcement2 108 0.250 0.435 0 1
2-yr Bund Rate 108 0.020 0.024 -0.004 0.136
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Figure 5.11: Standard monetary policy shock on new lending
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Note: Impulse responses from a standard monetary policy easing shock. 68% condence intervals
(2000 replications).
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Figure 5.12: Standard monetary policy shock on the credit stock
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Note: Impulse responses from a standard monetary policy easing shock. 68% condence intervals
(2000 replications).
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Wahrend der als Great Moderation benannten Phase der spaten 1980er bis zu den
fruhen 2000er Jahren setzte sich in weiten Teilen der akademischen Literatur die
Meinung durch, dass die Zeit von groen Wirtschaftskrisen uberwunden sei. Die
Zentralbanken hatten es scheinbar durch ihre geldpolitischen Manahmen geschat,
die Wirtschaft auf einen stabilen Wachstumspfad nahe dem Potentialwachstum
zu fuhren. Niedrige und stabile Inationsraten sowie weit weniger und schwachere
Rezessionsphasen schienen ein Indiz dafur zu sein.
Seit den spaten 1980er Jahren wurde den Zentralbanken die Hauptaufgabe
zugeschrieben fur eine niedrige und stabile Inationsrate zu sorgen. Diese Sta-
bilisierung allein, so schien es, wurde ausreichen, um fur ein schwankungsfreies
und dadurch nachhaltigeres Wirtschaftswachstum zu sorgen (siehe zum Beispiel
Bernanke (2004), oder Blanchard et al. (2013)).
Typischerweise nehmen Zentralbanken heutzutage uber die Steuerung
kurzfristiger Renanzierungszinssatze der Banken Einuss auf das Wirtschafts-
geschehen. Diese Renanzierungszinssatze dienen den Finanzmarktteilnehmern
als Leitlinie, nach der sich wiederum ihre Zinsen richten. Eine Erhohung oder
Senkung dieser Leitzinsen wirkt dabei dampfend beziehungsweise belebend auf
das Wirtschaftsgeschehen, und beeinusst somit wiederum die Inationsrate.
Die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse im Bezug auf die Wirkungskanale von Zentral-
bankmanahmen bedurfen jedoch einer Neubewertung im Zuge der Auswirkungen
der Globalen Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007/2008 (siehe zum Beispiel Boivin et al.
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(2010), oder Ramey (2016)). Notenbanken war es nach der Finanzkrise kaum noch
moglich durch ihre primare Politikmanahme Einuss auf den Konjunkturverlauf
zu nehmen, da die Leitzinsen in vielen Landern nahe, oder an die Nullzinsgrenze
gesenkt wurden. Die typische Transmission geldpolitischer Manahmen uber den
Zinskanal konnte somit nicht mehr gewahrleistet werden.
Durch das Zuruckgreifen auf gezielte Sondermanahmen, wie dem Bereitstellen
zusatzlicher Liquiditat, gezielten Wertpapieraufkaufen und/oder erweiterten Kom-
munikationspolitiken, erhoten sich die Zentralbanken zusatzliche Stimuli fur die
Wirtschaft zu erzeugen, um die negativen Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise abzu-
mildern. Die primaren Ziele lagen dabei auf einer Stabilisierung der Finanzmarkte
in der kurzen Frist sowie dem Setzen zusatzlicher Impulse in der mittleren Frist,
um die Kreditvergabe und somit das Wirtschaftswachstum wieder zu beleben.
Die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift setzt es sich, vor dem Hintergrund dieses
veranderten Manahmenkatalogs der Zentralbanken, zum Ziel, ein besseres
Verstandnis von Zentralbankpolitiken auf den Einuss der Wirtschaftssteuerung,
und hier vor allem auf die Kreditvergabe von Banken, zu vermitteln. So wird
der Frage nachgegangen, warum und wie sich Zentralbankmanahmen nach
der Finanzkrise in Bezug auf die Wirkungen der Neukreditvergabe verandert haben.
Zunachst wird in Kapitel (1) der Transmissionsprozess von Zentralbankma-
nahmen beschrieben. Hier liegt der Fokus, wie auch im Rest der Arbeit,
auf der geldpolitischen Transmission uber das Bankensystem. Bestimmte
Zentralbankpolitiken werden auf ihre Wirkungsweisen im Hinblick auf die
Kreditvergabe der Banken an die Privatwirtschaft untersucht. Dabei wird das
Hauptaugenmerk auf die veranderten Bedingungen nach der Globalen Finanzkrise
gelegt.
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Kapitel (2) unternimmt danach einen Erklarungsversuch, worin die Ursachen
des langfristigen Ruckgangs des allgemeinen Zinsniveaus in den entwickelten
Volkswirtschaften in den letzten vierzig Jahren begrundet liegen. Aufgrund
dieses sakularen Ruckgangs waren die Zinsen bereits vor der Finanzkrise auf
einem relativ niedrigen Niveau, welches den Zentralbanken nur noch begrenzte
Zinssenkungsspielraume zubilligte. Durch rasche Zinssenkungen nach dem Aus-
bruch der Finanzkrise wurden die Notenbanken vor die Herausforderung der
Nullzinsgrenze gestellt und sahen sich dadurch gezwungen ungewohnte Politik-
manahmen durchzufuhren.
In der Literatur nden sich diverse Grunde, warum das allgemeine Zinsniveau
bereits vor der Krise einen historisch fallenden Trend aufwies. Jedoch haben
bisherige Studien (siehe zum Beispiel IMF (2014), oder Rachel und Smith (2015)
fur einen Uberblick) den ausstehenden Kreditbestand einer Volkswirtschaft und
die daraus resultierende geringere Fahigkeit fur Zinszahlungen auer Acht gelassen.
Diese Lucke soll durch das Kapitel (2) geschlossen werden.
Die grundlegende Hypothese dieses Kapitels liegt in der Erkenntnis, dass das
Einlosen von Zinsversprechen an die Glaubiger von der angebotsseitigen Fahigkeit
abhangt, Zinszahlungen Erwirtschaften zu konnen. In der langen Frist kann
dies nachhaltig lediglich nur aus dem pro Periode erwirtschafteten Mehrwert
geschehen. Durch die gestiegene Verschuldung in den meisten Volkswirtschaften
in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten ist die Kapazitat, Zinszahlungen aus dem aktuell
erwirtschafteten Mehrwert zu leisten, jedoch deutlich zuruckgegangen. Da die
weiteren Faktoreinkommen|Gewinne und Dividenden aus unternehmerischer
Tatigkeit sowie Lohneinkommen|in den meisten entwickelten Volkswirtschaften
in den letzten vierzig Jahren nicht in dem Umfang zuruckgegangen sind, um
die gestiegenen Zinsforderungen durch die erhohte Menge an Schuldkontrakten
zu kompensieren, muss sich zwangsweise die durchschnittliche Zinszahlung pro
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Schuldkontrakt, sprich der durchschnittliche Zinssatz, verringern. Dies hat im
Umkehrschluss die Auswirkung, dass, solange die Wirtschaftssubjekte weder von
der Substanz leben, noch alte durch neue Schulden ablosen, noch die Schuldenhohe
im Vergleich zur Wirtschaftsleistung senken, die durchschnittliche Zinszahlung
pro Schuldkontrakt nicht steigen kann, ohne das andere Wirtschaftssubjekte,
im speziellen Unternehmer und Lohnarbeiter, auf ihren Teil des Mehrwertes
verzichten mussten. Zentralbanken sehen sich somit einer gewissen Restriktion im
Bezug auf ihrer Fahigkeit Leitzinsen zu erhohen, ohne potentiell ungewunschte
negative Nebenwirkungen zu verursachen, gegenuber.
Die theoretischen Erkenntnisse aus Kapitel (2) werden im zweiten Teil der
Arbeit, den Kapiteln (3) bis (5), aufgegrien, um anschlieend der Frage nachzuge-
hen, wie und ob es die Zentralbanken geschat haben, die Wirtschaft nach der
Finanzkrise durch ihre zusatzlichen Manahmen zu stabilisieren. Das Hauptau-
genmerk liegt dabei auf empirischen Schatzungen des Einusses der Geldpolitik
auf die Neukreditvergabe der Banken an die Realwirtschaft in der Eurozone.
Eine besondere Beachtung ndet dabei die Verwendung von Kreditgroen
in empirischen Untersuchungen zentralbankpolitischer Transmissionen uber
das Bankensystem. Die uberwiegende Mehrheit der empirischen Arbeiten zur
Frage des Einusses der Zentralbankpolitiken auf die Kreditvergabe verwendet
als Entscheidungsvariable die Bestandsgroe ausstehender Bankkredite. Bei
Fragestellungen, die sich mit dem Einuss der Zentralbankpolitik auf die
Kreditvergabe beschaftigen, ist die Anderung der Bestandsgroe jedoch nur mit
Einschrankungen geeignet, da sie nicht den genauen Betrag der neu ausgegeben
Kredite angibt. Neben der Neukreditvergabe beinhaltet die Veranderung des
Kreditbestands noch Informationen uber abgeschriebene und wertberichtigte
Kredite, Ruckzahlungen sowie Verbriefungen. Fur Zentralbanken ist es bei der
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Beurteilung der Transmission ihrer Politiken auf die Kreditvergabe aber von
Interesse, wie sich die heutige und zukunftige Neukreditvergabe entwickeln wird,
denn diese bewirkt unmittelbare Anderungen im realwirtschaftlichen Sektor.
Wie sich der Bestand bereits ausgereichter Kredite verandert, ist dabei von
nachrangigem Interesse.
Das Kapitel (3) geht dieser Erkenntnis aus einer theoretischen Sichtweise
nach. Die einzelnen Posten der Anderung des Kreditbestands werden einer
kritischen Analyse zu ihrer Aussagekraft fur den Entscheidungsraum von Zen-
tralbanken sowie privaten Nachfragern und Anbietern auf Kreditmarkten un-
terzogen. Das Hauptergebnis liegt dabei in der Erkenntnis, dass die weiteren
Faktoren in der Anderung des Kreditbestandes sich zum uberwiegenden Teil den
Steuerungsmoglichkeiten von Zentralbanken entziehen. Zwar kann eine Zentral-
bank in gewissem Mae Einuss auf die Schaung neuer Kredite ausuben, jedoch
entzieht sich die weitere Verwendung bereits geschaener Kredite uberwiegend
ihrer Kontrolle. Aus empirischer Sicht besteht zudem das Problem, dass diese
weiteren Faktoren nur bedingt mit der Neukreditvergabe korreliert sind. Dies
impliziert, dass empirische Untersuchungen uber die Wirkungsweise der Zentral-
bankpolitik auf die Kreditvergabe diese deutlich uber- oder unterschatzen konnte,
wenn die Anderung des Kreditbestandes als relevante Kreditgroe Anwendung
ndet.
Ein Blick auf die stilisierten Fakten untermauert die theoretischen
Uberlegungen. Fur die USA ergibt sich im Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2015 zwischen
der Neukreditvergabe und der Anderung des Kreditbestands an kommerziellen und
industriellen Krediten an Unternehmen lediglich eine Korrelation von 0.30. Das
hat zur Folge, dass 70% der Anderung des Bestands nicht durch die Kreditneuver-
gabe erklart werden konnen. Fur die Eurozone ergibt sich im Zeitraum zwischen
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2003 und 2015 eine Korrelation von 0.46 fur Bankkredite an nichtnanzielle
Unternehmen. Insbesondere in hoch volatilen Zeiten, weicht die Anderung des
Kreditbestands noch deutlicher von der Hohe der Kreditneuvergabe ab.
Ein weiteres Problem in diesem Zusammenhang betrit das Timing. So
konnten Zentralbanken zu divergierenden Entscheidungen kommen, falls sie nur
auf die Anderung der Bestandsgroe bei ihren Politikentscheidungen schauen.
So entwickelte sich die Kreditvergabe in der Eurozone laut EZB Monatsbericht
vom Juni 2011 wie folgt: "Die Jahreswachstumsrate der MFI-Buchkredite an
den privaten Sektor ... folgte weiterhin einem moderaten Aufwartstrend; sie
stieg ... auf 2,6% im April" (ECB (2011b)). Obwohl die Bestandsgroe wuchs,
schrumpften die vergebenen Neukredite annualisiert um 11,2% im April 2011.
Diese Unterschiede liegen in einer Verlangsamung des Ruckgangs der Neukred-
itvergabe sowie in niedrigeren Abschreibungen und geringeren Wertminderungen
bzw. gestiegenen Werterhohungen des Kreditbestandes begrundet. Von den
beiden letztgenannten Einussfaktoren werden jedoch kaum groere Impulse
auf das Wirtschaftsgeschehen zu erwarten sein. Aufgrund der Betrachtung des
wachsenden Kreditbestands stellte die EZB im Juli 2011 fest, dass sich, unter
anderem aufgrund der gestiegenen Kreditvergabe, ein Preisdruck in der Eurozone
ergeben konnte (EZB (2011a)). Zum Teil gestutzt auf diese Feststellung sah sich
die EZB veranlasst den Leitzins im Juli 2011 um 0,25 Basispunkte zu erhohen.
Die Zentralbank hatte eventuell andere Schlussfolgerungen gezogen, wenn sie im
Gegensatz zum Anstieg des Kreditbestands den Fokus auf die weiter fallende
Neukreditvergabe gelegt hatte.
Das Kapitel (4) greift die in Kapitel (3) gewonnenen Erkenntnisse auf und
stellt eine empirische Untersuchung uber Einussgroen fur die Kreditvergabe an.
Hierbei werden Unterschiede in empirischen Schatzungen zwischen der Benutzung
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der Bestandskredite und der Kreditneuvergabe aufgezeigt. Das Ziel dieses Kapitels
ist es, Determinanten herauszuarbeiten, welche Kreditnehmer dazu bewegen einen
Kredit nachzufragen sowie Kreditgeber veranlassen einen Kredit auszugeben.
Hierfur werden verschiedene empirische Zeitreihenmodelle, ahnlich der
bereits vorhandenen Literatur, angewendet. Die uberwiegende Mehrheit der
Untersuchungen in der Literatur zieht den ausstehenden Bestand an Bankkrediten
als zu erklarende Variable heran (so zum Beispiel Bernanke und Blinder (1988,
1992), Kashyap und Stein (2000), Kishan und Opiela (2000), oder Lown und
Morgan (2006)). Die empirischen Untersuchungen anhand eines Panelmodells von
acht Landern der Eurozone innerhalb dieses Kapitels konnen aber zeigen, dass es
sowohl auf der Angebots-, wie auch auf der Nachfrageseite zu teilweise erheblichen
Abweichungen der Einussfaktoren fur die Kreditvergabe je nach angewendeter
Kreditvariable kommen kann. Zusatzlich konnen die Spezikationen mit der
Neukreditvergabe als abhangige Variable die zugrundeliegende Theorie besser
darstellen, als die Spezikationen mit der Bestandsgroe. Diese Ergebnisse haben
weitreichende Konsequenzen fur die Beurteilung der spezischen Einussfaktoren
der Neukreditvergabe sowie fur die Wirkungsweise des Transmissionsmechanismus
von Zentralbankpolitiken uber das Bankensystem.
Ein Hauptziel der nach der Finanzkrise von der EZB durchgefuhrten Sonder-
manahmen war die Forderung der Kreditvergabe in der Eurozone. Aus diesem
Grund wird in Kapitel (5) eine Untersuchung der Wirksamkeit dieser unkonven-
tionellen Manahmen auf die Neukreditvergabe der nichtnanziellen Unternehmen
im Euroraum anhand eines strukturellen vektorautoregressiven Modells vorgenom-
men. Der uberwiegende Teil der bisherigen Literatur konnte herausnden, dass
diese Manahmen einen positiv, signikanten Einuss auf die Kreditvergabe haben
(siehe zum Beispiel Peersman (2011) und Gambacorta et al. (2014)). Jedoch be-
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nutzen diese Studien den Kreditbestand als relevante Kreditgroe. Wie in Kapitel
(3) ausgefuhrt, kann diese Variable nur unzureichend die Hohe der tatsachlichen
Neukreditvergabe wiedergeben. Dies kann bei der in diesem Kapitel bearbeiteten
Fragestellung zu divergierenden Ergebnissen fuhren.
Durch die Verwendung der Neukreditvergabe als relevante Kreditgroe kann
gezeigt werden, dass die unkonventionellen Manahmen nicht die wie in bisherigen
Studien gezeigte strikt positive Wirkung auf die Kreditvergabe entfalten konnten.
Zwar steigt die Neukreditvergabe auf einen unkonventionellen Politikschock, diese
positive Wirkung halt aber nur in der kurzen Frist an.
Zusammenfassend zeigt die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift auf, dass
Zentralbankmanahmen in den Jahren nach der Globalen Finanzkrise nicht
in dem Umfang auf die Kreditvergabe wirken, wie sie noch vor der Krise zu
beobachten waren. Eine Ursache wird in einer zu starken Verschuldung der
Wirtschaftsakteure gesehen, welche wesentlich zum vorherrschenden Niedrigzin-
sumfeld beigetragen hat. Zusatzlich ist es bei der Betrachtung des Einusses
von Zentralbankmannahmen auf die Kreditvergabe geboten, den tatsachlichen
Betrag der Neukreditvergabe, anstatt die Anderung des Kreditbestandes als
Entscheidungsvariable heranzuziehen.
Auf eine Diskussion uber potentielle Nebeneekte der unkonventionellen
Manahmen, wie zum Beispiel eines moglichen Verlustes der politischen Un-
abhangigkeit von Zentralbanken, den Einuss auf Vermogenspreisination, oder
Vermogens- und Einkommensverteilungen, sowie einer Problemanalyse bestimmter
Ausstiegsstrategien aus den unkonventionellen Manahmen, wird dabei bewusst
verzichtet, da diese uber das Ziel der Arbeit, namlich dem aufzeigen der Wirkungen
von Zentralbankpolitiken auf die Neukreditvergabe, deutlich hinaus gehen wurde.
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